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Abstract
This study investigates the reported operating performance of Chinese IPOs 
(Initial Public Offerings) before and after the IPO. It shows that Chinese IPOs 
report a significant decline in operating performance relative to the pre-IPO level, 
in terms of Return on Assets (ROA) and Operating Cashflow on Assets (CFO).
Importantly, the study explores the explanations for the operating performance 
from before to after the IPO. It starts with testing the ‘Managerial Ownership 
Dispersion Hypothesis’. However, there is no evidence that the decline in reported 
operating performance of Chinese IPO firms is associated with the change in 
managerial ownership from before to after the IPO. Managers in Chinese listed 
firms hold a very small percentage of ownership, which is too small to make any 
effective impact on corporate operating performance, and there is no significant 
decrease in the post-IPO managerial ownership relative to the pre-IPO managerial 
ownership. So, in this sense, Chinese IPO data cannot provide empirical evidence 
to support the Managerial Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis, which is conjectured 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
This study also tests the ‘Earnings Management Hypothesis’ to explain the 
operating performance decline of Chinese IPOs from before to after the IPO. There 
is significant evidence that Chinese IPO firms manipulate accruals so as to boost 
pre-IPO reported earnings. Besides accruals manipulation, this study further 
investigates related party transactions (RPTs) around the IPO. The findings show 
that related party transactions between IPO firms and controlling shareholders 
have significant effects on reported operating performance of IPO firms. The 
abnormally high reported operating performance in the pre-IPO period is positively 
associated with the size of operating RPTs (non-loan) between controlling
shareholders and IPO firms in the pre-IPO period. Evidently, controlling 
shareholders significantly structure artificial operating RPTs to boost revenues 
and/or profits of their IPO subsidiaries. However, in the post-IPO period, controlling 
shareholders discontinue these RPT-based manipulative practices, and begin to 
expropriate IPO subsidiaries by obtaining cash loans from IPO subsidiaries, 
primarily in return for profits and/or resources transferred into IPO subsidiaries in 
the pre-IPO period (Cheng et al., 2007). The post-IPO operating performance is 
negatively associated with the size of such loans by IPO firms to controlling 
shareholders in the post-IPO period.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Recent years have seen a large number of research studies made on companies’ 
going public in both developed markets and emerging markets. The majority of 
previous literature on IPO activity attempt to develop the theories or identify the 
evidence in three aspects: why firms go public, why they reward first-day investors 
with considerable underpricing, and how IPOs perform in the long run (Ritter and 
Welch, 2002).
The first question must be ‘why do firms go public?’ In most cases, the primary 
answer is the desire to raise equity capital for the firm and to create a public market 
in which the founders and other shareholders can convert some of their wealth into 
cash at a future date. Non-financial reasons, such as increased publicity, also play 
a minor role for most firms (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Public trading has costs and 
benefits. Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) point out that a high public price can 
attract product market competition. Public trading, however, can, in itself, add 
value to the firm, as it may inspire more faith in the firm from other investors, 
customers, creditors, and suppliers. Being the first in an industry to go public 
sometimes confers a first-mover advantage.
The second question ‘why are firms underpriced in the short run?’ receives much 
attention for academics, since Stoll and Curley (1970) first document a systematic 
increase from the offer price to the first day closing price in the US market. If
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investors are more informed than the issuer, then the issuer faces a placement 
problem. The issuer faces an unknown demand for its stock and does not know the 
price the market is willing to bear. So. observed (successful) IPOs thus are 
necessarily underpriced (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Baron (1982) offers an 
agency-based explanation for underpricing, which also has the issuer less 
informed, but relative to its underwriter. To induce the underwriter to put in the 
requisite effort to market shares, it is optimal for the issuer to permit some 
underpricing, because the issuer cannot monitor the underwriter without cost. 
Some theories of underpricing do not rely on asymmetric information. Tinic (1988) 
argue that issuers underprice to reduce their legal liability, because an offering that 
is priced at $20 and starts trading at $30 is less likely to be sued than if it had been 
priced at $30, but trades at $20.
Since the 1990’s, many studies have been made on the third question ‘how do 
firms perform in the long run?’ both in developed markets and in emerging markets. 
Although substantially underpriced, IPO stocks often underperform the market in 
the long-term horizon. For example, Ritter (1991) and Lough ran and Ritter (1995) 
find that US companies issuing stock, whether IPO or SEOs, have been poor 
long-time investments for investors. This market inefficiency has been further 
confirmed by using international (non-US) evidences, for example UK (Levis, 
1993), Germany (Ljungqvist, 1997), Japan (Cai and Wei, 1997), Canada (Kooli 
and Suret, 2003) and many others.
Previous studies on IPO long-run performance show that long-run return 
underperformance is often accompanied by poor post-IPO financial accounting 
performance. Jain and Kini (1994) study 682 US IPOs from 1976 to 1988 and 
argue that US IPO firms exhibit a decline in the post-issue operating performance, 
as measured by the operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated 
by assets, relative to pre-IPO level, both before and after industry adjustment.
Mikkelson et al. (1997) also confirm that median operating return on assets, or 
median operating return on sales, declines from the year before the offerings to the 
end of the first year of public trading by 283 US companies which got listed from 
1980 to 1983, but operating performance declines no further in ten years. They 
argue that companies making IPOs experience unusually high measures of 
operating performance in the year before the offerings.
Recent studies on developed markets indicate that the lack of operating 
performance of IPO firms might be associated with the agency problems described 
in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Public equity offerings normally lead to a more 
diversified ownership and the percentage of managerial ownership will decline. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the costs of deviation from value 
maximisation rise as management ownership declines, so that the long-term 
post-IPO performance may be negatively affected due to the deviation.
Another possible reason of the lack of post-issue operating performance is that 
pre-issue operating performance may have been exaggerated. According to 
accrual-based accounting principles, accounting earnings can be divided into 
cashflow component and accruals component. In comparison to cashflow 
component, accruals component is more likely to be manipulated by the 
management than cash flow component is (Benerish, 2001), since managers are 
able to control accruals component at their own discretion. In this sense, managers 
may manipulate accruals to boost earnings in the pre-IPO year. Firms with better 
historical earnings performance would normally find it easier to float on the stock 
market, and perhaps offer the stocks with a higher IPO price, if investors do not 
see through the earnings manipulative schemes. However, in the post-IPO period, 
the reversal of the accruals is unavoidable, and it will negatively affect earnings 
performance of IPO firms. Empirically, Teoh et al. (1998) study 1649 US IPO firms 
going public from 1980 to 1992 and find that discretionary current accruals, which
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are under the control of management and proxy for earnings management, are 
high before the IPO relative to those of non-issuers. Issuers with higher 
discretionary accruals have poorer performance in the subsequent three years. So, 
the aftermarket operating performance is associated with the use of accrual-based 
earnings management, or say, accruals management.
1.2 Motivation of this Research
Basically, this research is an earnings management study. It investigates how IPO 
firms manipulate reported operating performance in the pre-IPO period. Prior 
literature (Teoh et al., 1998; Roosenboom et al., 2003) shows that IPO firms may 
abuse the use of accruals to boost pre-IPO reported operating performance. 
However I further argue that besides accrual-based earnings management, IPO 
firms may engage in some other earnings manipulative schemes through related 
party transactions to boost pre-IPO reported operating performance.
As pointed out by Gordon et al. (2004), there is little rigorous academic research in 
prior literature that describes the extent of related party transactions in companies 
or investigates their underlying nature. Perhaps, one of the reasons is that, in 
western countries, related party transactions are strictly constrained by the laws 
and regulations, for example, US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) prohibits personal 
loans to executives and non-executive board members, due to recent corporate 
scandals. However, in Asian countries, like China, related party transactions 
between listed firms and controlling shareholders (and/or board members, top 
management) are legal, and, in fact, Chinese firms report a large percentage of 
RPTs with controlling shareholders. So, Chinese market provides a good research 
opportunity to study this RPT-based earnings management. Some recent studies 
on Chinese markets (Jian and Wong, 2004; Liu and Lu. 2004) have highlighted 
that Chinese listed firms may abuse the use of related party transactions for
opportunistic purposes like avoiding being de-listed and rights issues. However, no 
study has been made on Chinese IPO market to examine RPT-based earnings 
management.
This research establishes a new theoretical framework to explain the decline in 
IPO reported operating performance combining both accrual-based and 
RPT-based earnings management. It further provides empirical evidence for the 
theoretical argument that related party transactions are also contributing to the 
change in the operating performance from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO 
period, particularly for the emerging stock market in China. The most important 
contribution of this research is that, as to my best knowledge, this is the first study 
to investigate the effects of RPT (related party transactions) activities on IPO firms’ 
reported operating performance in the long run.
1.3 Organisation of the Research
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: the next two chapters (2 and 3) 
include a summary of literatures review, which is followed by a brief introduction of 
Chinese stock market and Chinese IPOs. The chapter 4 develops the hypotheses. 
Chapter 5 and 6 presents variables measurements and data collection & 
descriptive statistics respectively. Chapter 7 presents regression models. Chapter 
8, 9 and 10 discuss empirical results and test the three hypotheses. The last 
chapter (11) concludes the findings.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
Generally speaking, what leads to the change in reported operating performance 
of IPO companies after the public offerings has not been fully explored. Some 
researchers (Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Kim et al., 2004) argue 
that the decline in the long-term post-IPO operating performance is probably 
associated with agency problems described in Jensen and Meckling (1976). A 
second source of prior studies claims that pre-IPO operating performance may 
have been artificially inflated (Teoh et al., 1998; Roosenboom et al., 2003).
2.1 Theoretical Literature
2.1.1 Hypothesis of Interest Alignment
2.1.1.1 Agency Theory: an Overview
Agency problem that arises when cooperating parties have different goals and 
division of labour became one of the most important research focuses in financial 
literature. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent. The relationship between the stockholders 
and the managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship. 
The agency problems arise because of the impossibility of perfectly contracting for 
every possible action of an agent whose decisions affect both his own welfare and 
the welfare of the principal (Brennan, 1995).
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The agency literature addresses two typical forms of agency problems; adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The adverse selection problem, first noted by Akeriof 
(1970), arises because of pre-contractual information asymmetries. In the famous 
‘Market for Lemons’, Akeriof (1970) describes the circumstances of the now 
well-known ‘lemons’ problem where low quality goods can drive out high quality 
goods, since the sellers would sell ‘lemons’ (bad cars) to naive customers, and sell 
‘cherries’ (good cars) to knowledge customers. Moreover, the buyers will learn to 
presume that all or most used cars are ‘lemons’. This depresses the price of used 
cars, so that even more of the ‘cherries’ are held off the market. Adverse selection 
is also widely used in insurance industry, where the buyers of insurance are the 
group of the people often with private information about their personal situation. So, 
these more discerning customers expect to receive a higher than average level of 
benefits from the insurance companies.
Moral hazard is usually referred to as the lack of efforts and the risk of opportunism 
behaviours on the side of the agent. Moral hazard was also originated in the 
insurance industry, where it is referred to as the tendency of insurance buyers to 
change their behaviours in the ways that lead to larger claims against the 
insurance company. Moral hazard problems may arise in any situation in which the 
agent is tempted to take an inefficient action for self-interest seeking purposes and 
so on, because the agent’s interest is not aligned with the principal’s interest and 
the action has not been exactly monitored.
As Michael Jensen (1983) points out, agency theory can be distinguished into two 
branches: ‘normative theory of agency’ and ‘positive theory of agency". Both of 
them address the same problem, namely, the analysis of contracting problems 
between self-interested parties with divergent interests and the minimisation of the 
costs generated by these contracting problems. However, each of them uses 
different approaches and focuses on different aspects of the problem. Normative
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theory, which Jensen (1983) labels ‘principal-agent literature,’ is generally 
mathematical and non-empirical and focuses on informational aspects of the 
problem and how these aspects affect the form of the contract and how the costs 
generated by these informational aspects of the contract can be minimised. The 
other branch (Fama, 1980; Padilla, 2005) labelled ‘positive theory of agency’ is 
generally non-mathematical and empirically oriented and focuses in particular on 
the effects of market and institutional mechanisms that affect the contracting 
process.
The two branches of agency theory should consequently be considered 
complementary. As Jensen observes, the mathematical approach of the 
principal-agent literature offers little insight to explain the rich variety of observed 
contracting practices, and in particular, when it comes to analysing the effects of 
market and institutional mechanisms in the forms of contracts. On the other hand, 
positive theory of agency literature appears to offer better insights to explain the 
variety of contracting practices and how market mechanisms affect the contracting 
process. This positive theory is also more likely to produce practical conclusions in 
terms of economic policy.
There are plentiful studies that have been conducted in the field of positive agency 
theory. For example, keeping an effective level of management shareholdings is 
the primary mechanism to alleviate the concerns of agency conflicts, since Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that along with the increase of the managerial 
ownership, managers’ incentive to reach the value-maximisation of the company 
also increases (Table 2-1). As indicated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
managerial ownership is the basic way of controlling agency conflicts and keeping 
the interest of managers closely aligned with shareholders’ interest.
However, in modern corporations, particularly large ones, managers may not be
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able to maintain large stakes of the companies. So, an appropriate executive 
compensation package (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and a sound corporate 
governance mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 1983) would be established to control 
agency conflicts. Moreover, prior studies find that the external control of 
corporations also serves as important mechanism to control the agency problems 
as well. Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that, when a 
manager only owns a smaller stake, he is still disciplined toward firm value 
maximisation by the market forces such as the managerial labour market (Fama,
1980), and the corporate control market (Jensen, 1986). Table 2-1 presents major 
mechanisms of controlling agency conflicts identified in prior literature.
2.1.1.2 Manacterial Ownership Incentives
A managerial ownership incentive is one of major mechanisms to control the 
agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the costs of deviation 
from value maximisation rise as management ownership declines. The interests of 
managers and shareholders diverge as managers’ stakes decrease and 
ownership is dispersed. As their stakes decline, managers pay a smaller share of 
these costs and are more likely to squander corporate wealth. In a high information 
asymmetry environment, managers may indulge preferences for non-value 
maximising behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Since the managerial entrenchment hypothesis emerges, the relationship between 
ownership and corporate performance becomes mixed and more complicated. 
The entrenchment hypothesis is nicety explicit: ‘Managerial entrenchment occurs 
when managers gain so much power that they are able to use the firm to further 
their own interests rather than the interests o f shareholders' (Weisbach, 1988). 
When a manager controls a substantial fraction of the firm's equity, he can 
entrench himself from these market disciplines. With effective control, the manager
may indulge in non-value-maximising behaviours such as high salary and empire 
building. It suggests companies’ performance may be adversely affected for some 
range of managerial ownership stakes.
Therefore, Morck et al. (1988) offer a combined theory of the relationship between 
management ownership and corporate performance. Morck et ai. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) document how these two offsetting forces are 
realized in real firms. After investigating 371 companies of Fortune 500 (1980), 
Morck et al. (1988) find that market valuation rises as board ownership increases 
from 0% to 5%, falls as ownership rises further to 25%, and then continues to rise, 
although much more slowly, as board ownership rises beyond 25%. These results 
also apply individually to the ownership by the firm ’s top officers and its outside 
board members. They provide the interpretation that the increases of Tobin’s 
with ownership reflect the convergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders, while the decline reflects entrenchment of the management team. 
However, they also point out that the theoretical arguments alone couldn’t predict 
the relationship between ownership and performance, especially with regard to 
determining the managerial ownership turning points where managerial incentives 
will switch from alignment to entrenchment, and back again to alignment.
Subsequently, Short and Keasey (1999) follow Morck et al. (1988) theoretical 
model and conduct a new empirical design by using UK established public 
companies. They argue that a cubic model better describes the transition from 
alignment to entrenchment and back again to alignment. The coefficients on 
ownership and ownership-cubed are expected to be positive, while the coefficient 
on ownership-squared is expected to be negative. They provide results consistent
 ^ A ratio devised by James Tobin, who hypothesises the combined market value of all the companies on the 
stock market should be about equal to their replacement costs. The Q ratio is calculated as the market value of 
a company divided by the replacement value of the firm's assets.
with Morck et al. (1988), and their empirical approach allows the data to determine 
its own turning points. Specifically, they find an entrenchment effect when 
managerial ownership is between 16% and 42%, but an alignment-of-interest 
effect is found otherwise (i.e. <16% or >42%).
2.1.1.3 Managerial Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis
Public equity offering is a financing decision, which will affect the IPO firm in many 
ways, not only in the financial situation, but also in the aspect of ownership 
structure and corporate governance as well. The fundamental purposes of an IPO 
are to raise funds from the market, and/or liquidise entrepreneur’s stakes. 
Meanwhile, securities authorities also impose heavy legal compliance and 
reporting requirements on pre-IPO firms, such as governance requirements etc. In 
a typical IPO, firms will sell their new shares to the public, and, in this sense, the 
dilution of an entrepreneur’s stakes cannot be avoided, and the ownership 
structure of the firms is transited to be more diversified, relative to pre-IPO level.
Since the percentage of manager's stakes is diluted and ownership becomes more 
disperse, the conflict between managers and other stockholders may arise, as 
depicted in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Public listing may heighten the conflicts 
of interest between managers and shareholders, and as a result, managers may 
deviate from the value-maximising goal, so that companies’ operating 
performance in the long run may be negatively affected by the deviation from value 
maximisation.
2.1.2 Hypothesis of Earnings Management
The origin of earnings management research can date back to the 1970’s. In the 
1970’s and early 1980’s, a large number of studies investigate the determinants of
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accounting choices, in order to figure out if managers alter reported earnings for 
their own benefits. These studies provide evidence consistent with managers’ 
incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and 
contractual contexts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Since the mid-1980’s, studies 
of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals, 
because researchers assume that accruals component is more likely to be 
manipulated by the management than cash flow component Is (Benerish, 2001). 
However, in this study, I argue that accrual-based earnings management is only 
one source of earnings management.
2.1.2.1 Definition of Earninas Management
Generally, there are two widely quoted definitions of earnings management:
1. (Schipper, 1989) Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain.
2. (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.
The two definitions above do not have large discrepancies. Both of the definitions 
above show that earnings management is the purposeful behaviour of altering 
financial reports to reap the private benefits. Compared to Schipper (1989), the 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) definition gives more details on potential ways of 
earnings management and incentives to manipulate earnings. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) definitely indicate that firms could manage earnings by structuring
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transactions, besides managing accruals. In fact, there are several potential ways 
of manipulating earnings by structuring transactions, particularly with related 
parties and/or partners:
Firstly, firms may make fake transactions with their related parties to artificially 
boost their sales and revenues, by overselling goods, products and services to 
related parties. Sometimes, firms may also sell the products at a price higher than 
market price, which then sell the products to an external party at market price; then 
the profits would be shifted from related parties to the firms. For example. 
Coca-Cola typically has large ownership stakes and board seats in its bottlers. It 
historically has used the influential relationship with its bottlers to charge a price 
higher than the market price for the concentrate sold to bottlers and eventually 
boost its profits (McKay, 2002).
Secondly, firms may engage in channel stuffing by forcing distributors to purchase 
higher than normal inventories levels, so as to inflate the manufacturers’ sales and 
profits for the current period. For example Bristol-Myers Squibb, a US drug 
producer, was investigated by the SEC and the Justice Department for its admitted 
practice of channel stuffing and boosted its profits in 2001 (Harris and Lublin, 2002). 
For many years, the firm lured wholesalers into buying more drugs than needed to 
meet patient demand. While the channel stuffing activities in 2001 boosted profits 
in 2001, profits were sharply lower in 2002. In most cases, firms engaging into 
channel stuffing have influential relationship with their distributors, and they 
sometimes keep considerably large ownership stakes and/or board sets in its 
distributors.
Thirdly, some other approaches may also be available: firms may manage 
earnings by setting up special purpose entities, for example, the well-known case 
of Enron scandal (Emshwiller and Smith, 2002).
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The cases above illustrate that accrual-based earnings management is just one 
source of earnings management. Besides accrual manipulation, firms may further 
engage in earnings management through other approaches. In this research, I will, 
first of all, investigate managers’ discretionary exercise of managing accruals, 
which is the behaviour of accrual-based earnings management, and then try to 
study an additional source of earnings management technique, specifically related 
party transactions.
2.1.2.2 Accrual-based Earnings Management
Accruals are defined as the difference between reported earnings and cashflow 
from operation. It could further be broken up into non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals:
Reported Earnings - Cash flow  fro m  operations + Total accruals
Total accruals = D iscre liona iy  accruals + Non-discretionary accruals
Non-discretionary accruals are accounting adjustments to the firm ’s cash flows 
mandated by accounting standard-setting bodies. Discretionary accruals are 
adjustments to cash flows selected by the managers. Most prior researchers 
believe that adjustments of discretionary accruals become a convenient way to 
manage reported earnings, since the nature of accrual-based accounting gives 
managers a great deal of discretion in determining the actual earnings a firm 
reports in any given period. The opportunities for managing accruals are provided 
by GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and are supposed to handle 
differences in business structures and keep pace with business innovations (Levitt, 
1998): however, the discretion allowed in recording accruals gives rise to earnings 
management behaviour. For example, management has considerable control over
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- clean surplus principle means that the change in net book value of equity equals net profit minus net 
dividends
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the timing of actual expense items (e.g., advertising expenses or outlays for j
i
research and development). They can, to some extent, alter the timing of I
recognition of revenues and expenses by advancing recognition of sales revenue 
through credit sales, or delaying recognition of losses by waiting to establish loss 
reserves (Teoh et al., 1998). So, prior earnings management studies, unless 
specifically defined, are referred to as accrual-based earnings management.
Accruals are the principal product of GAAP. If clean surplus principle^ holds, 
accruals will total zero over the long run because the sum of earnings must equal 
the sum of cash flows over the life of business. Consequently, any 
higher-than-normal accruals in one period must be offset by lower-than-normal 
accruals in other period. That is to say, issuers may report unusually high earnings 
at the pre-IPO years by adopting discretionary accounting accrual adjustments 
that raise reported earnings relative to actual cash flows, but sooner or later, 
managers have to reverse accruals in a subsequent period. Once the firms reverse 
accruals, their performance would seem to be much 'poorer' than before the 
reversal. Thus, these IPO firms may underperform their industry peers in the stock 
market.
Recent earnings management studies identify conditions for the occurrence of 
earnings management and rationalise its presence by using an agency framework.
The debate on the influence of governance mechanisms on the quality of financial 
statements has its origin in the separation of ownership and control, which creates 
asymmetries between the interests of managers and shareholders (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). in many companies, managers are compensated both 
directly (in terms of salary and bonus) and indirectly (in terms of prestige, future 
promotions, and job security) depending on a firm ’s earnings performance relative
to some pre-established benchmark. It may be in their self-interest to give the 
appearance of better performance through earnings management so as to meet 
those stipulated in the contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This combination 
of management’s discretion over reported earnings and the effect these earnings 
have on their compensation leads to a potential agency problem.
Further, sound corporate governance mechanisms may be able to mitigate the 
agency problem caused by earnings management. Fama and Jensen (1983) and 
Shivadasani (1993) assert outside directors have incentives to develop reputations 
as experts in decision control and monitoring ability. Outside board members 
alleviate agency conflicts between shareholders and upper management, for 
example managers maximising their own utility at the expense of the shareholder 
through the consumption of perquisites, the selection of suboptimal investments, 
or opportunistic financial statements (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Amihud and Lev,
1981). Klein (2002) argues, by being financially independent of management, 
independent directors have the ability to withstand pressure from the firm to 
manipulate earnings. Shareholders benefit from director monitoring in that it 
maximises their shareholder wealth and facilitates a liquid secondary market for 
their securities.
2.1.2.3 RPT Practices and RPT-based Earnings Management
International Accounting Standards (IAS 24.9) define a related party transaction as 
‘a transfer o f resources, services, or obligations between related parties, 
regardless o f whether a price is charged. Parties are considered to be related if 
one party has the ability to control the other party or to exercise significant 
influence or jo in t control over the other party in making financial and operating 
decisions’.
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Related party transactions among group members can be cost-effective, because 
they help reduce transaction costs and enhance the enforcement of property rights 
and contracts (Coase, 1937). For firms, trade and foreign investment is often 
facilitated by inter-company financing transactions. Lower costs of capital and tax 
savings provide a strong incentive for engaging in these transactions. Coase (1937) 
argue that a firm is established when the cost of coordination within the firm is 
smaller than that of price mechanism can be extended to a group context. When 
external markets are not well developed, the formation of groups can help to 
improve efficiency and communication, identify and lock in partners, establish 
long-term business relations, reduce the environmental uncertainty (Cook. 1977), 
and increase member firms’ market power. The efficiency transaction hypothesis 
further shows that related party transactions efficiently fulfil underlying economic 
needs of the company (Gorden et al., 2004).
j
However, regulators, market participants, and other corporate stakeholders j
commonly regard these RPTs as potential conflicts of interest that can I
compromise management's agency responsibility to shareholders or a board of i
director's monitoring function (Gorden et al., 2004). These similar views about
related party transactions, also referred to as the conflict of interest hypothesis, are
consistent with agency concerns considered by Bede and Means (1932) and
Jensen and Meckling (1976). McCahery and Vermeuien (2005) also argue that a '
key concern about related party transactions is that they might not be undertaken
at market prices but can be influenced by the relationship between the two sides of
a transaction: there is a conflict of interest for some person in the company. For
both controlling shareholders and insiders such as management, related party
transactions can be the mechanism for extracting private benefits of control at the
cost of other shareholders. To be specific, Thomas et al. (2004) show that
controlling shareholders may like to structure transactions with their subsidiaries
and achieve income-reporting objectives of parent statements. For example,
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Coca-Cola, as discussed earlier, historically has used the RPTs with its bottlers to 
boost its profits and reach the pre-established operating targets (McKay, 2002).
If external capital markets could perfectly observe the manager’s investment 
actions and effort, there would be no need for corporate governance mechanisms 
to help monitor the manager, as one could construct perfect penalties to preclude 
non-value maximising behaviour. But, under the conflicts of interest hypothesis, 
related party transactions compromise management's agency responsibility to 
shareholders or a board of director's monitoring function. In such a case, related 
party transactions would be more prevalent when a firm's corporate governance 
mechanisms are weak (Gorden et al., 2004). Corporate governance issues arise, 
because of asymmetric information problems between external capital markets 
and the firm ’s managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Because of the potential conflicts of interest caused by related party transactions, 
in many countries, like the US, the laws constrained RPTs involving managers and 
directors (Clark, 1986). Recent US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) further limits the 
types of related party transactions in which companies can engage, prohibiting 
personal loans to executives and directors. It consequently alleviates the concerns 
of agency conflicts associated with RPTs, since RPT practices are now very rare in 
the US markets. In this sense, globally, there is little research, neither theoretically 
nor empirically, made on related party transactions (Gordon et al., 2004). Flowever, 
for the emerging markets, RPT practices are still freely adopted and as a result 
there is a continuing agency concern of RPTs. For example, recent studies reveal 
that Chinese firms are likely to conduct abusive related party transactions for 
earnings management purposes (Jian and Wong, 2004), mainly because of their 
weak corporate governance (Liu and Lu, 2004). It would be very interesting to 
make a contribution to the literature, by exploring the RPT-based earnings 
management in emerging markets.
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2.1.2.4 Relation between Accrual-based and RPT-based Earnings Manapement
The above discusses two approaches to manipulate earnings: accrual-based and 
RPT-based. Accrual-based approach is often the first source of earnings 
management available to the manager, because the manager is able to fully 
control the discretionary accruals component at his own discretion. However 
RPT-based approach has to be conducted with a related party willing for such 
transactions. So, firms may engage in either accrual-based approach or 
RPT-based approach to manipulate reported earnings for income-reporting 
objectives. In a country, like the US, RPT-based earnings management is less 
frequently adopted, since RPTs are strictly scrutinised by external reviewers 
and/or market regulators. But, in a post-communist country, like China, RPT-based 
approach may be conducted on a frequent basis, as well as accrual-based 
approach.
It is important to recognise that RPT-based earnings management is different from 
accrual-based earnings management:
Firstly, firms engage in accrual-based earnings management by borrowing from 
either the past or the future, for example, indulging in opportunistic behaviours in 
accounting method choices and discretionary estimates, but the total earnings 
over the long run could not be manipulated. The abuse of using discretionary 
accruals to manage reported earnings should be reversed sooner or later in a 
subsequent period. However, RPT-based earnings management occurs between 
two related parties by injecting valuable assets and/or shifting profits from one 
party to the other party. However, the profitability of the economic entity as a whole 
remains generally unaffected (Thomas et al. 2004).
Secondly, most importantly, accrual-based approach is to merely manipulate the
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accruals component of reported earnings, and it has nothing to do with the 
cashflow component of reported earnings. That is to say, this approach will never 
affect firms’ cashflow performance. However, RPT-based approach may be able to 
have an effect on either accruals component or cashflow component of reported 
earnings. For example, a firm may artificially structure sales relationship with its 
related party by accelerating credit sales without paying for the goods and services 
in cash. In this case, the firm ’s cashflow performance will not be affected by this 
manipulative practice, so that we can say the firm engages in an accrual-based 
earnings management practice through its related party. If, otherwise, its related 
party makes the cash payment for the goods and services transferred, the firm ’s 
cashflow performance will be artificially inflated, and it is no longer an 
accrual-based earnings management practice. This distinction is very useful to 
detect whether there is any manipulative scheme other than accrual-based 
approach to boost firm ’s operating performance by further examining the cashflow 
component of reported earnings.
2 .1.3 Expropriating Listed Subsidiaries through RPTs
Related party transactions may also be associated with the expropriation of the 
subsidiaries. Recent US corporate scandals have highlighted the extensive 
misuse of related party transactions and the opportunities to expropriate resources 
out of related parties. In the example of Adelphia, the company engaged in 
extensive related party transactions such that the controlling family members’ 
dealings with the listed company have been characterized as ‘using the company 
as the Rigas family's personal piggy bank, at the expense o f public investors and 
creditors' (Feeney^, 2002).
According to Claessens et al. (1999), expropriation is ‘the process o f using one's
29
control powers to maximize own welfare and redistribute wealth from others'. 
Johnson et al. (2000) use the term 'tunnelling', coined originally to characterise the 
expropriation of minority shareholders (removing resources through an 
underground tunnel), to describe the transfer of assets and profits out of listed 
firms for the benefit of the controlling shareholders.
Expropriation is highly associated with legal protection of minority investors, 
because investor protection makes expropriation technology less efficient (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2002). At the extreme of no investor protection, 
the insiders can steal a firm ’s assets perfectly efficiently. As investor protection 
improves, the insiders must engage in more distorted and wasteful diversion 
practices to channel resources. When investor protection is very good, the most 
that insiders can do is to overpay themselves, put relatives in management, and 
undertake some wasteful projects. As the ‘diversion technique’ becomes less 
effective, the insiders expropriate less, and their private benefits of control diminish 
(La Porta et al., 2002).
2 .1.3.1 Expropriation and Property Riahts
Padilla (2005) discusses property economics of expropriation by means of two 
types of economies: a market economy is defined as a social system of division of 
labour based on private ownership of the means of production. Two other 
important features define a market economy: freedom of contract and respect of 
the property rights of others. However, a socialist or planned economy is a social 
system based on public ownership of means of production. Traditionally, in a 
socialist economy, all the means of the production are controlled by the people's 
representatives, that is to say, the government/state. It is also important to 
emphasise that property rights are also respected in such system.
 ^us Postal Inspector
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The main difference between the two systems is the severity degree of 
expropriation by the government, that is to say, the severity degree of government 
intervention in the freedom owners of exercising their property rights. On a scale 
between 0 and 1, the degree of expropriation in a market economy is close to 0 
while the degree of expropriation of property rights in a socialist economy is close 
to 1. In such interventionist systems, government expropriation is manifested by 
commands and interdictions that restrict the owners' freedom to exercise property 
rights and freedom to contract. The more these rights are restricted, the more 
interventionist is the system and closer it is to a planned economy.
2.1.3.2 Expropriation and Concentrated Ownership
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out that large shareholders can reduce the 
incidence of agency problems that arise from the divergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers. However, La Porta et al. (1998) argue that with poor 
investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal 
protection. Furthermore, Berglof (1995) shows that, in emerging markets, the 
emergence of concentrated blocks of shareholders does not appear to be 
synonymous with the provision of monitoring services. He finds that, despite 
investment privatisation funds holding concentrated blocks of equity, there are few 
signs in the Czech Republic of such ‘control blocks’ translating into active 
corporate governance.
Berglof (1995) further argues that strong laws and enforcements, for example 
company, security, bankruptcy, takeover, and competition laws, stock exchange 
regulations, and accounting standards are likely to restrain the magnitude of 
expropriation. In this sense, the transition economies have provided particularly 
rich settings for considering the importance of investor protections and the 
mechanisms by which insiders expropriate value from outside shareholders, due
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to weak regulations and enforcements in transition economies.
La Porta et al. (1998) propose an alternative explanation for the association 
between ownership concentration and the magnitude of expropriation as far as 
emerging markets are concerned. On the one hand, large shareholders might 
need to own a high percentage of shareholdings to exercise their control rights and 
thus expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. On the other hand, when 
poorly protected in emerging markets, small investors might be willing to buy 
corporate shares only at such a low price that makes it unattractive for corporation 
to issue new shares to the public. Such low demand for corporate shares by 
minority investors would indirectly stimulate ownership concentration (La Porta et 
al., 1998).
2.1.3.3 Expropriation and Corporate Governance
Since the extensive presence of concentrated ownership in emerging markets, the 
primary concern of corporate governance there has broadened from mitigating the 
agency conflicts between firm managers and diffuse shareholders (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to protecting minority shareholders 
from expropriation by a controlling block holder and her management team 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Effective corporate governance is likely to monitor the behaviours of large 
shareholders and/or top managers, and protect small investors from the danger of 
expropriation. As Johnson and Shleifer (2004) point out, 'Privatised firms with 
weak corporate governance have repeatedly demonstrated weak performance 
and have frequently been ‘tunnelled’ by their management. In the Czech Republic, 
management o f newly privatised firms conspired with the managers o f investment 
funds to strip assets and siphon o ff cash flow. Belated attempts by the Czech
authorities to control this process have proved difficult.'
2.1.4 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMM)
2.1.4.1 Random Walk, Efficient Market Hvoothesis and Sianallinci Theory
Random walk theory can be traced to French mathematician Louis Bachelier 
whose PhD dissertation titled The Theory of Speculation’ (1900). It asserts that 
price movements will not follow any patterns or trends and that past price 
movements cannot be used to predict future price movements. Bachelier came to 
the conclusion that T he  mathematical expectation of the speculator is zero’ and he 
described this condition as a ‘fair game.’
The Efficient Market Flypothesis (EMH) evolved in the 1960s, and it states that at 
any given time securities prices perfectly and immediately incorporate all the 
information available at that time, which covers historical and new information, and 
expectations formed on their basis. Securities are precisely priced so that 
securities prices would be ideal signals of resource reallocation to investors (Fama, 
1970).
There are three forms of the efficient market hypothesis (EMFI):
1. The ‘W eak’ form asserts that all past market prices and data are fully reflected in 
securities prices. In other words, technical analysis is of no use.
2. The ‘Semi-strong’ form asserts that all publicly available information is fully 
reflected in securities prices. In other words, fundamental analysis is of no use.
3. The ‘Strong’ form asserts that all information is fully reflected in securities prices.
In other words, even insider information is of no use.
EMH theory assumes that securities markets are flooded with thousands of 
intelligent, well-paid, and well-educated investors seeking under and over-valued 
securities to buy and sell. The more participants and the faster the dissemination of 
information, the more efficient a market should be.
2.1.4.2 A Noise-based Approach to Market Efficiency
However, Efficient Market Hypothesis is far away from real world. In fact, individual 
investors typically fail to diversify, holding a single stock instead or a small number 
of stocks (Lewellen, et al. 1974). They often pick stocks by their own sentiment. 
Black (1986) believes that such investors, with no access to inside information, 
irrationally act on noise as if it were information that would give them an edge. 
Black (1986), following Kyle (1985), calls such investors ‘noise traders.’
Noise traders often respond to changes in expectations or sentiment that are not 
fully justified by information. Such changes can be a response to pseudo-signals 
that investors believe convey information about future returns but that would not 
convey such information in a fully rational model (Black, 1986). Noise traders often 
use some inflexible trading strategies or ‘popular models’, for example trend 
chasing etc, and those trading strategies based on pseudo-signals, noise, and 
‘popular models’ are correlated, leading to aggregate demand shifts for securities, 
because judgment biases afflicting investors in processing information tend to be 
the same (Shleifer and Summers, 1990). Many of these persistent mistakes are 
relevant for financial markets: for example, experimental subjects tend to be 
overconfident (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982), which makes them take on more risk. 
Experimental subjects also tend to extrapolate past time series, which can lead 
them to chase trends (Andreassen and Kraus, 1988). Finally, in making inferences
experimental subjects put too little weight on pase rates and too much weight on 
new information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), which might lead to them to 
overreact to news. In short, shifts in the demand for securities that do not depend 
on news or fundamental factors are likely to affect prices even in the long run 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1990).
Thus, a noise trade based finance theory becomes an increasingly important 
development to the finance literature. According to this noise-based financial 
theory, if corporate profitability has been manipulated, noise traders may be 
overoptimistic about the firm ’s future returns and are willing to buy the stock at a 
higher price. It would push the offering price higher than the equilibrium price, so 
that the stock may underperform the market benchmark in the long run.
2.2 Empirical Literature
2.2.1 Global Evidences for Long-run IPO Operating Performance
There is a large body of empirical evidences showing a decline in the post-IPO 
operating performance relative to pre-IPO level. Representative studies include;
Jain and Kini (1994) have studied 682 US IPOs from 1976 to 1988 and argue that 
US IPO firms exhibit a decline in the post-issue operating performance, as 
measured by the operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated by 
assets, relative to the pre-IPO level, both before and after industry adjustment. 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) also confirm that median operating return on assets, or 
median operating return on sales, declines from the year before the offerings to the 
end of the first year of public trading by using 283 US companies going public from 
1980 to 1983, but operating performance declines no further in ten years. They 
argue that companies making IPOs experience unusually high operating
performance in the year before the offerings. Kutsuna et al. (2002) study 247 IPO 
cases of JASDAQ (Japan) from 1995 to 1996, find Japanese companies show 
significantly falling operating performance after flotation by employing 
performance measures, which are similar to these of Mikkelson et al. (1997), and 
industry-median-adjusted growth rates of companies’ profits sharply decline from 
before IPO to after.
The decline of IPO operating performance in the post-IPO period has also been 
documented on emerging markets. Kim et al. (2004) investigate the operating 
performance of 133 Thai firms that conducted IPOs during 1987-1993 and 
document that firm operating performance subsequently declines after the firms go 
public, and that the decrease in operating performance is nearly one order of 
magnitude greater in Thailand than in the United States. For example, ROA 
(Return on Assets) 3 years after the IPO is 70% lower than during the year before 
the IPO. This result compares to a decline of 9% in the United States (Jain and Kini, 
1994). This finding is robust to a cash flow performance measure and to 
industry-adjusted performance measures as well.
There are some other prior studies studying Chinese A, B or H-share markets, 
which will be further discussed in details in a later section, for example, Wang et al. 
(2001); Chen and Shih (2004); Wang (2005) in China’s A-share Market and 
Aharony et al. (2000) and Huang and Song (2003) in China’s B- or H-share market. 
These prior studies on Chinese markets use actual accounting measures without 
industry adjustments, such as EBITDA, Sales Growth, ROE (Return On Equity) 
and EPS (Earnings Per Share) and so on, and have found that public listing is 
associated with a sharp deterioration in operating performance for up to six years 
after the IPO year.
2.2.2 Evidences for Managerial Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis
An empirical implication of managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis, 
addressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), for IPO firms is that post-IPO operating 
performance changes should be positively correlated with the change in 
managerial ownership from before to after the IPO. However, there are no strong 
evidences to support this:
Mikkelson et al. (1997), by using various measures of ownership by officers and 
directors in the US IPO companies, find no relationship between operating 
performance and managerial ownership of officers and directors. They argue that 
changes in equity ownership that result from going public do not lead to changes in 
incentives that affect operating performance. Moreover, empirical evidence from 
emerging markets shares a same finding. Kim et al. (2004) have studied the case 
of Thailand and also find that the ownership variables are not significant, if 
considering a linear relationship between firm performance change and ownership 
change.
Furthermore, some other studies focus on post-IPO managerial ownership 
retention, and find that there is a positive relation between post-IPO managerial 
ownership retention and post-IPO operating performance of US firms (for example, 
Jain and Kini, 1994). Moreover, Kim et al. (2004) construct a cubic form 
relationship between post-IPO managerial ownership retention and operating 
performance changes from before to the post-IPO period. Their findings indicate 
that firms with higher managerial ownership retention in the pre-IPO period are 
likely to report better operating performance in the pre-IPO period within both the 
0-31% and 71-100% ownership ranges. However, these studies (Jain and Kini, 
1994; Kim et al., 2004) do not relate managerial ownership changes from before to 
after the IPO to firm s’ operating performance changes over time. As Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) conjecture, there might be a positive relation between managerial 
ownership changes from before to after the IPO and IPO firms’ operating
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performance changes over the same time. Clearly, Jain and Kini (1994) and Kim et 
al. (2004) do not provide any evidence to examine this conjecture. As Mikkelson et 
al. (1997) argue, this research design ‘does not directly measure management
ownership   the measures o f management ownership is imputed from
estimates o f the post-offering stakes retained by pre-offering stockholders’.
2.2.4 Evidences for Accrual-based Earnings Management Hypothesis
There is considerable empirical evidence of accrual-based earnings management 
for US-based markets. Bagnoii and Watts (2000) suggest that 
relative-performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect 
competitors to do so. Similar arguments are found in Erickson and Wang (1999) in 
the context of mergers. Additionally, managers may raise earnings to meet 
analysts’ expectations (DeGeorge et al., 1999), to avoid debt-covenant violations 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Parker, 2000), or to smooth earnings. According to 
former SEC chairperson Levitt (1998), earnings management is a widespread 
phenomenon among public companies under pressure to meet analyst 
expectations.
Several empirical studies have documented the use of accrual-based earnings 
management related to US securities offerings (IPOs and SEOs). Incentives for 
managing earnings upwards include raising stock prices prior to initial public 
offerings (Teoh et al., 1998), and before stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson and 
Wang, 1999). Teoh et al. (1998) study 1649 US IPO cases from 1980 to 1992 and 
present evidence that US issuers of IPOs manage their earnings by manipulating 
discretionary current accruals over time. The discretionary accruals, which are 
computed by using modified Jones (1991) model, proxy for the magnitude of 
accrual-based earnings management. Some other studies have been made on 
European markets, for example Roosenboom et al. (2003) observe 64 Dutch IPO
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companies and also find that those IPO companies reported positive accruals in 
the first financial year. In the post-IPO years, managers reduce provisions for 
impairment in an attempt to mitigate the negative effect of the inevitable reversal of 
current accruals on reported net income.
Moreover, recent empirical studies on accrual-based earnings management 
further identify conditions for the occurrence of earnings management. Previous 
research also indicates that the likelihood of accrual-based earnings management 
is linked with corporate governance ineffectiveness. Accrual-based earnings 
management is often seen as sneaky managers pulling the wool over the eyes of 
gullible owners by manipulating accruals. Klein (2002) finds a negative relation 
exists between the abnormal accounting accruals and the percent of independent 
directors on audit committee among the US companies. Peasnell et al. (2001) also 
point out that there is a negative relationship between the proportion of 
non-executive board members and income-increasing earnings management in 
UK firms. The evidences are consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) that the 
focus on corporate governance is grounded in agency theory that recognises the 
oversight, or control, function of the board as the most critical of directors' roles.
2.2.5 Market Reaction to Accrual-based Earnings Management
Certainly, classical finance theory leaves no room for noise traders and investors’ 
sentiment. If a market is efficient, no information or analysis can be expected to 
result in outperform a nee (and/or underperformance) of a stock relative to an 
appropriate market benchmark. Securities prices will be precisely determined with 
no regard to firms’ discretionary accounting choices and abusive practices in 
accounting flexibility, because earnings management practices, as discussed 
earlier, may be able to alter corporate short-term profitability; however, long-term 
corporate fundamentals can never be manipulated. For example, in an
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accrual-based earnings management scheme, the total earnings in the long run 
cannot be altered through discretionary applications in accounting principles. In 
this sense, the valuation of the stocks will remain the same, and never be biased 
by earnings management schemes, if the market is efficient.
However, several recent studies have challenged the view that investors can fully 
see through earnings management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). If the investors’ 
ability to recognise earnings management is limited, investors may underestimate 
the magnitude of earnings management. They may be overoptimistic about the 
firm ’s future returns and are willing to buy the stock at a higher price so as to push 
the stock price higher. For example, the studies of earnings management 
surrounding equity issues show that firms with income-increasing abnormal 
accruals in the year of initial equity offer have significant subsequent stock 
underperformance (Teoh et al., 1998). The implication of these findings is that prior 
to public equity offerings some managers inflate reported earnings in an attempt to 
increase investors’ expectations of future performance and increase the offer price. 
Subsequent reversals of the accruals management are disappointing to investors, 
leading to some of the negative stock performance. These findings suggest that 
earnings management prior to equity issues does affect share prices.
Secondly, several other studies provide evidence that investors do not completely 
see through earnings management, investigating market reactions when earnings 
management is alleged or detected. For example, Foster (1979) finds that firms 
criticised in the financial press by Abraham Briloff for misleading financial reporting 
practices suffered an average drop in stock price of 8% on publication date. 
Dechow et al. (1995) report that firms subject to SEC investigation for earnings 
management show an average stock price decline of 9% when the earnings 
management was first announced. By using a sample of firms that actually 
violated GAAP, Beneish (1997) shows that GAAP violators earn significant
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negative abnormal returns for two years following the violation. Although these 
studies analysed firms for which the reporting practices in question are flagrant 
violations of accepted accounting principles or are fraudulent, they nonetheless 
suggest that investors do not completely see through earnings management.
Thirdly, there are some other interesting studies, whose findings are consistent 
with the claim that investors do not fully see through earnings management. Sloan 
(1995) reports that future abnormal stock returns are negative for firms whose 
earnings include large current accrual components and positive for firms with low 
current accrual components. Xie (1998) shows that results are largely attributable 
to shocks to abnormal accruals, rather than to normal accruals, Xie (1998) also 
provides evidence that the shocks to abnormal accruals are consistent with 
earnings management incentives. One interpretation of these findings is that 
investors do not fully see through earnings management reflected in abnormal 
accruals. Consequently, firms that managed earnings upward show subsequent 
stock price declines whereas firms with downward-managed earnings have 
positive subsequent returns.
In short, the empirical evidence shows that some firms appear to manage earnings 
for stock pricing reasons. Several recent studies indicate that there are situations 
in which investors do not see through earnings management.
2.2.6 Evidences for RPT-based Earnings Management
Prior literature on earnings management through RPTs is very limited. Thomas et 
al. (2004) study Japanese firms who issue both parent and consolidated financial 
statements, and find that parent earnings can also be managed using transactions 
with affiliates. They find earnings management behaviour for parent and 
consolidated earnings around three earnings thresholds: avoiding losses, avoiding
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earnings declines and avoiding negative forecast errors. Further tests indicate that 
the increased management of parent earnings around these three earnings 
thresholds is related to the firms’ ability to use affiliated transactions, while the 
management of consolidated earnings is unrelated to the firm's ability to use 
affiliated transactions.
Jian and Wong (2004) provide evidence of frequent related party transactions in 
China to manipulate earnings. Using a sample of 131 Chinese listed firms in the 
raw materials sector, they find that the group-controlled listed firms report 
abnormally high levels of related party sales to their controlling shareholders, when 
they have incentives to inflate earnings to avoid being de-listed or prior to rights 
issues. Once the group-controlled listed firms have generated more free cash 
flows, they may divert resources back to the group through providing other 
member firms generous trade credits.
Liu and Lu (2004) demonstrate that earnings management in China’s listed 
companies is mainly induced by the controlling owners’ RPT transactions. They 
argue that firms with better corporate governance tend to have less earnings 
management. Their empirical findings suggest that agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and outside investors are the main stimuli of earnings 
management in China’s listed companies.
2.2.7 Evidences for RPT-based Expropriation
On the other hand, related party transactions are often associated with the 
expropriation of the subsidiaries. Broadly speaking, controlling shareholders can 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders in many ways. For example, they 
can extract cash by selling assets, goods, or services to the company through 
self-dealing transactions; they can obtain loans on preferential terms; they can
42
transfer assets from the listed company to other companies under their control; or 
they can dilute the interests of minority shareholders by acquiring additional shares 
at a preferential price (Cheung et al., 2006a).
Cheung et al. (2006a) examine a sample of 328 filings of ‘connected transactions’ 
between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders during 
1998-2000. They find that, on average, firms normally report a large amount of 
RPTs each year, and the likelihood of undertaking connected transactions is 
higher for firms whose ultimate owners can be traced to mainland China, which is a 
post-communist country. Cheung et ai. (2006b) further focus on a sample of 
mainland Chinese firms by investigating connected transactions between Chinese 
listed firms and their state-owned shareholders and show how resources are 
expropriated from minority shareholders of the firm to the state. They find that the 
expropriation is concentrated in firms with the highest state ownership and 
controlled by local government SOEs. They argue that median value loss for these 
firms represents 45% of the value of the connected transaction, and the results are 
economically significant. The evidence is consistent with the ‘grabbing hand’ 
model of a post-communist government (Frye and Shleifer, 1997).
Some other empirical evidences show that expropriation is more likely to occur 
among firms with concentrated ownership and weak corporate governance. As 
Friedman et al. (2003) point out. Asian firms in pyramid ownership are more likely 
to be expropriated, presumably because of its high ownership concentration. La 
Porta et al. (1998) examine laws governing investor protection, the quality of 
enforcement of these laws, and ownership concentration in 49 countries all over 
the world. They find that concentration of ownership in the largest public 
companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the 
hypothesis that small shareholders are likely to be ignored in countries that fail to 
protect their rights.
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2.2.8 Market Reaction to RPT-based Earnings Management & Expropriation
Regarding RPT-based earnings management, Jian and Wong (2004) have also 
studied market reaction to the reported related party transactions. Stock return 
results show that a part of the related party transactions is perceived by the market 
as opportunistic. Investors view the reported sales figures to be slightly less 
credible when they are generated from related party dealings than through arm’s 
length transactions. The overall findings indicate that investors do not fully see 
through earnings management through RPTs. It is supportive of the large body of 
prior empirical studies on accrual-based earnings management that the ability of 
investors to recognise earnings management is limited.
Regarding to RPT-based expropriation, Jian and Wong (2004) also find that 
related party loan, which proxies for the level of expropriation, is negatively 
correlated with firm value, which is measured by Tobin’s Q and market-to-book 
equity. It shows that the stock prices are negatively affected, once the concerns of 
expropriation are raised. Cheung et al. (2006a) further confirm that stocks earn 
significant negative excess returns both around the initial announcement of the 
connected transactions and during the 12-month period following the 
announcement. Most importantly, they further find that excess returns are 
significantly negatively related to the percentage ownership by the controlling 
shareholder.
2.2.9 Chinese Evidences on Post-IPO Operating Performance
Some prior studies have also been made on operating performance of Chinese 
IPOs. Some studies have been based on Chinese H-share market, for example 
Aharony et al. (2000), and Huang and Song (2003); and others on Chinese 
A-share market, such as Wang et al. (2001), Chen and Shih (2004) and Wang
44
(2005).
Both Chinese A-share and B-share markets are based in mainland China 
(Shanghai and Shenzhen). A-share market is the main market for domestic 
investors; however, historically, B-share market is designed for overseas investors, 
and B-share stocks are traded in foreign currencies, either US Dollars or Hong 
Kong Dollars. Since 2001, domestic investors are also allowed to invest in B-share 
market. H-share market is Hong Kong based market, and H-share issuers, in this 
thesis, are referred to those firms incorporated in mainland China, and listed on 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
2.2.9.1 Studies on Chinese H-share markets
Aharony et al. (2000) study 83 Chinese H-share companies going public between 
1992 and 1995, and identify that the operating performance of those companies, in 
terms of ROA (Net Income on Assets), peaks in the IPO year and declines 
thereafter. They analyse the selected earnings components (annual change in 
accounting receivables and annual change in inventories), which are regarded as 
their proxies for the magnitude of accrual-based earnings management around the 
IPO, and find that H-share IPOs may have engaged in accrual-based earnings 
management by accelerating credit sales in the year of the IPO. After the IPO, the 
decline in ROA is associated with a decline in accruals, more specifically, in 
accounts receivables. This result suggests that there is accrual-based earnings 
management phenomenon among Chinese H-share IPO firms and that accounting 
accruals are used for the purpose.
Furthermore, Huang and Song (2003) compare the pre- and post-listing financial 
and operating performance of 38 H-share firms, in terms of a set of performance 
measures, like EBIT on Assets, Pre-tax Earnings on Assets, Pre-tax Earnings on
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Assets, Sales, Assets Turnover, Debt-to-Equity Ratio and Dividend-to-Profits 
Ratio and so on. Consistent with Aharony et al. (2000), they also find that the 
H-firms experienced a significant decrease in profitability and operating efficiency 
after listing. They point out that, theoretically, there are two major opposing 
influences on the operating performance change of these newly listed firms: the 
negative IPO effect and the positive privatisation effect. However, the IPO effect 
seems to dominate the privatisation effect for the newly listed Chinese IPOs in 
H-share market.
H-share and B-share markets are mainly designed for overseas investors, so that 
listing standards, reporting practices and corporate governance requirements in B- 
and H-share markets are more rigorous from these in A-share market. For 
example, B- and H-share companies are required to prepare their financial 
accounts in accordance with either IAS/IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards; formerly known as International Accounting standards) or Hong Kong 
GAAP, instead of China’s national Accounting Standards promulgated by Chinese 
Ministry of Finance for all A-share companies. Due to the low quality of national 
GAAP and enforcements, such as listing standards and code of corporate 
governance for A-share companies, there may be some different findings for 
A-share companies.
2.2.9.2 Studies on Chinese A- (and/or B-) share markets
Wang et al. (2001) have studied 992 A-share IPO cases going public from 1990 to 
2000, which cover almost all the A-share IPO firms during that period. They use 
the performance measures, e.g. EBITDA, Sales Growth, ROE (EBITDA on Equity) 
and ROS (EBITDA on Sales), and discover that public listing is associated with a 
sharp deterioration in performance for up to six years after the year of listing, which 
seems to be more serious compared to developed markets. Therefore, they argue
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that public listing and share-issue corporatisation may not work as a way to reform 
Chinese SOEs.
Chen and Shih (2004) have also studied IPO operating performance of Chinese 
listed companies, and they cover the sample from mid-1995 to mid-1999 of 884 
A-share and B-share companies, by using EPS (Net Earnings Per Share) and 
ROE (Net Earnings on Equity). They find that the financial indicators tend to fall 
rapidly year on year, so an IPO is of little obvious help to companies’ operational 
performance. The industries in which listed companies in China display strong 
operating performance are public utilities, transportation and finance sectors. They 
conjecture that the decline in operating performance may be linked with the 
concentrated ownership and poor corporate governance mechanisms: however, 
they don't provide empirical evidence how governance mechanism affect the 
operating performance of IPO firms before and after the IPO.
Wang (2005) examines the changes in operating performance (EBIT on Total 
Assets) of 747 Chinese listed companies (going public between 1994 and 1997) 
around the IPO, and also documents a sharp decline in the post-issue operating 
performance of IPO firms. He focuses on the effect of ownership structure and 
ownership concentration on IPO performance changes finds that neither state 
ownership nor concentration of ownership is associated with operating 
performance changes, but there is a curvilinear relation between post-IPO 
legal-entity ownership retention and operating performance changes. He argues 
that agency conflicts and management entrenchment co-exist to influence 
Chinese IPO operating performance, and the beneficial and detrimental effects of 
state shareholdings tend to offset each other.
2.2.9.3 Limitations on Prior Chinese Studies (A-share)
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Wang et al. (2001), Chen and Shih (2004) and Wang (2005) share some common 
weaknesses in research design:
Firstly, the three studies investigate a large sample of A (and/or B) shares IPO 
firms by using actual accounting figures without industry adjustment. The use of 
Lin-adjusted accounting figures to track the long-term trend of IPO operating 
performance may produce a misleading result, because there is a considerably 
large market and/or industry shock over the period. China experienced 
double-digit inflation and economic growth in the first half of 1990s, which dropped 
quickly at the end of 1990s. The average EPS (Earnings Per Share) and the 
average ROE (Return on Equity) of the entire market has significantly declined 
from Chinese ¥ 0.82 in 1990 to Chinese ¥ 0.13 in 2002 (Table 3-4). So, the decline 
in the un-adjusted figures in the long run doesn’t necessarily mean that public 
listing of Chinese SOEs tends to worsen companies’ performance, because 
macroeconomic situation has been changed, and the profitability for the entire 
market goes lower.
The above argument signifies the importance of the use of industry-adjusted 
accounting figures for the IPO performance research. So, this research will adopt 
industry-adjusted accounting figures instead of actual figures, so as to control for 
the industry and market shocks, it will follow the prior research methodology 
(Mikkelson et al., 1997) to calculate industry-adjusted figures by deducting the 
median contemporaneous operating performance of a group of matched publicly 
traded firms.
Secondly, the nature of the emerging stock markets in China at the early stage 
may not warrant the quality of financial data. China moved away from the 
traditional fund-based Soviet accounting model in 1992 (CMOF. 1992) and 
incorporated many common Western accounting practices reflected in IAS/IFRS.
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Furthermore, in order to further converge to IAS/IFRS in all the major aspects, 
CMOF (1998) made a significant move to promulgate a set of new revised 
standards. A series of reforms in accounting practices may lead to post-reform 
financial numbers incomparable with those in the pre-reform period. For example, 
according to CMOF (1998), companies should use best judgement to decide the 
level of allowance for doubtful debts, and provisions for inventories and 
investments should be made on the principle of prudence; while under 1992 
regulation, allowances for doubtful debts are based on the government-approved 
rate of 0.3% and no provision for inventories and investments is needed. In fact, 
the government-approved rate for impairment losses is so low that the reported 
earnings before 1998 had been considerably exaggerated. In this sense, the 1998 
GAAP reform is very likely to lead to a decline in the post-1998 reported earnings 
relative to the pre-1998 level.
This research will use the IPO cases going public in the post-1998 period, and, in 
this sense, long-term IPO operating performance will not be affected by the 1998 
GAAP reform. However, one may argue that there are ongoing GAAP changes 
subsequent to the 1998 GAAP reform, for instance the 2001 GAAP reform (Chen 
and Cheng, 2007). However, it should be noted that the industry-adjusted 
accounting measures will be adopted as the basic performance indicators in this 
study. Accounting figures after industry adjustment are not substantially affected 
by any GAAP changes, because the effects of GAAP changes on reporting 
practices of sample firms are also likely to be made on reporting practices of their 
industry peers in a same direction at a similar magnitude. Furthermore, Chen and 
Cheng (2007) argue that the 2001 GAAP reform in China is not a major change in 
accounting standards, so that the 2001 GAAP reform is not likely to make a 
considerable difference to the findings of this study.
Finally, more importantly. Wang et al. (2001), Chen and Shih (2004) conjecture
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that highly concentrated ownership structure and corporate governance 
characteristics of Chinese IPO companies may impact the long-run IPO operating 
performance. However, the question ‘why concentrated ownership and weak 
governance structure affect the IPO long-term operating performance in China’ 
has not been explored. Chen and Shih (2004) argue that pre-IPO reported 
operating performance may be manipulated, but they provide no empirical 
evidence to prove it.
Basically, weak corporate governance often results in more agency problems, 
discussed by Jensen and Mecking (1976). For example, earnings management 
practices may arise, if managers are compensated depending on a firm ’s earnings 
performance relative to some pre-established benchmark. It may be in their 
self-interest to manipulate earnings so as to meet those stipulated in the contracts 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). So, this study further argues that China's 
institutional infrastructure, such as concentrated ownership structure and weak 
corporate governance, may give a rise to more earnings management practices, 
not only through accounting accruals but also through related party transactions 
with controlling shareholders. The purpose of this study is not limited to adding 
another piece of evidence to the global IPO operating performance literature, but 
to investigating earnings management behaviour around the flotation, through 
accounting accruals and/or related party transactions, and its impacts on the 
long-term IPO operating performance. To my best knowledge, this is the first study 
to examine RPT-based earnings management among IPO firms.
2.3 Summary
In short, there is a large body of empirical evidences, globally, investigating 
long-run IPO operating performance. Prior studies across the globe have showed 
that there is a decline in long-run IPO operating performance relative to the
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pre-IPO level. Some researchers (Mikkelson et al., 1997) argue that the decline in 
the post-IPO operating performance may be associated with agency problems 
described in Jensen and Meckling (1976); however a second source of prior 
studies (Teoh et al., 1998; Roosenboom et al., 2003) argues that pre-IPO reported 
operating performance may be exaggerated.
Wang et al. (2001), Chen and Shih, (2004) and Wang, (2005) have found a decline 
in the post-IPO reported operating performance relative to the pre-IPO level in 
Chinese A-share (and/or B-share) market. However, they do not fully explore the 
explanations for the decline in the post-issue operating performance of Chinese 
IPOs: Wang et al. (2001) and Chen and Shih (2004) conjecture that the decline in 
reported performance is likely to be associated with firms’ concentrated ownership 
and poor corporate governance. Wang (2005) finds a curvilinear relation between 
post-IPO legal-entity ownership retention and operating performance changes. 
However, these prior studies provide no evidence on managerial ownership 
dispersion hypothesis, which states that there is a positive relation between 
managerial ownership changes and operating performance changes of IPO firms 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). So. first of all, this study will follow the research design 
of Mikkelson et al., (1997) to test the managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis 
by using Chinese IPO data.
Furthermore, prior literature shows that pre-IPO operating performance may have 
been exaggerated by the use of accrual-based earnings management around the 
IPO year, and the long-run IPO operating performance declines when unwinding 
the accruals in the post-IPO years (Teoh et al., 1998; Aharony et al., 2000; and 
Roosenboom et al., 2003). This research will further investigate the ways in which 
Chinese IPO firms boost reported operating performance around the IPO year. 
Firstly, discretionary accruals component of Chinese IPO firms’ reported earnings 
will be examined, to see if Chinese IPO firms are manipulating accruals to inflate
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reported earnings in the pre-IPO period. Wang (2005) uses two specific accruals 
items to examine Chinese A-share IPOs and finds no evidence of accruals 
management around the IPO. However, I will use an aggregate accruals model to 
investigate accruals management phenomenon for Chinese A-share IPOs.
Besides accrual-based earnings management, this research extends prior 
literature by focusing on an additional source of earnings management, specifically, 
earnings manipulation through related party transactions. There are some limited 
evidences of RPT-based earnings management practices adopted by Chinese 
companies to beat income-reporting objectives, and/or avoid being de-listed, for 
example, Jian and Wong (2004). However, I hypothesise that Chinese IPO 
companies may engage in the two manipulative approaches to boost pre-IPO 
operating performance.
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Chapter 3 China’s Stock market and Chinese IPOs
3.1 Overview: China’s stock market
China’s stock markets have been developing since the 1980s, in tandem with the 
market reforms and the liberalisation of the country’s economy. By the mid-1980s, 
Chinese stated-owned enterprises started to issue corporate shares to public 
investors. In the December of 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange were established. China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) is the sole national securities regulatory body, which is a unit of the State 
Council and is authorised to supervise and regulate the securities markets in 
accordance with the laws.
Chinese market has been growing rapidly since the beginning of its economic 
reform towards a market-oriented economy. At the end of 2005, 1,431 companies 
were listed on one of the two domestic exchanges, and total market capitalisation 
of the entire market reached at Chinese ¥ 3,243.0 billion (CSRC, 2006),
China’s share market is highly segmented. Generally, there are three kinds of 
shares by investor type:
State shares: are ultimately owned by the State Council and have been managed 
by the government-controlled state asset management bureaux. State shares are 
created though the injection of state-owned assets from authorised government 
organs acting on behalf of the state. They are not tradable on the stock exchanges.
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Legal Person (LP) shares: are mostly held by state-controlled companies, 
non-bank financial institutions and social entities (for example, trade unions) 
Sometimes, LP shares are issued to the non-state-controlled LP entities, such as 
foreign private companies. However, LP shares cannot be traded on the two 
exchanges.
Individual shares: are held by either private individuals or institutions, including 
institutional investors. Individual shares are listed on the stock exchanges and 
openly traded.
State shares and LP shares are also known as ‘non-tradable shares’. At the end of 
2005, non-tradable shares reached at 471.47 billion shares, which accounted for 
64.47% of the total shares issued (CSRC, 2006). That is to say, the majority of 
shares in Chinese stock market cannot be openly and freely traded. 96% of listed 
companies had non-tradable shares accounting for more than 40% of total equity 
capital, while only 0.4% of listed companies had no non-tradable shares at all. This 
balkanisation of share categories has created a number of problems. For example, 
owners of individual shares are discriminated against in terms of pricing: they pay 
much more for their shares than LP shareholders who are allocated their 
shareholding prior to the IPO at prices close to net asset value.
The types of tradable shares can be divided into three categories: A, B and 
H-share. A and B-share are both issued by joint-stock companies incorporated in 
Mainland China and listed on the China’s domestic exchanges, but B-share are 
quoted in foreign currencies, e.g. US Dollar on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 
Hong Kong Dollar on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and accessible to overseas 
investors. H-share are shares issued by joint-stock companies incorporated in 
Mainland China, but listed on the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx). A-share, which 
are traded in Chinese currency (¥), are available to domestic investors and
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Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs). A-share dominate Chinese stock 
market as compared to B and H-share. At the end of 2005, 1,240 companies have 
issued A-share to the market publicly, whilst the number for companies to issue B 
and H-share is 122 and 109 respectively (CSRC, 2006).
3.2 Chinese IPO market
Chinese IPO market is one of the vigorous emerging markets all over the world. 
Table 3-3 records the numbers and total capital raised from IPOs on A. B, and 
H-share markets respectively (CSRC, 2006). From 1990 to 2005, companies listed 
in Mainland China (A and B-share) had issued a total of 580.8 billion and raised a 
total of ¥ 847.7 billion. In contrast to B and H-share, A-share offerings dominate the 
IPO market and each year saw roughly 100 companies, on average, issuing 
A-share stocks to the public. When the market goes bullish, the number and the 
aggregate gross proceeds of IPOs will normally climb.
3.2.1 An IPO Process
China is one of the largest post-communist in-transition economies in the world 
Most listed companies began their corporate lives as state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), owned wholly by the state. Traditionally, Chinese SOEs have multiple 
social responsibilities rather than value creation and maximisation, such as 
running community’s schools and hospitals for employees. Since the early 1990’s, 
China decided to establish a market-oriented economy and reform its 
stated-owned economy. Public listing of SOEs in the domestic stock exchanges is 
one of the key directions to achieve the goal. The strategy to reform Chinese SOEs 
is to turn SOEs from public sole proprietorships controlled by industry-specific 
government agencies at various administrative levels into shareholding companies 
that are diverse in ownership.
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In preparation for IPOs, SOEs should be substantially restructured. In most cases, 
a new company limited by shares was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the SOE of which it was originally a part. Usually, profit-generating units would be 
carved out from the original SOE and transferred into the new company, while 
social welfare functions, such as schools and hospitals, and any other 
less-profitable business assets would be kept in the original SOE, which becomes 
the parent company after listing. The incorporated company then makes new 
equity offerings to the public and raises funds from the market (Green, 2003).
In order to make it clear. Table 3-1 provides a diagram showing a typical IPO 
process of a Chinese State-Owned Enterprise.
3.2.2 Pricing IPOs
There are several stock valuation methods adopted by practitioners all over the 
world, including the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach; the asset-based 
approach; and the comparable firms approach. Each of these methods has its 
advantages and disadvantages:
1. The DCF approach is to determine the value of a company in terms of its future 
cash flows. It is based on a firm theoretical foundation than any other approach is, 
but in many situations it is difficult to estimate future cash flows and an appropriate 
discount rate precisely.
2. The asset-based approach is to value a company at the sum of the value of its 
easily saleable parts. In other words, the company is split into some separate units, 
which can be sold individually in a mature market. It is more relevant when a 
significant portion of the assets can be liquidated readily at well-determined market 
prices if so desired. However, this approach can hardly be applied, if a market price
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for these separate saleable units is not obtainable.
3. The comparable firms approach uses market multiples of a peer group. It works 
best when a highly comparable group is available. While it can reduce the 
probability of mis-valuing a firm relative to others, this approach provides no 
safeguard against an entire sector being undervalued or overvalued.
In Chinese IPO market, three valuation approaches are all employed for IPO 
pricing purposes. However, almost all of IPO firms have adopted the comparable 
firms approach to value IPOs, and this approach often serves as the basic 
approach for IPO pricing, whenever possible. If there is no comparable peer firm in 
the stock market, the IPO firm has to adopt either DCF approach or Assets-based 
approach to price the IPO. The most important reason is, it is hard to reliably 
estimate future cashflow of the company (for DCF approach purpose), and/or 
value the saleable units of the company (for assets-based approach purpose). 
Practically, the nature of the comparable firms approach is much less complicated, 
and the valuation of IPOs can be reliably determined with a lower probability of 
mis-valuing the company relative to industry peers. A further examination of my 
sample IPOs also supports my argument above. All the IPO companies have used 
comparable firms approach to value the stocks, and more than 95% of them take 
this approach as a main approach of valuation.
A simplified version of a comparable firms approach to value IPOs is to multiply the 
EPS (Earnings Per Share) of the IPO firm by the average P/E (Price/Earnings) 
ratio of comparable publicly traded firms. Sometimes, in order to encourage the 
sale of securities, the market multiples may be multiplied by a discounted rate, 
which is discretionarily determined by the IPO firm and/or the investment bank. 
Generally, the discounted P/E ratio varies from industry to industry, and from 
period to period. The ratio in some industry sectors is a little higher than that of
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other sectors, for example. Hi-tech IPOs in the Internet Bubble at the end of 1990's 
are often over-priced. But the discounted P/E ratio is normally no more than 30 
Since 2001, China encourages new approaches to be employed for IPO valuation, 
but no real progress has been seen. Up to date, firms typically float shares at about 
20 times historical earnings, regardless of prospective profitability (Financial Times, 
2004).
However, the comparable firms approach is obviously defective, because the IPO 
valuation through the comparable firms approach is mainly based on the firm's 
historical reported performance, rather than its future profitability. As a result, a firm 
with better historical reported operating performance will offer the stocks to the 
public at a higher price. If the IPO firm manipulates its reported operating 
performance upwards in the pre-IPO period, the firm may be able to artificially 
push the offering price of the IPO go higher, and raise more funds from the market, 
in other words, the comparable firms approach may result in more earnings 
management practices for IPO firms to boost pre-IPO reported operating 
performance.
3.3 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Practices in China
3.3.1 Highly Concentrated Ownership Structure
However, China’s economic reform is characterised as an ‘one-third privatised’ 
reform (Green, 2003), because Chinese SOEs initially sell about one third of their 
equity to public investors, and such restructuring is designed to improve the firms’ 
performance while allowing the state to retain control. Table 3-2 describes the 
ultimate controlling shareholders of Chinese A-share companies, indicating the 
characteristics of concentrated corporate ownership in China (data source: China 
Economic Daily, 2001 ). It is clearly stated that 81.6% of all listed companies are still
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strongly controlled by the state either directly or indirectly. On average, almost half 
of corporate stakes (47.9% of the total) is held by the government agencies or the 
state-controlled institutions. As far as newly listed firms are concerned, the shares 
held by controlling shareholders are higher. A recent survey (CNINFO, 2005) 
points out that controlling shareholders, on average, retain a percentage of 62.42% 
in total shares at the end of the IPO year, since the IPO is the first-time sales of the 
stocks to the public.
Large shareholders may reduce the incidence of agency problems that arise from 
the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). However, as La Porta et al. (1998) point out, ownership 
concentration becomes a substitute for legal protection, if investor's protection is 
poor. In other words, when the ownership structure is highly concentrated, a major 
concern of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders arise. In this sense, the primary objective of corporate governance 
there has broadened from mitigating the agency conflicts between firm managers 
and diffuse shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to protecting minority 
shareholders from expropriation by a controlling block holder and his management 
team (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Table 3-2 also presents that the controlling shareholder of the non state-controlled 
listed company often has lower level of shareholdings (averagely 35.9% of the total 
shares). A lower percentage of shares held by controlling shareholders may 
indicate that there might be fewer concerns of agency conflicts between non 
stated-owned controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. But it is 
important to recognise that a percentage of 35.9% is still considerably high, so that 
the controlling shareholder may easily exercise the control over the listed company, 
because normally the second largest shareholder typically owns less than 5% of 
shares (Bai et al., 2004).
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3.3.2 Institutional Shareholdings
With the promulgation of the Tentative Rules o f Securities Investment Funds in 
1997, China’s fund industry entered a rapid growing period. Institutional investors 
nowadays become an increasingly important force of Chinese stock market. At the 
end of 2005, 53 fund management companies are running 54 closed-end funds 
and 252 open-end funds with net assets of Chinese ¥ 369.9 billion. Domestic 
insurance companies and the National Pension Fund are encouraged to invest in 
the domestic market indirectly via designated asset management institutions. 
Moreover, since China launched the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
scheme in 2002, 35 overseas financial institutions had obtained the QFII licenses 
with a total investment quota of USD 53.5 billion (CSRC, 2006).
However, it should be noted that the average proportion of the shares held by 
funds in the total shares reached 5.14% only by 2005 (CSRC, 2006). The 
percentages of QFIIs and National Pension Fund are much small (0.9% and 0.8% 
respectively) by 2005 (CSRC, 2006). So, the aggregate proportion of institutional 
investors retains less than 8% of ownership in Chinese listed firms. So, institutional 
ownership in Chinese markets is much lower than that in the US markets, in which 
institutional ownership and trading become increasingly important, and institutions 
owned 51% of US equities by the end of 2004 (US Federal Reserve Board, 2005).
Institutional investors can serve as an important corporate governance mechanism 
to monitor management behaviours. Prior research of western countries have 
indicated that the ability of managers to manipulate reported earnings for 
opportunistic purposes is constrained by the effectiveness of external monitoring 
by stakeholders such as institutional investors. Monks and Minow (1995) have 
found institutional investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, 
discipline, and influence managers. Shang (2003) also point out that the
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institutions in the US stock market prefer to hold stocks with lower magnitudes of 
earnings management, and sell shares to the market when they are faced with the 
firms that inflate their earnings. Chung et al. (2002) argue that the large institutional 
shareholdings of the US listed companies inhibit managers from increasing or 
decreasing reported profits towards the managers’ desired level or range of profits
Institutional investors have been participating in the Chinese stock markets since 
1997, and they are supposed to play an important role of monitoring the reported 
earnings. The presence of institutional shareholders is thus expected to help 
reduce the managerial opportunistic application in manipulating the Chinese 
earnings. But, if their shareholdings are low, institutional investors have lower 
incentives to offer the monitoring actions and typically retain the stocks for a 
shorter period (Maug, 1998). Unlike those in the developed markets who normally 
own the majority of shares of quoted companies, institutional investors in the 
Chinese markets have a very small ownership in listed firms. So, institutional 
investors may find it difficult to exert their influence on decision-making process, 
even though they may be willing to do so.
Furthermore, under the current form of property rights legislation, minority 
shareholders have little legal protection for their investment and their interests in 
the listed companies (Chen, 2005). Therefore, institutional investors, like any other 
minority investors, face the danger of being expropriated by the controlling 
shareholders. They are unlikely to perform the roles for the listed companies, as 
what are expected in developed markets, such as, market stabiliser and corporate 
governance described in Maug (1998).
3.3.3 Corporate Governance Practices in China
The Code o f Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (CSRC, 2002)
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was promulgated by the CSRC, Chinese securities regulator, as late as 2002. This 
code is the first official document regarding corporate governance practices 
implemented in mainland China. Prior to 2002, there are no rules regulating 
corporate governance matters, except for the Company Law, which was 
promulgated in 1993 and further revised in 2005. The Company Law  is the most 
important legal sources of corporate governance rules, which are the laws 
approved by the National People's Congress and its Steering Committee. In 
accordance to the Company Law, all listed companies are required to publish the 
memorandum of associations, which plays an active role in designing a 
corporation’s governance structure. The Chinese memorandum of associations is 
comparable to a document that would combine both the articles of incorporation 
and bylaws of an American corporation.
According to the 1993 Company Law, listed companies are required to form three 
statutory and indispensable corporate governing bodies; (1) the shareholders, 
acting as a body at the general meeting; (2) the board of directors; and (3) the 
board of supervisors. In addition, the Corporate Law  introduced two new statutory 
corporate positions - the Chair of the board of directors (Chair) and chief executive 
officer (CEO).
A big problem with corporate governance practices in China in the pre-2002 years 
is, no independent directors are appointed in the board of directors. Seemingly, the 
weakness has been corrected by the promulgation of the Code o f Corporate 
Governance for Chinese listed companies in 2002. The most striking change of the 
code is to officially introduce independent directors'^ into the board of directors, and 
by the end of 2003 more than one third of board members appointed should be 
independent directors, including one accounting expert on the board. Furthermore,
Independent non-executive directors
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an audit committee, a nomination committee and/or a compensation committee 
are also encouraged to establish on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Appendix A has 
presented a brief introduction of Chinese corporate governance rules.
1 then investigate the weaknesses of Chinese corporate governance practices.
3.3.3.1A Shareholders’ Meeting Dominated by ControUina Shareholders
‘One share, one vote’ principle has also been adopted by Chinese firms {Company 
Law ed. 1993 Ch. 3.106), with no regard to the categories in which the shares 
belong (State shares, LP shares and Tradable shares). As addressed earlier, 
controlling shareholders in Chinese firms retain such a large percentage of shares 
in their listed subsidiaries that shareholders’ meetings are primarily dominated by 
the controlling shareholders.
A recent survey (CNINFO, 2005) shows that, public investors are very reluctant to 
participate in the shareholders’ meetings, particularly for those which are fully 
manipulated by the controlling shareholders. CNINFO (2005) estimates that, on 
average, public investors (institutional investors and/or individual investors), who 
take part in a shareholders’ meeting, represent only 4-5% ownership of the listed 
firm; however, the controlling shareholder normally keeps more than 40% 
ownership of the listed firm. So, it is impossible for public investors to vote against 
the controlling shareholder. Furthermore, all the issues on which shareholders are 
asked to vote in a shareholders’ meeting are prepared by corporate executives 
and/or controlling shareholders; and, according to the CSRC (2000), smaller 
investors (3% ownership or less) are not allowed to raise any issues to discuss in a 
shareholders’ meeting. In this sense, minority investors without holding a 
considerable amount of shareholdings make little impact on decision making of the 
listed firm, so as to be unwilling to get involved in shareholders’ meetings.
3.3.3.2A Board of Directors Controlled by Controlling Shareholders
Since the strong influence by the controlling shareholder, in most cases, the board 
seats are effectively dominated by the controlling shareholder. The majority of 
directors have a clear connection with the controlling shareholders: some of them 
represent the controlling shareholders and hold a management position in the 
controlling shareholders’ entities simultaneously: others are former employees of 
the controlling shareholders. As the Survey (CNINFO, 2006) shows, 42.34% of 
board members hold a senior position in the controlling shareholders’ entities 
simultaneously. Another 40.12% of directors previously held a senior position in 
the controlling shareholders’ entities. Even though the IPO leads to a more 
diversified ownership structure, the board structure has not been affected 
substantially, compared to pre-IPO situation. In this sense, controlling 
shareholders have strong influences in the board room.
Since the independent directors are introduced in 2002, the concern about the 
independence of the board may be alleviated to a certain extent. However, 
according to a survey conducted by CNINFO (2006), the average percentage of 
independent directors in the board is 33.96% by the end of 2005, in comparison to 
the minimum level of 33.33% required by the CSRC (2002). This survey also 
points out that 15% of listed firms fail to comply with the CSRC (2002) and report a 
percentage of independent directors lower than 33.33%, The survey clearly 
demonstrates that many Chinese firms decline to use a higher proportion of 
directors who are independent from controlling shareholders and companies’ 
executives, although the Code (2002) requires them to do so. It shows that the 
enforcement for the Corporate Governance Code (2002) is very weak.
Many studies based on western markets have confirmed a positive relationship 
between the independence of the board and the monitoring effectiveness of the
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board. For example. Beasley (1996) find a negative relationship between the 
percentage of non-executive members on the board and the likelihood of fraud. 
Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms with a large percentage of non-executive 
members are less likely to receive accounting enforcement actions by the US 
securities regulator, the SEC, for alleged GAAP violations. Peasnell et al, (2001) 
indicate that there is a negative relationship between the proportion of 
non-executive board members and income-increasing earnings management in 
the UK firms.
Furthermore, a well-established audit committee, mainly consisting of independent 
directors, is expected to monitor the financial reporting process effectively. 
Research has demonstrated a negative correlation between the presence of an 
independent audit committee and the incidence of financial statement fraud in 
Western countries. For example, McMullen et al. (1996) show that the US firms 
which have (1) an audit committee composed entirely of non-executive directors;
(2) Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) on their audit committee; and (3) frequent 
audit committee meetings, are less likely to be subject to the US SEC enforcement 
actions or restating their quarterly reports, and it would be likely to find less 
financial frauds in those firms. Klein (2002) also finds a negative relation exists 
between abnormal accounting accruals and the percentage of independent 
directors on the audit committee in US companies.
Flowever, firstly, compared to that of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the 
proportion of independence of directors in Chinese companies is relatively low. 
The NYSE Listing Standards (2003) requires that publicly traded companies on the 
NYSE must have a majority of independent directors on the board. Therefore, the 
lower proportion of Chinese companies may lead to the inefficiency of corporate 
governance, primarily because independent directors are too small to fight against 
controlling shareholders. A notorious example of Yili Group (stock code: 600887)
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demonstrates that an independent director of the company got fired, when 
challenging the shareholders of the company and investigating the company’s 
undisclosed transactions and suspicious conducts (China Securities News^, 4 
August 2004).
Secondly, the nomination of directors may also be problematic. Independent 
directors should be third-party reviewers, and independent from the block 
shareholders and the management of listed companies. According to western 
practices (US NYSE Listing Standards, 2003; UK Combined Code, 2003), a formal, 
rigorous and transparent procedure is needed for the appointment of new directors 
to the board. There should be a nomination committee which should lead the 
process for board appointments and make recommendations to the board. 
Sometimes, whenever necessary, there will be an open recruitment event set for 
recruiting independent directors. However, this is not the case in China, because a 
nomination committee within the board is yet to be established for Chinese listed 
firms. A candidate director has to be nominated by shareholders only. According to 
the CSRC (2002), only the block shareholders (5% ownership or more) can 
nominate a director candidate (either an independent director or a 
non-independent director), and candidates should be approved in the 
shareholders’ meeting by majority vote. In fact, most candidates for directors are 
nominated by the controlling shareholder’s entity. So, the true nature of 
‘independence’ of independent directors may be jeopardised.
Thirdly, there is another concern whether independent directors effectively perform 
their duties in accordance with the Code and protect the interest of minority 
investors from being infringed. There is a large body of real-life examples showing 
that this may not be the case in China. For example, Kalong (stock code: 000921 ) 
shows that even when independent directors have recognised financial statements
 ^Website: http://www.cs.com.cn/ztbd/02/14/t20040804_116023.htm
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are potentially fraudulent, they don’t oppose in board meetings (China Securities 
News®, 13 April 2005). Another recent study also supports the point by providing 
evidence of the harmonisation of accounting practices (Chen and Cheng, 2007). 
They argue that introducing the Chinese Code of Corporate Governance in 2002 
fails to promote the harmonisation of earnings numbers, although weak corporate 
governance is expected to be the major factor to cause the divergence of 
accounting practices. So, they argue that corporate governance might only be 
effective in certain institutional environments, which may not be well established in 
China.
3.3.3.3 A Non~functionina Supervisory Board
At first glance, the Chinese corporate governance structure may appear similar to 
the two-tier system of corporate governance in Germany. German corporations are 
similarly governed by a board of directors and a supervisory board. There are 
substantial differences, however, between the German and Chinese systems of 
corporate governance. For example, the German supervisory board oversees the 
board of directors, and the members of the board of directors are appointed by, 
and may be dismissed by, the board of supervisors. But, in China, there is no 
hierarchical relation between the board of directors and the board of supervisors, 
and both directors and supervisors are appointed by, and may be dismissed by, 
shareholder action. In this sense, the effectiveness of the supervisory board to 
oversee the board of directors is much weakened in China.
Moreover, controlling shareholders have strong control over the activities of the 
supervisory board, primarily because controlling shareholders retain a large 
percentage of ownership and the supervisors mainly represent controlling 
shareholders’ entity other than minority shareholders. In this sense, the board may
® Website: http://www.cs.com.cn/ztbd/01/15/t20060413_902102.htm
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not act as an independent third-party watchdog on behalf of minority investors. 
This point of view is consistent with previous studies: Tam (1999) argues that the 
supervisory board in Chinese listed companies is only a nominal organ. So, 
China’s corporate governance is in effect characterised by the Anglo-Saxon 
unitary board rather than the two-tier board (Tam, 1999; Tian, 2001). Even though 
China promulgated the Code of Corporate Governance in 2002, it does not help to 
alleviate the concern, because it is not dealing with any issues in the nomination 
process of the supervisory board. Therefore, the supervisory board may not be 
able to provide the unbiased third-party oversight service.
3.3.3.4 Less Independent Management Team
The CEO plays an important role in implementing the resolutions of the board of 
directors and carrying out the day-to-day business operations. CEO and its 
management team members are responsible for the company’s operating 
performance and produce corporate financial statements in accordance with rules 
and regulations.
In China, the CEO is crucial for the controlling shareholder to achieve the goal of 
RPT-based earnings management and/or expropriation. The controlling 
shareholders are likely to have a close relationship with the CEO, in order to retain 
full control over the company’s operating activities, and facilitate related party 
transactions for opportunistic purposes. Top management team, including CEO, is 
appointed by the board meeting of directors. In fact, in many cases, the CEO is 
very close to the controlling shareholder, because the CEO often holds a senior 
management position in the controlling shareholder’s entity simultaneously. The 
survey (CNINFO, 2005) further shows that 41.2% of Chinese firms report their 
CEO to hold a senior management position in the controlling shareholders’ entities 
simultaneously; 44.5% of the firms use a CEO who held a management position in
controlling shareholders’ entities previously. A management team less 
independent from controlling shareholders may lead to more RPT-based earnings 
management and/or expropriation.
3.3.3.S Less Effective External Auditors
The use of an external auditor is mandatory for all listed companies in China. 
Some companies, listed on the Chinese B-share market, have to engage two CPA 
firms to audit their domestic GAAP statements and their IFRS statements 
respectively.
The external audit is an important element of the financial reporting structure, 
because it subjects information in the financial statements to independent and 
objective scrutiny, increasing the reliability of these financial statements. It is the 
responsibility of the auditors in the first instance to draw attention to departures 
from GAAP requirements in reporting to the shareholders, and for regulators and 
market participants to take some appropriate actions against those companies that 
abuse compliance with the agreed accounting standards (FEE, 2001).
According to FEE (2001), a quality audit is a part of the enforcement mechanism 
for accounting standards, and the quality control systems of the accountancy 
profession are designed to ensure the quality of the audit. So, quality auditors are 
likely to alleviate the concern of accrual-based earnings management. For 
example, Krishnan (2003) finds that specialist auditors (the Big 4) in the US 
mitigate accrual-based earnings management and managerial opportunistic 
behaviour more effectively than non-specialist auditors (non-Big 4) do. However, a 
quality audit is subject to the institutional environment, for example, quality auditing 
standards and quality assurance, including an effective monitoring system and 
ethic education. These institutional requirements have not been sufficiently
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developed in China to ensure the reliability of financial reporting that investors 
expect. Without effective institutional supporting systems, the quality of audit 
performed by the same auditor may be different from it appears in a 
well-developed institutional system (Chen and Cheng, 2007). Chen and Cheng 
(2007) further argue that quality auditors fail to promote the harmonisation of 
accounting practices and better financial reporting practices in a case of China.
3.4 Weak Legal Enforcement
A strong system of legal enforcement is needed to safeguard corporate 
governance mechanisms, because it could substitute for weak rules since active 
and well-functional courts can step in (La Porta, 1998). As one of the largest 
in-transition countries all over the world. China is still on the way to establish a 
market-oriented economy with a well-built legal system. A dramatic reform in the 
legal system has been made in China, in order to improve the effectiveness of 
legal system and law enforcement, for example Company Law was promulgated in 
1993 and further revised in 2005, and the specific rules and regulations have been 
issued.
However, there is a major problem about enforcements of these newly 
promulgated rules and regulations. Atypical example is on the promulgation of the 
Code o f Corporate Governance in 2002, as discussed earlier. The code requires 
all listed companies have no less than 33.33% of board members to be 
independent directors by the middle of 2003. However, the survey (CNINFO, 2006) 
shows there are 15% of listed firms do not comply with the code. Another example 
showing weak enforcement is related to GAAP compliance. Some researchers 
(Chen et al., 2002; Chen and Cheng, 2007) argue that the use of high quality 
accounting standards does not necessarily lead to harmonised accounting 
practices and comparable financial reporting in China, primarily because China
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lacks for supporting infrastructure and legal enforcement to ensure the standards 
are rigorously interpreted and applied.
There has been a discussion about the independence of the securities authority, 
which might be useful to explain the weak legal enforcement in China. Chinese 
securities administrative authorities don't have adequate independence from the 
government and market participants. The CSRC is one of the affiliated 
departments of the State Council, so that it is not an independent third party from 
state-controlled companies, for the reason that State shares and State-owned LP 
shares are ultimately owned by the State Council, and the shares are currently 
managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council (SASAC). So, the CSRC may find it difficult to secure an 
unbiased scrutiny and resist political pressures from the SASAC, or other 
governmental departments, such as CMOF etc. In China, since there is no 
hierarchical relation between the SASAC and the CSRC, it is impossible for the 
CSRC to punish the SASAC, and, on the contrary, the CSRC has to abide by the 
rules promulgated by the SASAC to safeguard the future development of 
state-controlled economy. A major difference between the Chinese securities 
market and the Western markets is that the Chinese markets are designed more 
like an ATM machine for the State-controlled economy to finance the 
State-controlled listed companies and help them survive financial distress. 
Therefore, the efficiency and the objectiveness of the Chinese regulatory oversight 
systems have been challenged and jeopardised by the existing political-economic 
environment.
As a result, the CSRC finds it very difficult to enforce laws and regulations, when 
dealing with state controlled companies. State controlled enterprises will never be 
punished, even if they clearly break the laws and expropriate minority investors. 
Moreover, state-controlled listed companies often lobby for more political support
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via their controlling-shareholders to avoid the CSRC’s law enforcement actions. 
Even when the CSRC’s enforcement actions have to be taken, the effectiveness of 
the actions may be affected by the involvement of the SASAC and CMOF. So, the 
effectiveness of laws and rules may be damaged substantially. A typical example 
is the IPO case of 'China Southern Airlines’ (CSA, stock code: 600029) in 2003, 
which is one of the biggest three airline companies in China and is ultimately 
controlled by the SASAC. The CSRC approved the IPO plan by the CSA without 
effective scrutiny, mainly because the CSRC had to follow the SASAC’s national 
development policy of boosting the airline industry. Flowever, the CSRC was 
strongly criticised by the public later on, since the company announced huge 
earnings decrease on the second day after being listed.
Most significantly, Chinese rules are in favour for state-owned companies rather 
than non state-owned companies. China has double listing standards for 
state-owned companies and non state-owned companies respectively, in order to 
encourage state-owned companies to go public easily. For example, pre-listing 
companies should normally have 3-year operating records with measurable 
earnings for the past 3 consecutive years {Company Law, ed. 1993, CFI. 3. 152), 
but state-owned companies can be exempted from this requirement. This unfair 
double standard is obviously harmful: individual-owned or family-controlled 
business may be disadvantaged, even though they report better operating results. 
A double standard for state-owned companies and non state-owned companies 
has a clear implication: the CSRC is able to act as a third party scrutiniser for non 
state-owned companies, and better enforce its rules and regulations, so that it is 
likely to see less cases of corporate governance failures, fraudulent financial 
statements and/or expropriations among non state-owned companies. However, 
the CSRC fails to do the same to state-owned companies.
3.5 Property Rights In China
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Property rights conceive of ownership and possession as belonging to legal 
individuals (Wikipedia Online, 2005). Traditionally, the bundle of rights includes: (1) 
control use of the property; (2) benefit from the property (examples: mining rights 
and rent); (3) transfer or sell the property; and (4) exclude others from the property 
Holmes (1881), in his well-regarded book ‘Common Law’, describes property 
rights in two fundamental aspects. The first is possession, which can be defined as 
control over a resource based on the practical inability of another to contradict the 
ends of the possessor. The second is title, which is the expectation that others will 
recognize rights to control resource, even when it is not in possession. Property 
rights are widely protected in the current laws of western countries usually in the 
form of a Constitution or a Bill of Rights. Protection is also found in the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 17).
On the contrary, communists, originally, argue that only collective ownership 
through a polity, though not necessarily a state, will assure the minimisation of 
unequal or unjust outcomes and the maximisation of benefits, and that therefore all, 
or almost all, private property should be abolished. So, communists have also 
upheld the notion that private property is inherently illegitimate. This argument is 
centred mainly on the opinion that the creation of private property will always 
benefit one class over another, giving way to domination through the use of this 
private property.
However, in a post-communist country, the communists’ ideology seems to 
co-exist with the notion of private property. Take China for example. China’s 
economic reform tends to privatise its state-owned economy by selling a small 
proportion of ownership in SOEs to individual investors, and allowing individuals, 
either natural persons or legal persons, to own and possess property in private.
It should be noted that the proportion of ownership held by individuals in China is
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relatively small. More importantly, there is a serious problem with the protection of :
private property in China. There were no constitutional safeguards for private 
property in China, until Chinese Constitution was amended in 2004. China's new '
Constitution (2004, Article 17.1) shows that private property is inviolable and the i
government protects the legitimate rights of citizens to private property and Its 
inheritance. However, it also makes clear that the State may expropriate or I
requisition private property for its use and shall make compensation for the private |
property expropriated or requisitioned (Article 17.3). Obviously, the Chinese rules |
are really weak in protecting private property. Empirically, Jacoby et al. (2002) ;
highlight the importance of the positive role in securing property rights, and they :
further find strong evidence of weak protection in private property on land i
investment using village data in China.
I
I
Property rights are one of the most important aspects of good governance (Dollar
and Kraay, 2000). But, if property rights are not well protected, the effectiveness of '
such governance is questionable. For most Chinese public firms, which are
controlled by the State ultimately, individual investors may be on the verge of being
expropriated and/or requisitioned by the state-controlled shareholders.
3.6 Summary
The chapter has presented a brief introduction of Chinese IPO market and 
institutional infrastructures in China. It identifies ownership characteristics and 
corporate governance characteristics of Chinese listed companies. To be specific, 
controlling shareholders have gained strong voting power in shareholders’ 
meetings, and influential control in the board room and day-to-day operations of 
their listed subsidiaries. In this sense, the interests of minority investors may be 
jeopardised, because controlling shareholders may expropriate wealth and profits 
from minority shareholders. Well-established corporate governance is likely to
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prevent controlling shareholders from jeopardising the interests of minority 
investors. However, some evidences demonstrate that corporate governance 
practices in China is weak and yet to be effective. It also shows that private 
property is not well protected in China, and the concern for expropriation by 
state-controlled shareholders may arise. Furthermore, the effectiveness of legal 
enforcement is problematic, for the reason that Chinese laws and regulations are 
weak, and the CSRC, Chinese securities authority, is not a third-party regulator.
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Chapter 4 Hypothesis Development
In this research, three main hypotheses have been developed on the basis of the 
literature survey, as follows;
4.1 Managerial Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), in a case of a decrease in managerial 
ownership, managers will deviate from the value-maximising goal, so that 
companies’ operating performance in the long run may be negatively affected by 
the deviation from value maximisation. Since firms will sell their new shares to the 
public in the IPO, the dilution of an entrepreneur’s and/or the manager's stakes 
cannot be avoided, and ownership becomes more dispersed. So, the change in 
the post-issue operating performance is likely to be consistent with the change in 
managerial ownership overtime (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
However, it should be noted that managerial ownership is very low among Chinese 
listed companies, because most Chinese listed companies originate from SOEs. 
wholly owned by the state. So, most Chinese listed companies do not have any 
shares held by managers, and only a small number of listed companies make their 
shares available to their managers, but the percentage is low. Aharony et al. (2000) 
find an average percentage of 0.5% of the total shares for H-share companies. 
Further, A-share companies report an average proportion less than 0.01% in the 
total shares (CSRC, 2006). Due to the low magnitude of managerial ownership, 
managerial shareholdings may not be effective to serve as one of the agency cost 
reducing mechanisms, which are discussed in Table 2-1. So, it is hard to expect
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any positive relationship between managerial ownership changes and firm’s 
operating performance changes. As a result, the change in managerial ownership 
may not be positively associated with the change of firm’s operating performance 
resulting from the flotation.
So, first of all, the managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis will be examined by 
conjecturing that Chinese managers do not keep an effective level of 
shareholdings. It is hypothesised that the operating performance would not be 
related to managerial ownership, and the change in managerial ownership 
resulting from the IPO is not associated with the change in IPO operating 
performance relative to the pre-IPO level.
So, the first hypothesis:
H1: there is NO relation between the change in the post-1 PC managerial 
ownership from before to after the IPO and the post-IPO operating performance 
changes relative to the pre-IPO level.
4.2 Accrual-based Earnings Management Hypothesis
There is a large body of empirical studies (Teoh et al., 1998; Roosenboom et al., 
2003), based on western markets, showing that the change in the post-issue 
operating performance might be consistent with accruals management. As argued 
by Teoh et al. (1998), issuers report unusually high earnings in the pre-issue period 
by adopting discretionary accounting accrual adjustments that raise reported 
earnings relative to actual cash flows. Once accounting accruals reverse in the 
future financial years, reported earnings would be reduced relative to cash flows 
So, the reported earnings performance in the long run would be negatively affected 
so as to go worse than the pre-IPO level. Management has strong incentives and
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opportunities to boost earnings numbers in the pre-issue period, because 
investors may pay a higher price, if investors are unaware that reported earnings 
are inflated (Teoh et a!., 1998).
However, Chinese managers do not have an economic incentive to inflate 
earnings in the pre-issue period, because the management team normally has 
very small shareholdings and does not benefit from a higher offering price directly 
(Aharony et a!., 2000). However, managers may have some indirect personal 
benefits for accrual-based earnings management: in China public listing is more 
like a political process rather than an economic process, because public listing is 
China’s privatisation strategy to reform the SOEs and government officials do not 
want the strategy to fail. Once the administrative government, either at a local level 
or at a national level, makes an IPO decision for the particular SOE to raise funds 
from the market, the task of public listing will be assigned to the SOE manager. If 
the SOE manager fails in this task, his job security may be jeopardised. However, if 
the management successfully helps the firm to go public and make new equity 
offerings, he would win a high reputation for himself. That would be beneficial to his 
job prospects and political careers as well. Moreover, in order to keep the interest 
of the managers closely aligned with that of shareholders, Chinese companies, 
once listed, often design a better compensation incentive package for the 
management team in accordance with the CSRC’s remuneration regulations. 
Practically, managers usually get paid better than previously, so that managers 
have a potential incentive to push the firms going public.
So, managers may artificially inflate reported earnings in the pre-IPO period. 
According to the Company Law (ed. 1993, CH. 3.152) in China, candidate 
companies should normally have 3-year operating records with measurable 
earnings for the past 3 consecutive years prior to the IPO. In this sense, good 
historical earnings performance in the pre-IPO period usually warrants a
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successful IPO in Chinese stock market. Secondly, managers may boost pre-IPO 
earnings performance to push up the IPO price and raise more funds from the 
markets, if investors cannot see through the ‘manipulative schemes’ and are 
willing to pay a higher price (Teoh et al. 1998). in valuing Chinese IPOs, the 
comparable firms approach is widely adopted, whilst the other two approaches 
(DCF and asset-based) are rarely employed. The comparable firms approach is 
typically implemented in China via multiplying the predicted EPS (Earnings Per 
Share) in the IPO year by the average P/E (Price/Earnings) ratio of comparable 
publicly traded firms. The predicted earnings number in the IPO year is largely 
based on company’s historical operating performance in the pre-IPO years. So, in 
this sense, inflated earnings figures may result in a higher IPO offer price. Basically, 
there is a major concern with the investors’ sophistication in China, since Chinese 
markets are at the very beginning stage of its development. As HKEx (2004) shows, 
public floatation is mainly bought by individual investors by the end of 2003, rather 
than by highly educated fund managers. Due to the short history of Chinese stock 
markets, individual investors are generally less experienced and very few of them 
are of financial literacy (Shanghai Securities News, 2002). Many investors pick up 
stocks with their sentiments, and fail to respond to corporate fundamentals in a 
rational manner. Mei et al. (2005) further confirm that Chinese stocks are often 
over-valued and the speculative trading is widely spread. It clearly shows that 
Chinese individual investors are less likely to recognise earnings management so 
as to promote managers to engage in more accruals management.
In this study, it is hypothesised that accrual-based earnings management may be 
one of the ways to inflate reported earnings under Chinese GAAP in the pre-IPO 
period, when managers have made an IPO decision. Flowever, pre-IPO abnormal 
discretionary accruals cannot be sustainable in the post-IPO period. Once 
accounting accruals unwind in the aftermarket years, reported earnings would be 
negatively affected. So, the hypothesis below will be examined:
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H2a: IPO firms use discretionary accounting accrual adjustments to manipulate 
reported earnings in the pre-IPO period, discretionary accruals are positive in the 
pre-IPO period and negative in the post-IPO period.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Fiealy and Whalen (1999), investors may not be 
able to fully see through income-increasing accruals management around the IPO, 
If this is the case, investors may be overoptimistic about the firm’s future 
profitability and are willing to buy the IPO at a higher price so as to push the IPO 
price higher (Teoh et al., 1998). Flowever. subsequent reversals of accruals 
management in the post-IPO period should negatively affect reported earnings of 
IPO firms, and disappointing earnings performance in the post-IPO period leads to 
contemporaneous poor stock performance in the aftermarket period. So, the 
hypothesis below will be examined:
H2b: IPO firms with large positive discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO period are 
likely to perform poorly in the stock market in the aftermarket period.
One may have concerns about the flexibility in accounting choices under Chinese 
GAAP for accrual-based earnings management purposes, because of strong 
governmental intervention in financial reporting practices of listed companies. 
Historically, accounting choices and/or estimates in using accounting standards 
were determined by the administrative governments, so that managers could 
hardly manipulate accruals for opportunistic purposes. For example, according to 
the Chinese GAAP (CMOF, 1992), allowance for doubtful debts was determined by 
the governmentally-approved level of 0.3% of the total debts for all the listed firms, 
and no provision for impairment losses on any other assets was required. Fixed 
assets depreciation policy, including expected useful lives, residual values and 
depreciation methods, has to be decided by the government.
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However, since the GAAP reform of 1998 (CMOF, 1998), firms are now allowed to 
determine provisions for impairment loss of receivables, investments and 
inventories on a prudent basis; however, the government still keeps the control 
over the provisions for the rest of tangible and intangible assets and fixed assets 
depreciation policy. Since then, Chinese managers are free to determine at least 
some accruals items at their own discretion, for example, allowance for doubtful 
debts and so on. As a result, accrual-based earnings management becomes 
available to Chinese managers for opportunistic purposes under Chinese GAAP. 
Some empirical evidences also confirm (Chen et al., 2002; and Chen and Cheng, 
2007) that Chinese companies can abuse some accruals items to push earnings 
upwards and the overwhelming item to achieve the goal is to record a low level of 
allowance for doubtful debts.
4.3 RPT-based Earnings Management Hypothesis
4.3.1 Related Party Transactions in China
Since 1998, Chinese listed firms have been required to disclose related party 
transactions on their corporate annual reports with full details. Historically, as 
shown in the diagram (Table 3-1), a Chinese listed company is a combination of 
some profitable units of the original SOE (controlling shareholder). In many cases, 
listed companies do not even have an independent distribution network and supply 
chains, so that they have to sell (or purchase) goods (or raw materials) to (or from) 
their controlling shareholders. Listed companies also need to pay for the use of the 
facilities provided by the controlling shareholder, for example water and gas supply. 
Table 4-1 summarises seven major types of related party transactions between the 
controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries, which are based on original 
corporate annual reports published in China.
Category one (Operating items) mainly consists of sales and/or purchases of 
products, services and other non-monetary assets, such as tangible and intangible 
assets. Many listed companies have to sell and/or purchase goods through their 
controlling shareholders, since they do not have independent distribution and 
supply chains. Some other types of related party transactions associated with 
firms' day-to-day operating activities may sometimes be incurred, such as leases, 
franchises, and administrative overheads (water & electricity supply etc.). Listed 
subsidiaries often use the trademarks, patents and permits owned by their 
controlling shareholders, which are normally made without charge. Similarly, 
franchises are usually provided by controlling shareholders free of charge.
Category two (Loan items) includes cash loans and loans guarantees. By the 
Standards o f Loans in China, a non-financial company is not allowed to act as a 
financial service lender and engage in the business of making customers loans. 
However, loans offered to related parties are not fully prohibited. In fact, by the end 
of 2003, more than 54% of Chinese A-share companies report to make cash loans 
to their controlling shareholders and the aggregate amount of such loans reaches 
Chinese ¥ 57.7 billion (Xinhua Net, 2005), accounting for 1.4% of total assets. 
Loans by controlling shareholders to listed companies may also happen 
occasionally, but only stay at a very small level (Xinhua Net, 2005). Related loans 
are often made with preferential terms, and usually interest free, or at an interest 
rate lower than the market level. So, in this sense, related loans by listed firms to 
controlling shareholders are often associated with the expropriation of listed firms 
by controlling shareholders.
A loan guarantee is not a real transfer of economic resources from one party to the 
other, so that it would not have a significant effect on corporate operating 
performance, unless the debtor (normally the controlling shareholder) is not able to 
return the funds to the lending institution (the bank). In this case, the guarantor
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(normally the listed company) will have to repay it to the creditor (the bank), and 
the operating performance of the guarantor’s entity (the listed company) may 
suffer from the transfer-out of funds.
4.3.2 RPT-based Earnings Management around the IPO
In this study, I extend prior literature and investigate the effects of RPTs between 
IPO firms and their controlling shareholders on the IPO firms’ operating 
performance from before to after the IPO. To my best knowledge, this study is the 
first one to study the association between IPO operating performance and related 
party transactions with controlling shareholders. 1 hypothesise that besides 
accrual-based earnings management, IPO firms may use some additional 
approach to boost reported earnings, to be specific, by adopting RPT-based 
earnings management. Since ownership structure for Chinese listed companies is 
highly concentrated, the interest of controlling shareholders and their listed 
subsidiaries is aligned. Controlling shareholders may be motivated in structuring 
transactions with IPO subsidiaries and help them to achieve income-reporting 
objectives.
The incentives to manipulate reported earnings of IPO firms are obvious; 
controlling shareholders boost the revenues and/or profits of their subsidiaries, 
primarily because IPO firms with good historical operating performance can easily 
qualify for equity offerings, and earnings manipulation may sometimes lead to a 
higher offering price of the IPO, if investors are deceived by the ‘manipulative 
techniques’ and are willing to pay a higher price (Teoh et al., 1998).
4.3.2.1 Pre-IPO Earninos Management
For the IPO subsidiaries’ side, IPO firms may like to do whatever possible for 
earnings manipulation purposes in the pre-IPO period, rather than rely on 
accrual-based approach only. As discussed earlier, accrual-based earnings 
management has nothing to do with the cashflow component of reported earnings. 
That is to say, accrual-based approach may make earnings performance better; 
however, corporate cashflow performance remains poor still. So, managers may 
like to use some other manipulative schemes, as far as possible, to boost earnings 
performance and/or cashflow performance. Apparently, RPT-based earnings 
management could probably be a potential option for IPO firms, because an 
obvious advantage of RPT-based approach over accrual-based approach is that 
RPT-based earnings management may have an effect on either accruals 
component or cashflow component of reported earnings.
For controlling shareholders’ side, controlling shareholders have incentives to 
boost the revenues and/or profits of their subsidiaries, primarily because 
controlling shareholders have a large percentage of ownership in their IPO 
subsidiaries. On the other hand, this RPT-based earnings management may also 
be beneficial to controlling shareholders’ entity as well. If public investors fail to see 
through this earnings management scheme, public investors may need to pay a 
price premium to buy the shares and have to contribute more to the Shareholders’ 
Equity of the IPO firms than original shareholders.
In addition, if ultimately owned by the governmental agencies, controlling 
shareholders (the original SOEs) have obvious political connections with the 
governments, since they are managed by an administrative government, and top 
managers are normally government officials and are appointed by the government. 
Once the administrative government decides an IPO decision for the SOEs to raise 
funds from the market, the government may sometimes require the controlling 
shareholders to provide financial assistances whenever necessary to boost
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pre-IPO subsidiaries’ earnings performance to secure the IPO. So, controlling 
shareholders may have to structure a large percentage of RPTs to benefit their 
IPO subsidiaries.
So, I hypothesise that transactions with their controlling shareholders might be the 
second source to boost the pre-IPO reported earnings figures of IPO firms. 
Basically, there are many ways to conduct the RPT-based earnings manipulation: 
for example, ‘overcharging’ , ‘underpaying’ and ‘overselling’.
(1) Overcharging: IPO firms may sell goods and products to their controlling 
shareholders, and a higher selling price, rather than the fair price, may be charged 
for the transactions. In this sense, profits would be shifted directly from controlling 
shareholders to their IPO subsidiaries. IPO firms may also sell non-monetary 
assets, such as tangible assets and intangible assets, to controlling shareholders 
at a price higher than fair value, and the gain (the difference between selling price 
and fair value) will be recognised in the income statement once incurred.
(2) Underpaying: IPO subsidiaries may purchase raw materials, water & electricity 
supply etc from controlling shareholders at a price lower than fair value, and profits 
can also be shifted from controlling shareholders to IPO firms. Sometimes, IPO 
subsidiaries may purchase community services (administrative services), and/or 
non-monetary assets from controlling shareholders at a lower price, and the gain 
(the difference between purchasing price and fair value) will be recognised in the 
income statement once incurred.
(3) Overselling: Most importantly, IPO subsidiaries may also inflate the sales 
figures, by aggressively overselling goods and products (trade relationship) to 
controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders, as a result, hold excess 
inventories above the normal level, and do not return products to the subsidiaries
85
before the IPO. In this sense, pre-IPO sales and revenues may be inflated through 
transactions with controlling shareholders, and thus profits are exaggerated as a 
result.
So, if RPT-based earnings management is conducted through the ‘overcharging’, 
‘overselling’ and ‘underpaying’ activities, there might be a positive relationship 
between the size of operating RPTs and the operating performance of IPO firms, 
primarily because IPO subsidiaries who structure larger operating RPTs with 
controlling shareholders are more likely to engage in this RPT-based earnings 
management. Accordingly, this study tests the following hypothesis:
H3a: in the pre-IPO period, the IPO operating peiiormance is associated with the 
aggregate amount o f operating transactions (non-loan) between controlling 
shareholders and IPO subsidiaries.
4.3.2.2 Post-IPO Payback
However, once IPO subsidiaries get listed, controlling shareholders lose interest in 
consistently boosting reported performance of their listed subsidiaries. Further, 
controlling shareholders may expect future payback for what they have contributed 
in the pre-IPO period. One common way for controlling shareholders to benefit 
from the pre-IPO contributions is to sell the shares in the stock market after the IPO 
process is completed. However, in Chinese market, controlling shareholders have 
to retain the stocks for up to 3 years after the IPO is completed, due to a lock-up 
requirement. Most importantly, the shares held by controlling shareholders are 
categorised as non-tradable shares, which can not be traded publicly on the stock 
exchanges, so that controlling shareholders have to sell their shares off exchanges 
by identifying a potential buyer on their own, for example public auctions.
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So, a more likely way for controlling shareholders to obtain repayment Is to 
expropriate listed subsidiaries by siphoning cash and/or other economic resources 
back from the listed firms, in return for the assets and/or profits surrendered by 
controlling shareholders in the pre-IPO period (Cheng et al., 2007). For example, 
controlling shareholders may obtain cash loans from their listed subsidiaries with 
the terms preferential to controlling shareholders. As the CSRG-conducted survey 
shows (Xinhua Net, 2005), those loans by IPO firms to controlling shareholders are 
often made on preferential terms, for example interest free or at a rate lower than 
market level. So, in this sense, such loans are regarded as an important way to 
expropriate IPO subsidiaries. Since IPO firms often keep a large amount of unused 
IPO proceeds in their bank accounts (Aharony et al., 2000), IPO firms are able to 
make loans to their controlling shareholders without running short of working 
capital, unless those loans are extraordinarily larger than IPO firms can 
comfortably afford.
Of course, controlling shareholders may also expropriate their listed subsidiaries 
through some other ways in the post-IPO period: to name a few, controlling 
shareholders may sell goods, and/or non-monetary assets, to their IPO 
subsidiaries at a higher-than-market price, and/or pay a lower-than-market price 
for buying goods and non-monetary assets from their IPO subsidiaries. Flowever, it 
is important to recognise that expropriations through cash loans on preferential 
terms are more likely than expropriations through other RPTs. For example, 
expropriations through trade relationship and/or non-monetary assets are less 
likely to be adopted, because a loss will be immediately recognised into income 
statements of listed subsidiaries to write off the difference between the trading 
price and the fair value. As a result, it may trigger public complaint and a CSRC 
investigation may follow up. So, expropriation through cash loans on preferential 
terms could be the main way for controlling shareholders to expropriate listed firms 
after the IPO, and, in this research, the extent of net loans between listed
87
subsidiaries and controlling shareholders is the proxy for the magnitude of 
expropriation. Then, the second hypothesis is:
H3b: In the post-IPO period, controlling shareholders are likely to expropriate IPO 
subsidiaries in the post-IPO period via related loans; and post-IPO operating 
performance is negatively associated with the size o f related loans.
4.3.2.3 Post-IPO Market Reaction
Finally, the last two hypotheses are developed to examine the market reaction to 
the pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management and post-IPO loan-based 
expropriation.
Firstly, it is expected that investors are very unlikely to fully see through this 
RPT-based manipulative scheme, even though disclosures of operating RPTs, 
including the nature and the terms of transactions, should be made on IPO 
prospectuses and/or annual reports. Take an ‘overcharging’ case for example. IPO 
subsidiaries may abuse the operating RPTs by charging controlling shareholders 
at an unfairly high price for the goods and products sold; however investors may 
not be able to observe the fair value of the transactions, particularly when a 
comparable price in an open market is not available. So, investors cannot tell 
whether the transaction is structured artificially for opportunistic purposes or not. 
Take an ‘overselling’ case for another example. If IPO subsidiaries aggressively 
oversell goods to controlling shareholders, financial statements of IPO subsidiaries 
would not show this overselling practice in any section and investors can hardly 
judge this practice. The likely way to observe this practice is to check the balance 
sheets of controlling shareholders’ entity to see whether or not controlling 
shareholders hold excess inventories above the normal inventory level. However,
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controlling shareholders do not need to disclose their financial statements to the 
public in China, so that investors are unable to observe this overselling practice.
Since investors cannot fully see through this pre-IPO RPT-based earnings 
management, investors may be overoptimistic about IPO firms' profitability and 
consider these artificial operating RPTs to be genuine, expecting these RPTs to be 
sustainable in the post-IPO period. However, if controlling shareholders fail to 
maintain those artificial operating RPTs in the post-IPO period, the long-run stock 
performance may be negatively affected. So, it is hypothesised that the change in 
operating RPTs from before to after the IPO would have a positive effect on the 
long-run stock performance of IPO firms.
H3c: in the post-IPO period, the long-run stock performance of IPO firms is 
positively associated with the change in operating RPTs from before to after the 
IPO.
Secondly, it is further hypothesised that post-IPO loan-based expropriation is likely 
to affect long-run stock performance of IPO firms. IPO firms should be able to 
make small loans to their controlling shareholders without damaging their 
operating performance seriously; however, such loans may significantly impact 
corporate performance and investor’s confidence, when they are large.
Once listed firms make cash loans to their controlling shareholders in the post-IPO 
period, listed firms are required to disclose loan RPTs on the footnotes of their 
annual reports. Public investors are able to observe these loan transactions, as 
soon as these RPTs disclosures are released. As La Porta et al. (1998) argue, if 
public investors realise that they are expropriated and poorly protected, they might 
be willing to buy corporate shares only at a lower price. It would destroy i n v e s t o r s  
confidence and negatively affect the stock performance of I P O  firms. I n  othet
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words, long-term stock performance of IPO firms in the post-IPO period may be 
negatively affected, when IPO firms report to make a large cash loans to their 
controlling shareholders. So, the final hypothesis is:
H3d: in the post-IPO period, the size o f related loans from IPO firms to controlling 
shareholders is negatively associated with long-run iPO stock performance.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, the three hypotheses have been developed: (1) Managerial 
ownership dispersion hypothesis; (2) Accrual-based earnings management 
hypothesis and (3) RPT-based earnings management hypothesis. Firstly, I 
hypothesise that the change in reported operating performance from before to 
after the IPO is NOT associated with the contemporaneous change in managerial 
ownership over the same time, since managerial ownership is extremely 
uncommon in China. It is expected that managerial ownership held by Chinese 
managers is too small to make a difference.
Then, it is further hypothesised that operating performance of Chinese IPOs in the 
pre-IPO period is artificially inflated. The one way to boost pre-IPO reported 
earnings is to adjust discretionary accounting accruals so as to manipulate 
pre-IPO reported earnings. In the post-IPO period, IPO firms with large positive 
discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO period are expected to perform poorly in the 
market in the post-IPO period.
Further, a second likely way to boost sales and/or profits of pre-IPO subsidiaries is 
to structure artificial related party transactions with controlling shareholders. It is 
hypothesised that the abnormally high reported operating performance in the 
pre-IPO period is positively associated with operating RPTs (non-loan) between
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controlling shareholders and IPO firms. However, in the post-IPO period, 
controlling shareholders discontinue these RPT-based manipulative practices and 
begin to expropriate IPO subsidiaries by obtaining a large percentage of cash 
loans from IPO subsidiaries, primarily in return for profits and/or resources 
transferred into IPO subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period (Cheng et al. 2007). It is 
expected that Chinese IPOs reporting a decline in operating RPTs from before to 
after the IPO are likely to perform poorly in the stock market, and those IPOs 
making cash loans to controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period are also likely I
to perform poorly in the stock market. i
Chapter 5 Variable Measurement
5.1 Operating performance Measures
Table 5-1 presents all the operating performance measures that have been 
employed for performance evaluation in IPO literature. It shows that ROA 
(Operating Returns on Assets) is the most commonly used performance measure 
in prior literature for judging operating performance (for example, Jain and Kini, 
1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Kutsuna et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2004; Aharony et al., 
2000; Huang and Song, 2003; Wang et al., 2001; Wang, 2005), followed by CFO 
(Cashflow From Operations on Assets), for example Jain and Kini (1994); 
Mikkelson et al. (1997); Kim et al. (2004); Aharony et al. (2000); Huang and Song
(2003) and Wang et al. (2001).
Although most studies (Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997; Huang and 
Song, 2003; Wang et al., 2001 and Wang, 2005) use EBITDA (Earnings before 
Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation) to proxy for corporate operating 
returns, some researchers (Kutsuna et al., 2002; Aharony et al., 2000 and Chen 
and Shih, 2004) adopt Net income (Earnings after Tax) and/or EBIT (Earnings 
before interest and Tax) to proxy for operating returns. I am in favour of EBITDA to 
proxy for operating returns, when a large multi-industry sample is examined. Tax 
calculation and depreciation policies vary from industry to industry, so that Net 
Incomes figures across the companies from different industry sectors may not be 
comparable with each other. In this sense, EBITDA is a better operating 
performance measure to compare some companies with others from different 
industries.
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Furthermore, although most prior studies use asset-scaled measures and/or 
sale-scaled measures, some researchers (Kutsuna et al. 2002; Chen and Shih, 
2004) also use actual earnings measures to examine the changes in operating 
performance. It is important to recognise that actual earnings figures may not as 
useful as asset-scaled figures to evaluate operating efficiency for IPO firms, 
because new capital is raised from the market and, as a result, the size of 
operations accordingly goes larger resulting from the IPO. So, actual earnings 
figures may not be appropriate to evaluate operating efficiency and profitability for 
IPO firms.
This research follows most of prior studies and adopts ROA (Operating Return, 
EBITDA, on lagged (-1) Assets) and CFO (Cashflow from Operations on lagged (-1) 
Assets) as the basic financial indicators forjudging corporate operating efficiency. 
The first reason to choose the two performance measures is that the two measures 
are widely employed as basic operating performance measures in financial 
statement analysis to evaluate firms’ operating efficiency; it is believed that ROA 
and CFO are good performance measures, particularly for evaluating a 
multi-industry sample of IPO firms. Secondly, the use of same performance 
measures is able to make my research more comparable to the findings in prior 
literature.
Besides the two basic indicators for performance evaluation, there are some other 
financial indicators to reflect corporate operating performance in different aspects. 
For example, sales and sales growth figures are often examined, since they may 
be useful to judge operating efficiency. Most prior IPO literature, such as Jain and 
Kini (1994); Kutsuna et al., (2002); Kim et al., (2004); Aharony et al., (2000); Huang 
and Song (2003); Wang et al., (2001); Chen and Shih (2004) and Wang (2005). 
examines IPO firms' operating scale and growth capability by studying sales and 
sales growth. This study will also investigate the sales and the sales grovrth for
Chinese IPO firms: (1) Sales denotes the size of operations. It is measured as 
‘nominal sales’; alternatively, it can also be measured as ‘nominal sales scaled by 
lagged (-1) total assets’; (2) Sales growth is measured as the year-over-year 
growth rate of sales.
Table 5-2 lists all the operating performance measures adopted by this study, and a 
detailed definition is also provided for each of the performance measures. It should 
be noted that prior studies all use accounting performance measures, and none of 
previous studies uses economic profit measures, such as EVA (Economic Value 
Added) and so on. One of the possible reasons is that, according to China’s listing 
standards, accounting figures are the major performance measure to evaluate 
corporate operating performance, for example, qualifying for new securities 
offerings, IPO pricing and so on, and investors are primarily guided by accounting 
performance to assess the IPO firms’ operating results and management’s abilities. 
So, accounting performance is thus more relevant to IPO firms’ operating 
performance assessment. Based on this, Economic profit measure will not be 
adopted as the operating performance measures.
In order to control for the industry shocks, the IPO firms’ operating performance 
after industry adjustment will be examined. According to Mikkelson et al. (1997). 
industry-adjusted earnings numbers are obtained by deducting the median 
contemporaneous operating return of a group of industry-matched publicly traded 
firms. The matched firms are selected by matching the industry of the sample firms 
within the same sector of the CSRC’s Standard Industry Classification (SIC 2001). 
The CSRC’s SIC (2001) is currently the only official system, which is widely used 
and covers all the listed firms in mainland China. The structure of this classification 
follows western systems, such as the US SIC and the UK SIC, after being 
re-organised to make it more applicable to Chinese firms. Table 5-3 presents the 
Chinese SIC (2001) and sample distribution by industry sectors. According to the
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SIC (2001), there are 13 specific industry sectors in total (from sector A to M), and 
sector C (Manufacturing) is further divided into 9 sub-sectors, as it is an 
extraordinarily large sector and covers too many companies (around 2/3 of total) 
Thus, in this study, sample companies are divided into these 21 industry 
(sub-)sectors, and matched publicly traded firms are those which come from the 
same industry sectors (or sub-sectors) and went public prior to 1998.
5.2 Stock Performance Measures
The two stock performance measures, BAHRs (buy and hold returns) and CARs 
(cumulative abnormal returns), are used to evaluate the aftermarket abnormal 
stock performance of Chinese IPOs, since both of them are widely used in prior 
literature to identify long-term abnormal performance (Teoh et at., 1998; 
Roosenboom et al., 2003), but neither of them is always preferred (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). The yearly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the yearly 
raw return on a stock minus the yearly benchmark return for the corresponding 
trading period. The buy-and-hold returns (BAHRs) and the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) for an IPO firm / in event time are calculated as follow:
,v=l
Where R, , represents the raw stock return of stock / in event year Y (s) (s=1. 2, 3, 
4, 5), and R,„^ , is the contemporaneous benchmark return in event year Y (s) (s=1, 
2, 3, 4, 5). The aftermarket period includes the following 5 years where years are
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defined as successive 252-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. Thus, the 
event year 1 consists of event days 2-252, and the event year 2 consists of event 
days 253-504. For IPOs that are de-listed before their 5-year anniversary, the 
aftermarket period is truncated, and the 5-year return ends with its last listing.
In the classic study, Ritter (1991) use matching firms for a benchmark, which 
denote those already-listed firms matched by industry. In this study, an 
industry-matched firms benchmark is also used, primarily because IPO long-run 
operating performance is industry-adjusted by matching firms, and accordingly 
IPO long-run stock performance should also be adjusted by a same 
industry-matched firms benchmark. So. the benchmark return used is the median 
contemporaneous stock return of industry-matched publicly traded firms. In 
addition, the buy-and-hold returns and Cumulative abnormal returns are both 
inclusive of dividends and other distributions.
5.3 Managerial Ownership Variables
Let Managerial Ownership represent the ownership stake held by corporate 
executives and directors. It is calculated as the proportion of the shares owned by 
corporate executives and directors in the total shares. This definition of managerial 
ownership is made the same as that in prior literature, for example Mikkelson et al. 
(1997). Furthermore, A Managerial Ownership represents the change in the 
ownership stake (in percent) held by corporate executives and directors resulting 
from the flotation.
5.4 Accruals Variables
The explanatory variable {DAC, Discretionary Accruals) is the proxy for the level of 
accrual-based earnings management, and ADAC is the proxy for the change of
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discretionary accruals (DAC), which is the difference between the discretionary
accruals in a pre-IPO year and that in a post-IPO year.
However, the separation of discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals, 
or say, normal accruals and expected accruals, is practically difficult 
(Garza-Gomez et al., 2006), not only because discretion is unobservable but also 
because there are economic events in the life of a company that will cause total 
accruals to change from year to year. Every time that a researcher estimates 
discretionary accruals he is forcing an expectation model of the ‘normal’ or 
expected behaviour of accruals in relation to economic events. Despite all the 
generated interest and the abundant literature on this area, there is no consensus 
about which model or method of estimating discretionary accruals is superior. As a 
matter of fact, there are no guidelines about how to estimate these models in order 
to improve the power of the tests (Garza-Gomez et al., 2006).
Basically, speaking, there are two approaches to obtain DAC (discretionary 
accruals) in prior literature: firstly, Healy (1985) uses total accruals and the change 
in total accruals as measures of management's discretion over reported earnings. 
In other words, he does not separate discretionary accruals from non-discretionary 
accruals, and uses the total accruals to proxy for discretionary accruals. This 
research methodology has been seldom adopted in recent accrual-based earnings 
management research, because of its clear shortcomings of failing to separate 
discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals (Garza-Gomez et al., 2006). 
Secondly, many more previous studies have been trying to isolate discretionary 
accruals from nondiscretionary accruals. For example, a modified version of Jones 
(1991) model introduces a regression approach to control for nondiscretionary 
factors influencing accruals, specifying a linear relation between total accruals and 
the change in sales and property, plant and equipment. Dechow et al, (1995) 
compare various models of discretionary accruals, and conclude that the modified
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Jones (1991) model is the most statistically powerful model for detecting 
accrual-based earnings management. Since then, many empirical studies in top 
journals adopt this modified Jones (1991) model to calculate DAC (discretionary 
accruals), such as Teoh et al. (1998) and Roosenboom et al. (2003). Here below is 
a detailed calculation of discretionary accruals by using modified Jones (1991) 
model;
As discussed in chapter 2, total accruals are the sum of all accounting adjustments 
to cash flows to obtain reported net income:
Total accruals = Net income ~ Cash flo w  from  operations
Total accruals = D iscretionary accruals + Non-discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals = Net income -  Cash flow  fi'om operations -  Non-discretionary accruals
Nondiscretionary variables are modelled as the expected accruals from the 
modified Jones (1991) model, and the discretionary variables are the residuals. 
Expected accruals for an IPO firm / in a given year t are estimated from a 
cross-sectional regression in that year of total accruals on the change in sales 
using an estimation sample of all listed firms in the same industry subcategories 
Specifically, for each year t in the test period, run the following cross-sectional 
regression:
TA + a
A S A L E S I A T R P
+  OL- PPE^  TA
Where TAC^j is the total accruals for IPO firm ’s peers j at year t; lsSALES\s the
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year-to-year change in sales revenues; a TR is the change in trade receivables; 
PPE is the gross level of property, plant and equipment; and TA is the beginning 
total assets.
The asset-scaled nondiscretionary accruals for IPO firm / in year t, /V7/f(’ ., is 
computed using the estimated coefficients and as:
NTAC,.j = «0 { ! 1 + a \ &SALES,,-ATR,yTA - \ - a i
PPE, , -
V j
Where is the estimated intercept; a^  and are the slope coefficients for IPO 
firm i at year t. The residual total accruals are the asset-scaled excess accruals for 
IPO firm / in year t. DAC , , , which is calculated as:
DAC.. = ^TAC, ' -N TA C .
So, due to the statistical power of the modified Jones (1991) model, this study also 
adopts this model as the basic indicator to measure the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. Meanwhile, total accruals are also examined to observe accrual-based 
earnings management, since extant models to isolate discretionary accruals from 
non-discretionary accruals, including the modified Jones (1991) model, provide 
imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, and interpretations of the evidence 
may be biased (Garza-Gomez et al., 2006). So, this study uses the two indicators 
together to depict the change of accruals around the flotation.
In prior studies, some researchers further break down total accruals into a few
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special accruals components, to see which specific accruals components 
contribute most to the accrual-based earnings management practices. For 
example, Aharony et al. (2000) analyse two simple specific accruals items 
(accounts receivables and inventories) of Chinese H-share IPOs, and find that 
accounts receivables are abnormally high in the pre-IPO period, but low in the 
post-IPO period, and there is no evidence of such movement in inventories. So, 
they conclude that Chinese H-share IPOs may engage in accrual-based earnings 
management by accelerating credit sales prior to the IPO year. However, the 
movement from before to after the IPO in one single specific accrual item does not 
necessarily mean that managers manipulate the aggregate accruals component to 
inflate reported earnings, because the movement in one specific accrual item may 
be offset by the movement in another specific accrual item and the aggregate 
accruals, as a whole, remain unchanged. Empirically, Wang (2005) adopts the 
same accrual components to analyse Chinese A-share IPOs, but does not find any 
evidence that A-share companies manipulate pre-IPO reported earnings through 
accruals.
It is also important to recognise that specific accruals models are mainly used for a 
specific industry, such as banking (Scholes et al., 1990) or property and casualty 
insurance (Petroni, 1992), which needs the knowledge of institutional 
arrangements to characterise the likely discretionary behaviour of specific accruals. 
In this sense, specific accruals models may not be very useful to detect 
accrual-based earnings management for a multi-industry sample.
5.5 RPT Variables
The explanatory variable {RPTs) represents the aggregate amount of actual 
related party transactions between a listed subsidiary and its controlling 
shareholder scaled by lagged (-1) total assets. ARPTs is the asset-scaled
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difference between pre-IPO amount of RPTs and post-IPO amount of RPTs.
RPTs will be further broken into two line items: loan RPTs and operating RPTs, 
because the two items represent totally different economic transactions. Loan 
RPTs, or say net loans, denotes the difference between loans provided by 
controlling shareholders to their listed subsidiaries and loans provided by listed 
subsidiaries to their controlling shareholders scaled by lagged (-1) total assets. 
However, operating RPTs denotes the aggregate amount of asset-scaled related 
party transactions, which exclude loan transactions, for example: the sales and/or 
purchases of goods, products, and services; non-monetary assets; royalties; 
administrative overheads and leases.
Table 5-4 list all the explanatory variables used in this study, including managerial 
ownership variables, accruals variables and RPT variables,
5.6 Control Variables
In the regression analysis, a set of control variables should be included. By 
following prior literature, the following four control variables will be used: AGE, 
SIZE, EXPENDITURE and SUBSIDY. A detailed definition of these control 
variables is also provided in Table 5-5.
Firstly, according to Mikkelson et al. (1997), firm age may explain the variation in 
the post-IPO operating performance. They argue that relatively young companies 
are likely to report lower performance figures in their early years due to low volume 
of sales, high initial operating costs, and/or an aggressive pricing strategy, 
however, matured firms tend to have better performance relative to young firms, 
because well-recognised brands names and a large group of loyal customers. 
Take a start-up firm for a typical example: the start-up firm has low sales at its early
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stage of business, but incurs higher production and selling costs, because of 
inexperience, a small scale of operations, and/or extraordinary one-time start-up 
costs. In order to attract customers, the firm may also price the products at a 
smaller profit margin then matured companies do. All above make young firms 
unlikely to report operating performance as good as mature companies do. 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) further find that the level of operating performance differs 
greatly between firms of different lengths of operating history, and older firms have 
substantially higher median operating performance both before and for five years 
after going public. So, in this sense, a control variable 'AGE  is included in order to 
control for the influences of the age of the firm, which is measured as the difference 
between establishment year and the IPO year.
A second control variable, ‘SIZE, may also explain the variation in the post-IPO 
operating performance (Mikkelson et al., 1997). Smaller firms often tend to young 
firms, which usually hold a tiny proportion of the market share and operate in a very 
difficult circumstance. Small firms always face low volume of sales, and/or high 
initial operating costs. They may also price their products at a smaller profit margin 
in order to get customers’ attention. This conjecture is confirmed by Fama and 
French (1995), who provide evidence that smaller firms generally had lower 
profitability. Moreover, Mikkelson et al. (1997) also find that larger firms have 
substantially higher median operating performance both before and for five years 
after going public. So, a control variable ‘SIZE’ is included to control for the 
influences of the size of the firm, which is measured as the natural logarithm of 
beginning-year total assets.
EXPENDITURE is a variable to control for the influence of capital expenditure on 
firm operating performance. EXPENDITURE is calculated as the capital 
investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) scaled by lagged (-1) total assets. 
Capital investment is one of the important determinants of corporate performance
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(Morck et al., 1988). In order to keep the firm ’s operations normal and stable, the 
management has to maintain a required level of capital expenditure. If the 
managers fail to do so, the scale of the operation may be affected, along with the 
decrease in capital expenditure.
Then, a control variable ‘SUDSIDY  will be introduced. It is measured as the 
government subsidy received by listed firms, including tax refunds, and 
project-specific government grants. According to Chinese GAAP, tax refunds and 
government subsidies are recognised immediately as gains when received (CMOF 
2001, Article: 106.4). Since most Chinese firms are state-controlled, they may 
receive government subsidies, and their profit and loss account may be affected by 
government subsidies in the year when received. It is expected that the 
administrative government may also offer financial assistance directly to pre-issue 
firms to support them to go public, and government subsidies can be one of the 
ways to boost the reported earnings of pre-issue firms. In order to push the SOEs 
to go public, SOE managers often lobby for as much financial assistance as 
possible from the administrative government. Financial assistance, such *=as a 
government subsidy, may be made available for some pre-IPO firms: for example, 
firms engage in some designated industry sectors on the National Development 
Programme, such as agriculture, mining, water, electricity and gas supply etc, are 
more likely to obtain financial assistances from the government, such as tax relief 
and so on. The financial assistance is often made as a temporary policy for 3 
consecutive years or less, and not automatically renewable.
In addition, another 3 control variables are also introduced to control for the effects 
resulted from ownership structure and corporate governance characteristics. Prior 
literature, for example La Porta et al. (1998) and Berglof (1995), shows that highly 
concentrated ownership structure in emerging markets may result in a concern of 
being expropriated by controlling shareholders, if investors are not well protected.
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This may give a rise to operating performance declines of listed subsidiaries. 
Johnson and Shleifer (2004) further argue that effective corporate governance is 
likely to monitor the behaviours of large shareholders and/or top managers, and 
protect small investors from the danger of expropriation. However, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that in a case of concentrated ownership, corporate 
governance is typically exercised by large shareholders. Without legal protection 
of small investors, concentrated ownership can be described as potential 
expropriation by large shareholders in the firm.
Take an emerging market, like China, for example. The extensive presence of 
concentrated ownership and weak corporate governance highlights the high 
likelihood of expropriation conducted by controlling shareholders. Chen and Shih
(2004) insist that poor governance characteristics and highly concentrated 
ownership may affect the long-run operating performance of Chinese firms. They 
further point out that a strong control retained by controlling shareholders, 
particularly those state-owned shareholders, may lead to too much administrative 
interference so that their listed subsidiaries may suffer the consequences in terms 
of operating performance.
So, there are two ownership variables to be introduced in this study: one is 
'OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION’, which is measured as the proportion of 
ownership held by the controlling shareholder at the end of the IPO year; the other 
ownership variable 'OWNERSHIP TYPE’ measures the type of the controlling 
shareholder, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling 
shareholder is ultimately owned by the state at the end of the year; 0 otherwise.
Finally, a corporate governance variable will also be introduced. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that the corporate board is a major monitoring mechanism of 
corporate governance to alleviate agency problems. They point out that a
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well-balanced effective board would be largely comprised of outside independent 
directors to ensure better monitoring. UK Combined Code (2003) also highlights 
the importance of the corporate board: 'every company should be headed by an 
effective board, which is collectively responsible for the success o f the company'. 
OECD (Corporate Governance Principles, 2003) further points out that the 
corporate board would be mainly responsible for protecting minority shareholders 
from expropriation by a controlling shareholder and the management team.
So, the governance variable used in this study is the composition of the board of 
directors 'BOARD COMPOSITION. In prior literature, board composition is 
normally measured as the proportion of independent directors in the board. 
However, independent directors were not introduced into Chinese firms until the 
promulgation of the Code o f Corporate Governance in 2002. In fact, the majority of 
directors in Chinese corporate boards represent controlling shareholders, and the 
rest may represent small investors or be independent from any shareholders It is 
believed that directors representing smaller investors in the boardroom are likely to 
protect smaller investors from being expropriated by controlling shareholders. So, 
the variable 'BOARD COMPOSITION  is measured as the proportion of the 
directors in the board representing controlling shareholders, who hold a senior 
management position simultaneously in controlling shareholders’ entity, at the end 
of the IPO year. This variable measures the percentage of board seats held on 
behalf of controlling shareholders. If controlling shareholders retain a strong 
control over the corporate board, the risk of expropriation by controlling 
shareholders is expected to be high.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presents variable measurement: operating performance is measured 
as asset-scaled earnings performance (EBITDA on total assets) and/or
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asset-scaled cashflow performance (Operating cashflow on total assets) minus the 
median contemporaneous operating figures of 2-digit SIC-code industry-matched 
publicly traded firms. Long-run stock performance is measured as the 5-year 
benchmark-adjusted CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) and/or BAHR (Buy and 
Hold Return) in event time, and the benchmark to be used is the median stock 
performance of 2-digit SIC-code industry-matched publicly traded firms.
Explanatory variables in this study include managerial ownership (the proportion of 
shares by corporate executives and directors); discretionary accruals (the level of 
accruals management that is calculated by using modified Jones (1991) model) 
and the two RPT variables: the aggregate amount of operating RPTs (non-loan) 
and the net amount of cash loans respectively. Moreover, a set of control variable 
is also introduced: for example firm s’ size and age, capital expenditure, 
government subsidy, and ownership and governance variables. In Table 5-4 and
5-5, a detailed variable definition for explanatory variables and control variables is 
also presented.
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Chapter 6 Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics
6.1 Data Collection and Data Source
This research will cover the IPO cases of Chinese A- and/or B-share markets, 
whose first trading day over stock exchange is between January 1999 and 31 
December 2000. The sample IPOs should have accounting figures and RPT 
disclosures available from one year before till four years after, and data for stock 
returns available up to 5 years after the IPO. There are 260 companies making the 
security offerings in 1999-2000 on Chinese A- or B-share markets. However, the 
260 public offerings include 21 cases, which offer convertible bonds, or closed-end 
funds, rather than common stocks, so that the research sample is cut down to 239 
firms after the 21 cases are excluded.
The reason why the sample of firms was made in year 1999-2000, because, in this 
study, detailed information is needed on the related party transactions between 
listed companies and their controlling shareholders; but listed firms did not 
disclose the information until the 1998 accounting regulation, which requires all 
listing firms and pre-IPO firms to make disclosures on related party transactions. 
Moreover, before the promulgation of the 1998 accounting rules, listed firms were 
not required to produce cashflow statements. Without those statements, it is 
difficult to observe the change of accruals components over time. In addition, this 
study investigates long-run operating performance in the post-IPO period, 
covering 4 financial years subsequent to the IPO year. However, the data on the 
IPO cases going public in 2001 are not fully available, since financial figures in 
2005 have not been updated in major databases.
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Operating performance and stock performance figures of IPO firms are generously 
provided by Shenzhen Securities Info Co., Ltd and GreatWise Info Co. Ltd 
respectively. The data on related party transactions and corporate governance for 
this research are manually collected from companies’ IPO prospectuses and/or 
their annual reports. The electronic IPO prospectuses and annual reports are 
available on the website of China Finance Online (http://www.jrj.com.cn), which is 
the major Chinese financial information provider and currently listed on the US 
market (Nasdaq NM: JRJC). If some annual reports cannot be found on this 
website, the official websites of shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (http://www.sse.com.cn and http://www.cninfo.com.cn) have been 
providing electronic annual reports freely since 1999.
Annual reports provide a comprehensive information set to study listed firms in 
many aspects: such as corporate governance, financial statements and 
accompanying footnotes etc. According to CMOF (1998), if there have been any 
type of RPT transactions between related parties, disclosure is required in the 
accompanying notes of the financial statements, including the nature of the 
relationship, the types of transactions, and the details of the transactions, e.g. the 
amounts of the transactions and the percentages, and the pricing policies of 
transactions. If the price of assets (or services) received and/or surrendered is 
different from the comparable market price (the approximation of the fair value), 
both the transaction price and the market price should be disclosed. When the 
comparable market price is not available, the asset pricing principles may be 
disclosed in full details. So, annual reports and/or IPO prospectuses will provide 
data necessary for this empirical study.
One may have a concern about the low quality of corporate disclosures of Chinese 
listed companies, which may lead to a difficulty of data collection, since we can 
only observe and collect the data of RPT practices disclosed on public sources,
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such as annual reports. It is true that Chinese listed companies have a poor record 
of financial reporting practices and information disclosures, and some companies 
may not abide by the information disclosure regulations, so that there might be a 
potential data limitation for this empirical study. If firms fail to perform their 
responsibilities of public disclosures, RPT variables may be inappropriately 
under-determined. As a result, the positive relation between RPT variables and 
IPO performance may turn to be less significant, or diminish to irrelevance.
However, it should be recognised that corporate annual reports are still the most 
reliable source for corporate RPT practices, although a small number of 
companies may fail to follow the regulations. It is assumed that most companies do 
comply with the reporting and disclosure regulations, since corporate annual 
reports are subject to an audit by an external CPA firm and the scrutiny from the 
CSRC and the stock exchanges. The CSRC may file charges against managers 
who fail to follow the disclosure requirements. So, it is reasonably believed that the 
majority of companies are able to produce their annual reports in accordance with 
the CSRC’s regulations, and the use of RPT disclosures on annual reports is the 
best way to obtain the data of RPT transactions.
6.2 Data descriptive
Table 6-1 presents the sample distribution by industry sectors, and sample IPO 
firms are segregated into 21 industry sectors (or sub-sectors). As the Table shows, 
the 239 sample IPO firms account for 16.70% of the entire Chinese listed 
companies (ending at 2005). The sample firms are widely spread into each of the 
21 industry (sub-)sectors, showing that sample firms are well diversified in terms of 
industry sectors in which their businesses are. For any particular industry sector, 
the proportion of my sample firms in their peer competitors of a same industry 
sector ranges roughly from 10% to 25%, indicating that sample firms are well
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spread over all the sectors, and they are not concentrated in a few particular 
industries. In this sense, the 239 firms can serve as a reasonable research sample 
and well represent the entire market.
Table 6-2 describes ownership characteristics of sample IPOs, in terms of 
ownership concentration and state ownership. Table 6-2 shows that, on average, 
the sample firms report a percentage of 62.42% ownership held by controlling 
shareholders at the end of IPO year; while the percentage for the entire market is 
45.7%. It should be noted that the IPO is just the first-time sale of stocks to public, 
so that IPO firms should normally report a much higher level of ownership held by 
controlling shareholders than other firms do. Once the firms make a second stock 
offering subsequent to the IPO, the percentage will further decline.
A major difference between Chinese firms and western firms lies in ownership 
structure. Chinese governments ultimately keep a large percentage of 
shareholdings in listed firms, before and even after the IPO. The state-owned 
enterprises, representing the interests of the State, normally act as controlling 
shareholders of listed firms. In Table 6-2, sample firms are further segregated Into 
two groups by ownership type: the first group is controlled by the State, and the 
second is controlled by individuals, families and/or a group of people, who are not 
linked with the governments. Table 6-2 presents that 83.68% of the sample firms 
are state-controlled; while the percentage for the entire market is almost the same 
(81.6%). Furthermore, both the sample firms and the total market reports a higher 
percentage of shares held by controlling shareholders than non state-controlled 
firms do. For example, the sample reports a shareholding percentage by 
controlling shareholders of 64.25% and 53.06% respectively for state-controlled 
firms and non state-controlled firms.
Finally, Table 6-3 further presents the statistic description of sample companies in
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terms of a few financial indicators, for example, sales, total assets, EBITDA, return 
on assets and cash flow on assets, in comparison to contemporaneous figures of 
market benchmarks. From Table 6-3, it is clear that the sample firms are of a 
magnitude similar to the whole market by means of operation scales and 
profitability. Sales figures of the sample firms are Chinese ¥1.44 billion (mean 
value) and ¥ 0.70 billion (median value) respectively, and the figures for the market 
are ¥ 1.90 billion and ¥ 0.62 billion respectively. The mean test and median test 
both show that the differences between sample firms and the market are not 
statistically significant (t statistic = 0.22 and z statistic = 0.86 respectively). Table
6-3 further conducts mean test and median test on total assets between the 
sample group and the population group, and it is found that the mean difference 
and median difference between the two groups are both small (¥ 0.25 billion and ¥ 
0.16 billion respectively), which are not significant at any effective level.
Sample firms also report a level of profitability close to the entire market; the mean 
value and median value of EBITDA for sample companies are Chinese ¥ 0.21 
billion and ¥ 0.09 billion respectively, and ¥ 0.27 billion and ¥ 0.08 billion for the 
entire market. Both mean test and median test show that the differences of the two 
groups are not statistically significant at any effective level (t statistic = 0.34 and z 
statistic = 0.09 respectively). Further, Table 6-3 also tests the mean and median 
differences of two groups in terms of asset-scaled EBITDA and asset-scaled 
cashflow from operations, which are very small in absolute value, and there is no 
evidence that these small differences to be statistically significant at any effective 
level.
6.3 Operating Performance around the IPO
This research investigates post-IPO operating performance starting from the full 
financial year prior to the IPO year, in which the IPO is offered, to the fourth
financial year subsequent to the IPO year. Table 6-4 illustrates the entire period to 
be investigated before and after the IPO.
One may argue that there is a short period prior to the IPO year being examined, 
since this study investigates only one full financial year prior to the IPO. Of course, 
it would give a much better view of performance changes before and after the IPO. 
if we could look at the financial years further backwards prior to Y (-1) year. 
However, Chinese IPO firms are not required to disclose historical operating 
performance of the Y (-2) years or earlier on their IPO prospectuses, and in fact 
only a very small amount of IPO firms provide two-year historical performance prior 
to the IPO on a voluntary basis. So, if a longer operating history prior to the IPO is 
examined, the sample size would have to be largely cut down.
6.3.1 R O A and CFO
Table 6-5 reports the actual ROAand CFO performance of sample companies from 
Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year. The mean value and median value of ROA figures in Y 
(-1) year are 21.57% (t statistic = 17.65) and 19.05% (z statistic = 8.59) 
respectively. The figures decline evidently to 16.59% (t statistic =11.18) and 
12.94% (z statistic = 8.56) respectively in the IPO year, and further to 9.44% (t 
statistic = 12.27) and 8.56% (z statistic = 8.33) respectively in Y (+1 ) year. In Y (+2) 
year, the ROA figures keep failing to 7.63% (t statistic = 10.53) and 7.47% (z 
statistic = 7.42) respectively: from that year onwards, it seems that the ROA figures 
remain stable and slightly decrease to 7.27% (t statistic =10.22) and 6.84% (z 
statistic = 7.42) respectively.
Panel B presents the cash flow performance of sample companies from Y (-1) year 
to Y (+4) year. The mean and median CFO figures in Y (-1) year are 7.39% (t 
statistic = 3.05) and 3.18% (z statistic = 4.52) respectively. The mean CFO figure
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declines to 6.01% (t statistic = 5.06) in Y (+1) year, and further to 4.05% (t statistic 
= 4.48). However, the median CFO values do not show a decline from before to 
after the IPO. The median CFO figure in Y (-1) year is 3.18% (z statistic = 4.52), 
and it seems that the figure goes up to 5.38% (z statistic = 5 40) in Y (+1) year, but 
it drops back to 3.84% (z statistic = 4.76) in the fourth financial year after the IPO
Table 6-5 presents un-adjListed ROA and CFO figures from before to after the IPO 
However, it does not take industry adjustments into consideration. So, Table 6-6 
further looks at how IPOs perform in the long run relative to their industry peers.
Table 6-6 shows the industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures from Y (-1) year to Y 
(+4) year. Panel A shows that, in terms of ROA, IPO firms significantly outperform 
their industry peers by 12.71% (mean value, t statistic = 10.39) and 10.18% 
(median value, z statistic = 8.43) respectively in the pre-IPO year. In the IPO year, 
IPO firms keep outperforming the industry by 7.06% (t statistic = 4.76) and 3.40% 
(z statistic = 6.20) in mean and median values respectively. However, the 
outperformance disappears in the post-IPO period. For example, the mean and 
median industry-adjusted ROA figures in Y (+1) year are 0.09% (t statistic = 0,11) 
and -0.79% (z statistic = 0.87) respectively. From that year onwards, 
industry-adjusted ROA figures further decline a little to -0.65% (mean value, t 
statistic = -0.91) and -1.08% (median value, z statistic = 1.43) respectively in Y (+4) 
year. It seems that IPO firms are likely to underperform the industry peers a little bit 
starting from Y (+3) year on; however it is not statistically significant at any effective 
level.
-j Panel B in Table 6-6 presents the Industry-adjusted CFO from Y (-1) year to Y (+4)
@ year. It confirms that IPO firms significantly outperform the industry in the pre-IPO
period in terms of CFO performance. It reports a significantly high CFO figure of 
6.74% (mean value, t statistic = 2.79) and 2.54% (median value, z statistic = 3.81)
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in Y (-1) year. However, as soon as the IPO process is completed, IPO firms do not 
outperform their industry peers any more in terms of CFO performance. From the 
IPO year onwards, the mean and median values of industry-adjusted CFO figures 
fluctuate around zero, showing no statistically significant (under-) outperformance 
of IPO firms relative to industry peers.
Table 6-6 shows that IPO firms significantly outperform industry peers in terms of 
ROAand CFO figures in Y (-1) year and the IPO year. From Y (+1) year onwards, 
however, the outperformance disappears. IPO firms seem to report a lower 
operating performance than industry peers do, but no significant evidence has 
been found.
Table 6-7 goes further to investigate the change of industry-adjusted ROA and 
CFO figures from the pre-IPO year to a post-IPO year. Panel A shows that the 
performance changes in industry-adjusted ROA figures from Y (-1) year to IPO 
year are -5.64% (mean value, t statistic = -6.26) and -5.00% (median value, z 
statistic = 6.80) respectively. The decline from Y (-1) year to any other post-IPO 
year is much larger: for example, the changes from Y (-1) year to Y (+1) year are 
-12.62% (mean value, t statistic = -10.52) and -9.88% (median value, z statistic = 
8.52) respectively; the changes from Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year are slightly larger, 
with a mean value o f -13.36% (t statistic = -10.81) and a median value o f -11.50% 
(z statistic = 8.30).
Panel B (Table 6-7) reports the performance changes in industry-adjusted CFO 
figures from Y (-1) year to IPO year are -7.14% (mean value, t statistic =-4.46) and 
-2.80% (median value, z statistic = 5.84) respectively. The decline from Y (-1) year 
to any other post-IPO year is roughly the same magnitude: for example, the 
changes from Y (-1) year to Y (+1) year are -5.02% (mean value, t statistic = -2.17) 
and -2.20% (median value, z statistic = 2.27) respectively; the changes from Y (-1)
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year to Y (+4) year are -7.46% (t statistic = -2.95) and -3.70% (z statistic = 3.70) 
respectively.
Table 6-7 confirms that there is a significant decline in IPO operating performance 
in terms of ROA and CFO from before to after the IPO. This finding is consistent 
with some prior studies, for example Wang et al. (2001), Chen and Shih (2004) and 
Wang (2005). Then, this study further investigates the operating performance of 
Chinese IPO firms in aspects of Sales and Sales growth.
6.3.2 Sales
Table 6-8 describes the sales of sample companies from Y (-1 ) year to Y (+4) year. 
Panel A tells that the mean and median values of un-adjusted sales figures 
increase steadily from ¥ 843.14 million (t statistic = 5.96) and ¥ 377.91 million (z 
statistic = 8.59) respectively in Y (-1) year to ¥ 1,068.41 million (t statistic = 5.84) 
and ¥ 416.31 million (z statistic = 8.58) respectively in the IPO year and further to ¥ 
1,449.86 million (t statistic = 5.69) and ¥ 701.85 million (z statistic = 8 59) 
respectively in Y (+4) year.
Panel B shows the industry-adjusted Sales from before to after the IPO. The mean 
value of industry-adjusted sales figures in Y (-1) year is ¥ 504.14 million (t statistic 
= 3.56), and the figure increases steadily to ¥ 655.41 million (t statistic = 3.58) in Y 
(+1) year and reaches the peak of ¥823.86 million (t statistic = 3.23) in Y (+4) year. 
Flowever, the median values provide a mixed finding; it declines from ¥ 38.91 
million (z statistic = 3.61) in Y (-1) year to ¥ 21.61 million (z statistic = 2.78) in the 
IPO year and reaches the bottom of ¥ 3.31 million (z statistic = 2.67) in Y (+1) year. 
However, in the subsequent years, the figure rebounds to a level even higher than 
that in Y (-1) year. For example, the figure reaches the peak of ¥ 86.03 million (z 
statistic = 3.54) in Y (+2) year.
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Panel C further investigates the changes of Sales from before to after the IPO. It 
shows that, in terms of mean values, the figures are likely to increase from the 
pre-IPO year to any post-IPO years, but the findings are not strongly significant. 
The median tests tell a mixed story; for example, the change from Y (-1) year to Y 
(+2) year is ¥ 27.29 million (z statistic = 1.95). But, the change from Y (-1) year to Y 
(+4) year is the negative figure (¥ -41.75 million, t statistic = 0.91).
Table 6-8 provides mixed findings on Sales figures of sample firms; sales figures of 
IPO firms seem to slightly go up from before to after the IPO in terms of mean 
values, but the changes are not strongly significant. In terms of median values 
sales figures are likely to decline, but the findings are also not significant at any 
effective level. It is important to recognise that firms experiencing an IPO are 
expected to raise funds from the market and expand their operating scale, so that 
sales figures of IPO firms are likely to jump more quickly relative to the industry 
peers, due to the new equity offerings and expanded operations. However, it does 
not necessarily mean that IPO firms are growing faster than their industry peers 
do.
Table 6-9 further presents Sales figures scaled by lagged (-1) total assets from 
before and after the IPO. In Panel B, the mean value of industry-adjusted sales 
figures in Y (-1 ) year is 9.53% (t statistic = 1.09), and the figure slightly increases to 
11.24% (t statistic = 2.18) in Y (+1) year and 9.95% (t statistic = 2.26) in Y (+2) year 
respectively, but declines to 5.24% (t statistic = 1.09) in Y (+3) year and 2.50% (t 
statistic = 0.48) in Y (+4) year respectively. The median values show a same 
tendency; it declines from 8.71% (z statistic = 1.50) in Y (-1) year to 3.52% (z 
statistic = 0.94) in Y (+3) year and 3.38% (z statistic = 0.49) in Y (+4) year. Panel C 
further investigates the changes of asset-scaled Sales from before to after the IPO. 
It shows that, in terms of both mean values and median values, the figures are 
likely to decrease from the pre-IPO year to any post-IPO years. For example, the
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changes in mean values from Y (-1) year to Y (+3) year are -4.29% (t statistic = 
-1.80) and -7.03% (t statistic = -1.94) respectively, at 10% significance level.
6.3.3 Sales Growth
Table 6-10 presents the Sales growth of IPO companies from Y (-1) year to Y (+4) 
year. Panel A shows that the mean and median values of un-adjusted figures climb 
from 14.78% (t statistic = 4.54) and 8.08% (z statistic = 4.73) respectively in Y (-1) 
year to 20.54% (t statistic = 5.61) and 15.17% (z statistic = 6.22) respectively in Y 
(+4) year, even though the figures fluctuate between the IPO year and the Y (+3) 
year.
Panel B presents the industry-adjusted sales growth from before to after the IPO. It 
clearly shows that the IPO firms significantly outperform the industry by 9.22% (t 
statistic = 2.83) and 2.52% (z statistic = 2.53) respectively in Y (-1) year, in terms of 
mean and median industry-adjusted sales growth. However, this significant 
outperformance relative to industry peers disappears from the IPO year onwards; 
the mean values of industry-adjusted sales growth positive, and fluctuate in the 
post-IPO period with a maximum figure of 5.11% (t statistic = 1.47) and a minimum 
figure of 0.03% (t statistic = 0.01). However, the median values tell a different story: 
the median figures are all negative (but not statistically significant) in the post-IPO 
period, with a maximum figure o f -0.43% (t statistic = 1.09) and a minimum figure of 
-4.06% (t statistic = 0.23).
Panel 0  further examines the changes of industry-adjusted sales growth from 
before to after the IPO. It shows that there is a significant decline of 
industry-adjusted sales growth rate from the pre-IPO year to any post-IPO years: 
the changes are -8.00% (mean value, t statistic = -1.91) and -10.70% (median 
value, z statistic = 2.10) respectively from Y (-1) year to Y (+1) year. It seems that
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the declines from Y (-1) year to any other post-IPO years are smaller: for example 
the changes from Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year are -7.08% (mean value, t statistic = 
-1.61) and -6.43% (median value, z statistic = 1.92) respectively.
Table 6-10 shows that IPO firms seem to outperform their industry peers in sales 
growth in the pre-IPO period, and the outperformance disappears in the post-IPO 
period. This finding confirms that IPO firms are growing faster than industry peers 
in the pre-IPO year; however, this is not the case in the post-IPO years. Clearly, 
there is a decline in sales growth subsequent to the IPO, relative to the pre-IPO 
level.
6.4 IPO Operating Performance and Firm Characteristics
Chen and Shih (2004) and Wang (2005) conjecture that IPOs’ ownership 
characteristics and corporate governance structure may have a significant effect 
on long-term operating performance. Chen and Shih (2004) further conjecture that 
the decline in operating performance from before to after the IPO may be linked 
with the poor corporate governance characteristics. Wang (2005) documents a 
sharp decline in the post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, and finds that 
agency conflicts, management entrenchment, and controlling shareholders 
expropriation co-exist to influence Chinese IPO performance.
In this section, this study will further look at how firms’ characteristics are 
associated with long-term IPO operating performance, in terms of 
industry-adjusted ROA and CFO. This study limits its discussion on the three most 
important firms’ characteristics. Two ownership characteristics are used to 
describe ownership structure: the type of controlling shareholders {OWNERSHIP 
TYPE), the proportion of shares held by controlling shareholders {OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION). Moreover, another governance characteristic is also
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discussed: the proportion of board seats retained by controlling shareholders 
{BOARD COMPOSITION). There might be some other variables to measure 
corporate governance characteristics, but with regard to the issue of investor 
protection, independent directors and those board members in no association with 
controlling shareholders are mainly responsible to defend minority investors. More 
discussion on the choice of the three variables has been presented in the Chapter 
5 ‘Variable Measurement’.
6.4.1 Type o f Controlling Shareholders and IPO Operating Performance
Firstly, the effects of state ownership on IPO long-term operating performance will 
be examined. Since most Chinese firms are ultimately controlled by the 
governments of different levels, state ownership may play an important role in the 
IPO firms’ performance. Tian (2001) studies a sample of Chinese firms over the 
1994-1998 interval, and shows that firms under the control of state shareholders 
are valued lower than those under the control of non-state shareholders, and there 
is a U-shape relation between state shareholdings and firm value. Sun et al. (2003) 
conjecture that state ownerships are negatively related to the post-IPO 
performance. So, in Table 6-11, firms are segregated into two portfolios by the type 
of controlling shareholders. The first portfolio, called as 'non state-controlled’, 
consists of firms ultimately controlled by non state-related organisations and/or 
individuals; while the second portfolio ‘state-controlled’ includes those who are 
ultimately controlled by governments of different levels.
Panel A presents industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures of IPO firms before and 
after the IPO by two state ownership portfolios. Between the Y (-1) year and the Y 
(+4) year, there is no significant evidence showing that state-controlled IPO firms 
report lower operating performance than non state-controlled IPO firms do In 
terms of ROA figures, the mean difference between non state-controlled firms and
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state-controlled firms is small and insignificant (-0.29%, t statistic = -0.10) in Y (-1) 
year, and non state-controlled firms are likely to report higher ROA figures in the 
post-IPO years (1.70%), but the test results are not statistically significant (t 
statistic = 1.13). In terms of CFO figures, the mean difference between non 
state-controlled firms and state-controlled firms is (1.04%, t statistic = 0.24) in Y(-1) 
year; but in the post-IPO period, non state-controlled firms do not report higher 
CFO figures (-1.07%, t statistic = -1.36) than state-controlled firms.
Panel B examines the changes of industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures from 
before to after the IPO by two state ownership portfolios. It seems that, in terms of 
ROA figures, state-controlled firms report a quicker decline than non
state-controlled do from Y (-1) year to the post-IPO years (1.43%), however 
statistically insignificant. The decline in CFO figures tells a different story: 
state-controlled firms seem to decline from the pre-IPO year to any post-IPO years 
more slowly than non state-controlled firms do (-2.00%), but statistically 
insignificant (t statistic = -0.65).
Table 6-11 discusses the effects of state ownership on the IPO long-term operating 
performance. The table shows that state-controlled IPOs do not necessarily 
underperform the non state-controlled IPOs both before and after the IPO, in terms 
of industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures. Further, there is no significant
evidence that state-controlled firms report a larger decline in operating
performance from before to after the IPO than non state-controlled firms do.
6.4.2 Ownership Concentration and IPO Operating Performance
Then, the relation between ownership concentration and long-term IPO operating 
performance will be investigated. As suggested by prior literature (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986), concentrated ownership can reduce the incidence of agency
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problems that arise from the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers. However, La Porta et al. (1998) argue that if investor protection is weak, 
there may be a concern of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, such as expropriation. In this sense, it is interesting to 
examine IPO firms with different levels of ownership concentration.
So, In Table 6-12, firms are segregated into three portfolios by the level of 
ownership concentration, i.e. the proportion of ownership held by controlling 
shareholders. The first portfolio represents the firms with less concentrated 
ownership, whose controlling shareholders keep no more than 30% of the 
ownership at the end of the IPO year, and the second portfolio with controlling 
shareholders retaining the ownership at a range between 30% and 50%. In the 
third portfolio, controlling shareholders hold more than 50% of the ownership.
Panel A presents industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures of IPO firms before and 
after the IPO by the three ownership concentration portfolios. In terms of both ROA 
and CFO figures, IPO firms with higher concentrated ownership report higher 
operating performance than the remaining firms do. The mean ROA figures of 
three portfolios in Y (-1) year are 4.91%, 7.77% and 13.87% respectively, and the 
AN OVA test result is statistically significant. In the post-IPO period, IPOs with 
highly concentrated ownership are likely to report better operating performance 
(0.29%) in comparison to the IPOs with lower concentrated ownership (-2.91% and 
-3.27% respectively), but statistically insignificant. The CFO figures seems to show 
the same tendency, but all statistically insignificant.
Panel B examines the changes of industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures from 
before to after the IPO by the three ownership concentration portfolios. It shows 
that, in terms of ROA figures, IPO firms with more concentrated ownership are 
likely to report a quicker decline (-13.59%) than the firms with lower ownership
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concentration do (-11.06% and -7.81% respectively) from Y (-1) year to the 
post-IPO period. Similarly, in terms of CFO figures, IPO firms with more 
concentrated ownership seem to decline from the pre-IPO year to the post-IPO 
period quickly (-6.24%) than the firms with lower ownership concentration (-3.14% 
and -5.33% respectively).
Table 6-12 discusses the effects of ownership concentration on the IPO long-term 
operating performance. The table shows that, in terms of industry-adjusted ROA 
and CFO figures, IPO firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to 
outperform the firms with lower ownership concentration in the Y (-1) year; 
moreover, IPO firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to report a 
larger decline from before to after the IPO.
6.4.3 Board composition and IPO Operating Performance
Finally, the relation between board composition and IPO long-term operating 
performance will be further investigated. A well-balanced board of directors is the 
key corporate governance mechanism monitoring corporate financial reporting 
practices and operating activities (Fama and Jensen. 1983). Corporate 
governance plays an important role in mitigating the agency conflicts between firm 
managers and diffuse shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the 
ownership is highly concentrated, the primary objective of corporate governance 
has broadened to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by a controlling 
blockholder and his management team (Shleifer and Vishny. 1997).
So, the board composition might have an effect on IPO long-term performance 
changes relative to the pre-IPO level. In Table 6-13, firms are further segregated 
into three portfolios by the level of board independence. As discussed earlier, 
board composition is calculated as the proportion of board members (at the end of
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the IPO year) who represent the controlling shareholder and hold a senior position 
in the controlling shareholder’s entity simultaneously. The first portfolio represents 
the firms with the lowest proportion (no more than 30%) of board members 
representing controlling shareholders at the end of the IPO year, and the second 
portfolio with controlling shareholders retaining the board seats at a range between 
30% and 50%. In the third portfolio, controlling shareholders occupy more than 
50% of the board seats.
Panel A presents industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures of IPO firms before and 
after the IPO by the three board composition portfolios. In terms of ROA figures, 
IPO firms with the board more dependent on controlling shareholders seem to 
report higher operating performance (15.81%) than the firms with an independent 
board do (11.23% and 11.30% respectively) in the pre-IPO year; in the post-IPO 
years, firms with a more dependent board report slightly higher ROA figures than 
those with a less dependent board do. Similarly, in terms of CFO figures, the 
results show that firms with a more dependent board report slightly higher CFO 
performance than the remaining firms do before and after the IPO.
Panel B examines the changes of industry-adjusted ROA and CFO figures from 
before to after the IPO by the three board composition portfolios. It shows that, in 
terms of ROA figures, IPO firms with a more dependent board report a quicker 
decline (-15.38%) than the remaining firms do (-11.63% and -11.72 respectively) 
from Y (-1) year to the post-IPO period, but the AN OVA test is not strongly 
significant (p-value = 0.33). in terms of CFO figures, IPO firms with a more 
dependent board seem to decline from the pre-IPO year to the post-IPO period 
more quickly (-8.54%) than the remaining firms do (-4.79% and -4.33% 
respectively), but statistically insignificant.
Table 6-13 discusses the effects of board composition on the IPO long-term
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operating performance. The table shows that, in terms of industry-adjusted ROA 
and CFO figures, IPO firms with a more dependent board seem to outperform the 
firms with a less dependent board in the Y (-1) year; moreover, IPO firms with a 
more dependent board are likely to report a larger performance decline from 
before to after the IPO than the remaining firms.
6.6 Summary
In this research, 239 Chinese A- (and B-) share IPOs going public between f  
January 1999 and 31®* December 2000 are examined. The investigation period 
covers 6 years in total, including the one financial year prior to the IPO year and the 
four financial years subsequent to the IPO year.
Based on either ROA or CFO performance, Chinese IPOs report a significant 
decline from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period, and ROA figures show an 
extraordinarily large decline, compared with CFO figures. Sales figures, sales 
growth ratios of IPO firms before and after the IPO have also been examined. The 
findings show a significant decline in sales growth from before to after the IPO. 
Actual sales of IPO firms are likely to decrease in the post-IPO period relative to 
the pre-IPO level, particularly when the figures are scaled by lagged total assets In 
addition, Megginson and Netter (2001) conjecture that state ownership is widely 
believed inefficient, and privatisation results in improved performance; however, 
China’s privatisation reform does not seem to lead to an ‘improved performance’ 
for those state-controlled enterprises. One of the possible explanations is that the 
state retains a very large percentage of ownership in public firms before and even 
after the IPO, so operating efficiency is barely improved due to the concern of 
agency conflicts between the state-owned controlling shareholders and corporate 
executives is not alleviated subsequent to the IPO.
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Secondly, the finding above shows that IPOs significantly outperform their industry 
peers in the pre-IPO period in terms of operating performance measures (ROA, 
CFO): they are likely to underperform their industry peers in the post-IPO period, 
but the evidence is not strongly significant. It seems that that pre-IPO operating 
performance may be artificially exaggerated. So, in this research, the main 
research question is to explore the reasons why Chinese IPOs abnormally 
outperform their industry peers prior to the IPO. and why there is a significant 
decline in post-IPO operating performance relative to the pre-IPO level.
Finally, the effects of firms’ ownership and governance characteristics on IPO 
long-term operating performance have also been examined. There is no significant 
evidence that firms controlled by the State report a larger (or smaller) decline in 
operating performance from before to after the IPO than non state-controlled firms 
Flowever, the test results show that IPO firms, which are more controlled by 
controlling shareholders, for example a more concentrated ownership structure 
and a less independent board of directors from controlling shareholders, are likely 
to report higher operating performance in the pre-IPO year, and report larger 
performance changes in the post-IPO period relative to the pre-IPO level. It seems 
that ownership concentration and board composition may have an effect on the 
long-run operating performance of Chinese IPOs.
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Chapter 7 Regression Models and Model Specifications
7.1 Regressions Models
This Chapter presents regression models. First of all, regression analysis in social 
research will be briefly introduced, and then bring in my regression models to test 
those test the three hypotheses that have been developed in Chapter 4.
7.1.1 Single and Multiple Regression Models
Regression analysis is the statistical methodology for predicting the values of one 
or more variables from a collection of predictor (explanatory) variables. Regression 
analysis with a single explanatory variable is termed as ‘single regression’, more 
explanatory variables as ‘multiple regressions’.
Regression is used to account for (predict) the variance in an interval dependent 
variable, based on linear combinations of interval, dichotomous, or dummy 
independent variables. Multiple regression can establish a set of independent 
variables explains a proportion of the variance in a dependent variable at a 
significant level (through a significance test of R^), and can establish the relative 
predictive importance of the independent variables (by comparing beta weights). 
Power terms can be added as independent variables to explore curvilinear effects. 
Cross-product terms can be added as independent variables to explore interaction 
effects. One can test the significance of difference of two R^’s to determine if 
adding an independent variable to the model helps significantly.
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Performing a regression analysis is similar to performing a correlation test. First of 
all, formulate the null hypothesis: the null hypothesis (HO) is therefore that 'Y is 
independent of X, therefore the slope of the regression line is O’. The single and 
multiple regression equations take the form below:
Y  = a  + p"^X + £
y  = cr + jS 7 ^ X'l + j6 2^X 2 + .., + X); + £
The (3 values are the regression coefficients, representing the amount the 
dependent variable Y changes when the corresponding independent changes 1 
unit. The a is the constant, where the regression line intercepts the y axis, 
representing the amount the dependent variable Y will be when all the independent 
variables are 0. The ratio of the beta coefficients is the ratio of the relative 
predictive power of the independent variables. The error terms are assumed to 
have a normal distribution with the mean value of 0, and that error terms must be 
independent from each other.
7.1.2 Parameter Estimation
By recognising that the t/i =  Q -1- - f  regression model is a system of 
linear equations we can express the model using data matrix X, target vector Y and 
parameter vector 5. The /th row of X and Y will contain the x and y value for the /th 
data sample. Then the model can be written as
127
Vi -Tl
2/2 = 1 1'2 a 4-
^2
J/n_ 1 Xn
which when using pure matrix notation becomes 
1 -(- £
where E is normally distributed with expected value 0 (i.e., a column vector of Os)
and variance In, where In is the nxn identity matrix. The matrix X S  (where
(remember) 5 is the vector of estimates of the components of 5) is then the 
orthogonal projection of Y onto the column space of X.
Basic matrix algebra yields
6 =  ( x ' x ) - ^  x ' y
(where X' is the transpose of X) and the sum of squares of residuals is
Y \ In  -  x i x ' x y ' - x ' )  Y.
The fact that the matrix is a symmetric idempotent matrix is incessantly
relied on in proofs of theorems. The linearity of 5 as a function of the vector Y. 
expressed above by saying
5 =  (X 'X ) - \X 'Y ,
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is the reason why this is called ‘linear’ regression. Nonlinear regression uses 
nonlinear methods of estimation.
The matrix Ip-  X  {X' X)~  ^ X' that appears above is a symmetric idempotent matrix 
of rank n -  2. Here is an example of the use of that fact in the theory of linear 
regression. The finite-dimensional spectral theorem of linear algebra says that any 
real symmetric matrix M can be diagonalised by an orthogonal matrix G, i.e., the 
matrix G'MG is a diagonal matrix. If the matrix M is also idempotent, then the 
diagonal entries in G'MG must be idempotent numbers. Only two real numbers are 
idempotent: 0 and 1. So Ip -  X{X'X) after diagonalisation, has n -  2 Os and two 
1s on the diagonal. That is most of the work in showing that the sum of squares of 
residuals has a chi-square distribution with n -2  degrees of freedom.
We sum the observations, the squares of the Vs and Xs and the products XY  to 
obtain the following quantities.
S.V =  I'l +  -rj H h ,r„
and Sy similarly.
— Tj_ +  r-2 -j- • • • - f
and Syy similarly.
S x Y  =  I l V l  +  i ’2ÿ 2 +  r  x„y„.
We use the summary statistics above to calculate , the estimate of p.
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-  _  nSx\^ ~  S x S y
V 0 0 'n->oxx
We use the estimate of |3 and the other statistics to estimate a by:
'S'y -  g 'S xa n
A consequence of this estimate is that the regression line will always pass through 
th e ‘centre’ / n )
7.1.3 Statistical Definitions
The coefficient o f determination {R^ is a summary measure that tells how well 
the sample regression line fits the data. It represents the percent of variance in the 
dependent variable explained collectively by all of the independent variables. In 
most cases, the ratio would fall somewhere between 0 and 1. If we have an of 
0.4, we then know that the variability of the Y values around the regression line is 
(1-0.4) times the original variance; in other words we have explained 40% of the 
original variability, and are left with 60% residual variability.
The statistic is defined as the ratio of the sum of squares explained by a regression 
model and the ‘total’ sum of squares around the mean in the usual ANOVA 
notation (ESS and TSS represent explained sum of squares and total sum of 
squares respectively).
R  ^= ESS /  TSS
Regression analysis programs also calculate an adjusted R .^ The best way to 
define this quantity is:
R \, ij = MSE /  MST
The estimated variance of Y is MST  = TSS/(n-1) and the explained variance is 
MSB = ESS/(n-p~1) where p is the number of predictors in the regression equation. 
We ‘average’ by dividing by degrees of freedom rather than by n in order to make 
the sample mean squares unbiased estimates of the population variances.
Moreover, the F-test is a measure of the overall significance of the estimated 
regression. The overall F  statistic is a statistic for testing the significance of R  ^ If 
prob(F) < 0.05, then the model is considered significantly better than would be 
expected by chance and we reject the null hypothesis of no linear relationship of y 
to the independents. F is a function of R \ the number of independents, and the 
number of cases. F is computed with k and (n -  k -  1) degrees of freedom, where k 
= number of terms in the equation not counting the constant.
F ( k , N - k -  1 )  = k1 -  R -  
N - k - 1
The T-test is a test of significance approach. A test of significance is a procedure 
by which sample results are used to verify the validity or invalidity of a null 
hypothesis. The t statistic is the coefficient divided by its standard error. The 
standard error is an estimate of the standard deviation of the coefficient, the 
amount it varies across cases. It can be thought of as a measure of the precision 
with which the regression coefficient is measured. If a coefficient is large compared 
to its standard error, then it is probably different from 0.
1 3 :
7.1.4 Assumptions
Multiple regression shares all the assumptions of correlation: linearity of 
relationships, the same level of relationship throughout the range of the 
independent variable (‘homoscedasticity’), interval or near-interval data, absence 
of outliers, and data whose range is not truncated. Particularly, it is important that 
the model being tested is correctly specified. The exclusion of important causal 
variables or the inclusion of extraneous variables can change markedly the beta 
weights and hence the interpretation of the importance of the independent 
variables.
Proper specification o f the modei
If relevant variables are omitted from the model, the common variance they share 
with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those variables, and the error 
term is inflated. If causally irrelevant variables are included in the model, the 
common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to 
the irrelevant variables. The more the correlation of the irrelevant variable(s) with 
other independents is, the greater are the standard errors of the regression 
coefficients for these independents. Omission and irrelevancy can both affect 
substantially the size of the p coefficients.
No muiticoiiinearity
Perfect muiticoiiinearity occurs if independents are linear functions of each other 
(ex., age and year of birth), when the researcher creates dummy variables for all 
values of a categorical variable rather than leaving one out, and when there are 
fewer observations than variables. When there is perfect muiticoiiinearity, there is 
no unique regression solution. When there is high but imperfect muiticoiiinearity a
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solution is still possible but as the independents increase in correlation with each 
other, the standard errors of the regression coefficients will become inflated. High 
muiticoiiinearity does not bias the estimates of the coefficients, only their reliability. 
This means that it becomes difficult to assess the relative importance of the 
independent variables using beta weights. It also means that a small number of 
discordant cases potentially can affect results strongly.
There is no unique method of detecting muiticoiiinearity or nneasuring its strength. 
But, practically, some rules of thumb are likely to help;
First of all, examine the partial correlation between independent variables Since 
the problem of muiticoiiinearity relies on zero-order correlation between 
independent variables, it is suggested that one should examine the partial 
correlation coefficients first. Secondly, another suggested rule is to calculate the 
pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficients between any two regressors. High 
zero-order correlations may suggest collinearity, but it should be recognised that it 
is not necessary to say that they would be high to have collinearity in any specific 
case. Finally, sometimes, one may be able to conjecture collinearity from the 
regression results, when is high, but individual t tests indicate that very few of 
the partial slope coefficients are statistically different from zero.
In a case of detection, there are some ways to deal with this problem: for example, 
dropping a variable and re-specify the model. However, it should be noted that 
omitting a variable may substantially bias the true value of estimated parameters 
Another technique is to pool the data and combine cross-sectional and time series 
data. One may be able to transform the independent variables into different forms, 
for example the use of first differences, since there is no a priori reason to assume 
that their first differences will also be highly correlated.
Homoscedasticity
It should be assured that the residuals are dispersed randomly throughout the 
range of the estimated dependent. Put another way, the variance of residual eri oi 
should be constant for all values of the independents). If not, separate models 
may be required for the different ranges. Also, when the homoscedasticity 
assumption is violated ‘conventionally computed confidence intervals and 
conventional t-tests for OLS estimators can no longer be justified’ (Berry, 1993; 81). 
However, moderate violations of homoscedasticity have only minor impact on 
regression estimates (Fox, 2005: 516). Lack of homoscedasticity may mean (1) 
there is an interaction effect between a measured independent variable and an 
unmeasured independent variable not in the model; or (2) that some independent 
variables are skewed while others are not.
Non-constant error variance can be observed by requesting a simple residual plot 
(a plot of residuals on the Y axis against predicted values on the X axis) A 
homoscedastic model will display a cloud of dots, whereas lack of 
homoscedasticity will be characterised by a pattern such as a funnel shape, 
indicating greater error as the dependent increases. Further, a proper residual test 
may also be helpful to detect heteroscedasticity, for example. White’s test. A 
reason to use W hite’s test is. White does not reply on the normality assumption 
and is easy to implement.
In a case of detection, one method of dealing with hetereoscedasticity is to select 
the weighted least squares regression option. This causes cases with smaller 
residuals to be weighted more in calculating the p coefficients. Square root, log, 
and reciproval transformations of the dependent may also reduce or eliminate lack 
of homoscedasticity. Furthermore, non-constant error variance can indicate the 
need to re-specify the model to include omitted independent variables.
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No outliers
Outliers are a form of violation of homoscedasticity. Detected in the analysis of 
residuals and leverage statistics, these are cases representing high residuals 
(errors) which are clear exceptions to the regression explanation. The set of 
outliers may suggest/require a separate explanation. To deal with outliers, there is 
a need to remove them from analysis and seek to explain them on a separate basis, 
or transforms may be used which tend to ‘pull in' outliers. These include the square 
root, logarithmic, and inverse (x = 1/x) transforms.
Same underlying distribution is assumed for ail variables
Most significance statistics build on the normal distribution, so it is usual for the 
common underlying distribution to be required to be normally distributed. Strictly 
speaking, the dependent variable should be normally distributed for each 
combination of values of the independents. Use of a dichotomous dependent 
variable in OLS regression violates the assumptions of normality and 
homoscedasticity as a normal distribution is impossible with only two values. To 
the extent that an independent variable has a different underlying distribution 
compared to the dependent (bimodal vs. normal, for instance), then a unit increase 
in the independent will have nonlinear impacts on the dependent. Even when 
independent/dependent data pairs are ordered perfectly, unit increases in the 
independent cannot be associated with fixed linear changes in the dependent.
Linear regression will underestimate the correlation of the independent and 
dependent when they come from different underlying distributions. When OLS is 
applied to heteroscedastic models the estimated variance is a biased estimator of 
the true variance. That is, it either overestimates or underestimates the true 
variance, and, in general it is not possible to determine the nature of the bias. The
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variances, and the standard errors as well may therefore be either understated or 
overstated. Thus t-tests are not valid any more.
Normally distributed residual error
Error, represented by the residuals, should be normally distributed for each set of 
values of the independents. A histogram of standardised residuals should show a 
roughly normal curve. An alternative for the same purpose is the normal probability 
plot, with the observed cumulative probabilities of occurrence of the standardised 
residuals on the Y axis and of expected normal probabilities of occurrence on the X 
axis, such that a 45-degree line will appear when observed conforms to normally 
expected. The central limit theorem assumes that even when error is not normally 
distributed, when sample size is large, the sampling distribution of the |3 coefficient 
will still be normal. Therefore violations of this assumption usually have little or no 
impact on substantive conclusions for large samples, but when sample size is 
small, tests of normality are important.
7,2 Models for Managerial Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis
The managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis, described in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), has a clear empirical implication for IPO firms; post-IPO 
operating performance changes should be positively correlated with the change in 
managerial ownership (Mikkelson et al., 1997). So, according to Mikkelson et al. 
(1997), the basic model to test managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis is:
APerfonmmce =  x AM anageria ljO w nersh ip  + e
where the dependent variable (APerformance) is the difference between pre-IPO 
operating performance and post-IPO operating performance. Operating
performance is measured as the ROA (EBITDA scaled by lagged (-1) total assets) 
and the CFO (Cashflow from operations scaled by lagged (-1) total assets) 
respectively. AManagerial Ownership represents the change in ownership (in 
percent) held by corporate executives and directors resulting from the flotation.
To be specific, the first two OLS cross-sectional models are described as below: 
AROA^  ”   ^AK4cmagerial_0\\mership^ + (7 1)
ACFO  ^ = P -^\- /3^  * Ahdanagerial __ Ownership  ^ + £•, ^7 2 )
Then, they are followed by the two models below:
AROA, = Pq + (3, * AM anageria l _ Ownership , + p , ^Size^ + Pi *
+ * A C apita l _  exp enditn re , + AGovernmeni _ subsidy ,
+ p(  ^ "^'Ownership _ type  ^ + p^ '^'Ownership ^concentrâ t ion ^
+ * Board  _  Compositio /?, +
(7.3)
ACFO^ = p(, + P, ''^AManagerial _ Ownership , + P, Size ^ + p , ^ Age^ 
+ y7,| * AC apita l _  exp enditnre , + p^ AGovernmeni subsidy 
+ * Ownership _  type ^ + P^ * Ownership _ concentrât ioip
+ P^ * B oard _ Compositio n, + £•,
where AROAi and ACFOi are the changes of ROA and CFO figures from the year 
(Y-1) to a post-IPO year (Y+/) (/ represents the /th fiscal year in the post-IPO period, 
/= 1,2,3,  4). AManagerial Ownership/ represents the contemporaneous change 
in managerial ownership (in percent) over the same period. Further, this study runs 
the regressions by adding a set of control variables, which have been developed in 
prior chapter. The variable S/ze,- is measured as the beginning-year total assets in
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a post-IPO year (year Y+1; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4), and Age,- represents 
the difference between the establishment year and the IPO year \Capital 
Expenditurei denotes the change in asset-scaled capital investment (adjusting for 
depreciation charges) from the Y-1 year to a post-IPO year (Y+/). AGovernment 
Subsidy! denotes the change in asset-scaled government subsidy from the 
pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year Y+/). Ownership Type, is 
the type of the controlling shareholder, which is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the controlling shareholder is ultimately owned by the state at the end of the 
year; 0 otherwise. Ownership Concentration! and Board Compositiom 
represent the proportion of ownership held by the controlling shareholder and the 
proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at the 
end of the IPO year respectively.
In Table 7-1, a Pearson inter-correlation test between each two of the independent 
variables is conducted. As discussed in earlier section, the concern of 
muiticoiiinearity arises, when there is high correlation between independent 
variables. The tables show that the correlation between independent variables is 
weak and insignificant, except the three ownership and governance variables 
(Ownership type. Ownership concentration and Board composition). The 
significant correlation results imply that state-controlled IPO firms are significantly 
associated with high concentrated ownership structure and board composition. It 
confirms that the State retains a strong control over its IPO subsidiaries, in terms of 
voting power and board seats.
The high correlation of the three variables would give rise to a concern of 
muiticoiiinearity and data redundancy in regression models, which is discussed in 
the last section. One way forward is to drop two of the three variables, but omitting 
a variable in the regression may substantially bias the true value of estimated 
parameters, because the common variance they share with included variables
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may be wrongly attributed to those variables, and the error term is inflated.
It should be recognised that the importance of muiticoiiinearity depends on the 
type of muiticoiiinearity. Importantly, muiticoiiinearity among the explanatory 
variables is the main research concern as it inflates standard errors and makes 
assessment of the relative importance of the explanatory variables unreliable. 
However, muiticoiiinearity among the control variables will not affect research 
outcomes provided one is not concerned with assessing the relative importance ot 
one control variable compared to another. If there is a muiticoiiinearity of control 
variables with explanatory variables, this is not a research problem but rather may 
mean that the control variables will have a strong effect on the independent 
variables, showing the independent variables are less important than their 
uncontrolled relation with the dependent variable would suggest.
So, in this study, the three control variables will be retained in the two regression 
models (model 7.3 and model 7.4), since there is no significant collinearity 
between explanatory variable and control variables. However, for the 
muiticoiiinearity concern between the three ownership structure and governance 
variables, it is unlikely to assess the relative importance of these variables in 
explaining the variance of the dependent variable.
7.3 Separation of Discretionary Accruals from Reported Earnings
In order to test the hypothesis of accrual-based earnings management, this study 
need to calculate the magnitude of discretionary accruals (DAC), which is the 
proxy for the level of accrual-based earnings management. The modified Jones 
(1991) model is adopted for the calculation of discretionary accruals. Then, this 
study will investigate the change of discretionary accruals from the pre-IPO period 
to the post-IPO period.
One may wonder if a regression model is needed to investigate the effects of the 
changes in discretionary accruals on the operating performance changes, as does 
in section 7.2 to test managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis. For example 
AROA/and/or AC F O, may be regressed on the change in discretionary accruals
(ADAC/) from the Y-1 year to the Y+/ year. However, the regression model, if
conducted, is clearly mis-specified, because, as described below, dependent 
variables (Performance or APerformance) should contain accruals component 
(DAC or ADAC).
Reported earnings = CFO + TAC (Total Accruals) (7.5)
TAC = DAC (Discretionary Accruals) + Non-DAC (Non-discretionary Accruals) (7.6)
Reported earnings = CFO  + DAC  + Non-DAC  (7.7)
AReported earnings =  ACFO  + ADAC  + A N  on-DAC  (7.8)
Based on formula (7.8), a change in discretionary accruals (ADAC) from the 
pre-IPO year to the post-IPO years surely leads to a contemporaneous change in 
reported earnings over the same period, only if the other two components (ACFO 
and ANon-DAC) remain stable. In this sense, it is not necessary to bring in a 
regression model to identify the accrual-based earnings management around the 
IPO.
7.4 Models for RPT-based Earnings Management Hypothesis
Finally, this study will identify earnings management phenomenon through related 
party transactions between controlling shareholders and IPO subsidiaries. Firstly 
this study will examine the relation between the size of related party transactions
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and contemporaneous operating performance of IPO firms in each of the three 
investigation periods (the pre-IPO period, the IPO year and the post-IPO period). 
The reported operating performance is regressed on the two RPT variables: 
operating RPTs and net loans. In the post-IPO period, the average of operating 
performance of the four post-IPO years is regressed on the average of operating 
RPTs and the average of net loans of the four post-IPO years. The OLS 
cross-sectional models for testing the RPT-based earnings managemen! 
hypothesis are specified as follow:
ROA^  = -I- * Net __ Loari^  4- * Operolingterns^ (7 9)
CFO  ^ = + /?, Net _ Loan^  + pj Operating _ items, 4-g, (7.10)
ROA, = Po -h (3, '^Net_loon. + P, * Operating_items, + p  ^*Size, + p  ^ Age,
+ P^ * Capitol_Qxpendilii7'e, + p ,^ * Government_siibsidy, ^ ^
+ P j Ownership_type. +  p^ * Ownership_concentration,
+  * Board_Com position, +  8,
CFO, = Pu 4- Pi * Net _ loan, + P, * O perating_ items, + P^  Size, +■ p , * Age, 
+ P^ Capital_Q x^enditure, + P^ , ^ Government_siibsid}
+ Pi Ownetsship_typ(i, + A  Ownership_concentration 
+ P<) * Board_Composition, + s.
where ROA, and CFO/ denote EBITDA and Cashflow from operations scaled by 
lagged (-1) total assets respectively in a given period / (/ = -1, 0, 1). Met /oan, 
represents the difference between loans by controlling shareholders to listed 
subsidiaries and loans by listed subsidiaries to controlling shareholders scaled by 
lagged (-1) total assets in a given period / (/ = -1, 0, 1). Operating items;, 
representing the aggregate amount of operating RPTs scaled by lagged (-1) total
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assets in a given period i (/ = -1 ,0 ,  1).
In formula (7.11) and (7.12), a set of control variables have been introduced. 
Firms' SizBj is measured as the beginning-year total assets, and Age, is 
measured as the difference between the establishment year and the IPO year. 
Capital Expenditure! and Government Subsidy; denote asset-scaled capital 
investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) and asset-scaled government 
subsidy. Ownership Type; is the type of the controlling shareholder, which is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling shareholder is ultimately 
owned by the state at the end of the year; 0 otherwise. Ownership Concentration, 
and Board Compositiom represent the proportion of ownership held by the 
controlling shareholder and the proportion of directors representing the controlling 
shareholder in the board at the end of the IPO year respectively.
In Table 7-2, a Pearson inter-correlation test between each two of the independent 
variables is also conducted. The tables show that the correlation results between 
operating RPTs and ownership and governance variables are strongly significant. 
The correlation result implies that IPO firms with high concentrated ownership 
structure and board composition are likely to conduct more RPTs with their 
controlling shareholders. The high correlation of these variables gives rise to a 
concern of muiticoiiinearity between control variables with explanatory variable 
(operating RPTs). However, as discussed earlier, to simply remove the three 
ownership and governance variables is not a good decision, because omitting a 
variable in the regression may substantially bias the true value of estimated 
parameters, and the error term is inflated. Further, muiticoiiinearity between control 
variables with explanatory variable is not a research problem, even though the 
control variables will have a strong effect on the explanatory variables.
So, in this study, the three control variables will be retained in the two regression
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models (model 7.11 and model 7.12). Although such regressions ignore the |
contemporaneous correlations among variables, and can lead to biased standard Ii
errors (but not biased coefficient estimates), this specification provides regression |
I
coefficients that allow an easy interpretation of the economic significance. I
Furthermore, a similar version of regression models has also been specified in !
!prior literature (Ritter, 1991; Teoh et al., 1998). However, it is unlikely to assess the :
relative importance of these variables in explaining the variance of the dependent 
variable, and it should be beard in mind that the control variables would have an •
effect on explanatory variables.
7.5 Summary
This chapter presents a brief introduction on the methodology of regression 
analysis. Then, it presents the research design to test each of the three 
hypotheses:
First of all, a regression analysis is introduced to test managerial ownership 
dispersion hypothesis. The change in operating performance from before to after 
the IPO is regressed on the contemporaneous change in managerial ownership 
and a set of control variables.
Secondly, in order to examine discretionary accruals around the IPO 
(accrual-based earnings management), modified Jones (1991) model is employed 
to separate discretionary accruals from non-discretionary accruals. So, the 
movement of discretionary accruals over time indicates that managers are 
manipulating accounting accruals for income-reporting objectives. It is not 
necessary to bring in a regression model to investigate the effect of discretionary 
accruals adjustments on reported earnings of IPO firms, because discretionary 
accruals is a component of reported earnings.
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Finally, another regression analysis is introduced to test RPT-based earnings 
management hypothesis: the operating performance is regressed on the 
contemporaneous amounts of operating RPTs and net loans, and a set of control 
variables. Such regressions ignore the contemporaneous correlations among 
variables and can lead to biased standard errors (but not biased coefficient 
estimates), but this specification provides regression coefficients that allow an 
easy interpretation of the economic significance.
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Chapter 8 Hypothesis Testing: Managerial Ownership Dispersion
In this chapter, the hypothesis of managerial ownership dispersion will be 
examined. First of all, descriptive statistics of explanatory variables and/or control 
variables are to be presented. Then, a regression analysis follows.
8.1 Descriptive Statistics
8.1.1 Managerial Ownership Variables
Table 8-1 presents the descriptive statistics of managerial ownership and the 
changes from before and after the IPO. Panel A shows that Chinese firms report a 
very low proportion of shares owned by managers. An average proportion of 
managerial ownership is 0.008% (t statistic = 1,02) in the Y-1 year, and it declines 
to 0.004% (t statistic = 1.57) in the Y+2 year and further to 0.002% (t statistic = 1.68) 
in the Y+4 year. A further examination on the sample IPOs shows that there are 
only 5 firms (2% of the sample) reporting to have some of their shares owned by 
managers prior to the IPO year, and most firms (98%) do not even have a share of 
ownership held by managers. Since managers barely own any stocks in the 
pre-IPO firms, it is expected that managerial ownership in Chinese IPOs has little 
effect on operating performance of IPOs and its long-run variation subsequent to 
the IPO.
Panel B presents that the changes in managerial ownership from the pre-IPO year 
to the post-IPO years. In terms of mean tests, there seems a slight decline 
(-0.004%) in managerial ownership from the Y-1 year to the Y+1 year, however, the
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test result is statistically insignificant (t statistic = -1.00). The declines from the Y-1 
year to the Y+2 year, Y+3 year and Y+4 year are very small (-0.000%, -0.001%, 
and 0.000% respectively) and statistically insignificant (t = -0.27, -0.75 and 0.22 
respectively). In terms of median tests, it is clear that there is no change in 
managerial ownership over time, since the decline is equal to zero.
Table 8-1 (Panel B) clearly shows that there is no significant evidence of a decline 
in managerial ownership from before to after the IPO. It implies that managerial 
ownership dispersion hypothesis can not explain the decline in post-IPO operating 
performance relative to the pre-IPO level, since Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
conjecture that operating performance decline from before to after the IPO is 
positively associated with contemporaneous managerial ownership dispersion 
over the same time. However, managerial ownership in China, on average, does 
not significantly disperse from before to after the IPO. Furthermore, it is observed 
that some IPO firms (9 firms, 3.7% of the sample) report their managerial 
ownership to increase in the post-IPO period relative to the pre-IPO level, mainly 
because these firms implement managerial shareholding incentive schemes 
subsequent to the IPO, in order to align the interest of managers in line with 
shareholders.
As shown in Table 8-1, it is conjectured that managerial ownership and its change 
from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period is very unlikely to have a significant 
effect on corporate operating performance changes from before and after the IPO 
So, in this study, it is hypothesised that there is NO relation between operating 
performance changes from before to after the IPO and managerial ownership 
changes over the same period. A further regression analysis will follow to support 
this conjecture.
8.1.2 Control Variables
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Table 8-2 presents the descriptive statistics of control variables: Size, Age, Capital 
expenditure (and ACapital expenditure). Government subsidy (AGovernment 
subsidy) and ownership and governance variables (Ownership type and 
Ownership concentration and Board composition).
Panel A shows the natural logarithm of total assets of IPO firms before and after 
the IPO. The log form of total assets is used to alleviate the possible impact of 
outliers. Panel A indicates that the figure (natural logarithm of total assets) ranges 
between 8 and 11, and it seems to increase slightly from the pre-IPO period to the 
post-IPO period, presumably because the business scale of IPOs is growing over 
the period. Importantly, the means and medians are shown to be around the value 
of 9, and the standard deviations remains to be constantly small. In this regression 
analysis, it is hypothesised that smaller IPOs are more likely to suffer a large 
decline in reported operating performance from before to after the IPO.
Panel B shows the age of IPO firms, which is measured as the number of years 
between the establishment year and the IPO year. It is shown that, by the end of 
the IPO year, the average age of IPO firms is 4 years old (t statistic = 16.10), and 
the median value is 3 years (z statistic = 8.69). It is indicated that IPO firms, on 
average, do not have a long historical operating record prior to the IPO, mainly 
because China’s market-oriented economic reform is launched as late as the early 
1990’s. In this regression analysis, it is hypothesised that IPOs of start-up firms are 
likely to suffer a larger decline in reported operating performance from before to 
after the IPO.
Panel C describes asset-scaled capital expenditure before to after the IPO. It is 
shown that the mean and median values of capital expenditure seem to fluctuate 
substantially around the IPO, going up from 6.93% (t statistic = 4.12) and 2. 02% (z 
statistic = 7.17) respectively in Y (-1) year to 17. 40% (t statistic = 7.43) and 9. 79%
147
(z statistic = 8.54) respectively in the IPO year, but soon drop to 0. 43% (t statistic = 
1.98) and 0. 00% (z statistic = 5.78) respectively in Y (+1) year. From Y (+2) year 
onwards, the figure rebounds to a level higher than the pre-IPG level; for example, 
9.72% (t statistic = 10.07) and 6.64% (z statistic = 8.79) respectively in Y (+2) year 
and goes lower to 7.91% (t statistic = 8.34) and 4.65% (z statistic = 5.90) 
respectively in Y (+4) year.
Panel D investigates the changes of capital expenditure from before to after the 
IPO. It shows that there is a significant decline from the pre-IPO year to Y (+1) year, 
in terms of both mean value (-6.50%, t statistic = -3.79) and median value (-1,81 % 
z statistic = 6.47) respectively. However, in any other years there seems to be a 
slight increase (2.77%, 0.89% and 0.96% respectively) in terms of mean values 
and the median values show a significant increase (3.26%, 2.33% and 1 95% 
respectively; z statistic = 4.34, 3.00 and 2.52 respectively). The amount of capital 
expenditures demonstrates capital investments of the firms, which may reveal 
future growth in operating performance. In this regression analysis, it is 
hypothesised that the change in capital expenditure from before to after the IPO is 
positively associated with the contemporaneous change in operating performance 
over the same period.
Panel E and F present asset-scaled government subsidy and its change from the 
pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period. Most Chinese IPOs are state-controlled 
firms, and they may receive government subsidies. Government subsidies should 
be recognised as a gain in income statements once received, so that the change in 
government subsidies would be able to impact companies’ long-run operating 
performance. Panel E shows that government subsidy is not very common before 
and after the IPO, since the median values constantly remain to be zero. The 
average figure in the Y (-1) year is 0.70% (t statistic = 5.12), but it goes lower in the 
post-IPO period (0.29%, 0.15%, 0.26% and 0.10% respectively, and t statistic =
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3.86, 4.11, 3.98 and 3.74 respectively).
Panel F examines the change of government subsidy from before to after the IPO 
In terms of mean values, there is a significant decline (-0.4%, t statistic = -3.21) 
from the Y (-1) year to the Y (+1) year. The declines from the Y (-1) year to any 
other post-IPO years (Y+2, Y+3, Y+4) are of a same magnitude (-0.54%, -0.46% 
and -0.54% respectively; t statistic = -4.01, -3.11 and -3.64 respectively). In this 
regression analysis, it is hypothesised that government subsidy is supportive of 
abnormal high operating performance of IPOs, and the change in government 
subsidy from before to after the IPO may be positively related to the 
contemporaneous change in operating performance of IPOs over the period.
Finally, Panel G presents ownership structure and corporate governance 
characteristics of IPO sample at the end of the IPO year. It shows that 83.6% of the 
sample is controlled by the State directly or ultimately. The controlling shareholders 
on average retain a percentage of 62.47% in the ownership of sample IPOs at the 
end of the IPO year. Furthermore, an average percentage of 43.36% in the board 
seats is retained by controlled shareholders by the end of the IPO year. Panel G 
demonstrates that Chinese IPOs are mainly characterised as state-controlled firms, 
which are strongly controlled by controlling shareholders, due to concentrated 
ownership and concentrated board composition. In this study, it is expected that 
firms strongly manipulated by controlling shareholders are more likely to report a 
decline in operating performance from before to after the IPO, due to related party 
transactions concerns.
8.2 Regression Analysis
8.2.1 Managerial Ownership
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Table 8-3 presents the regression results to test managerial ownership dispersion 
hypothesis. In model 1, the change of ROA from the pre-IPO year to the post-IPO 
year / (AROA,-, / =  1, 2, 3, 4) is regressed on contemporaneous managerial 
ownership change (AManagerial Ownership,) over the same period. The table 
shows that model 1 explains less than 0.5% ( ^ " )  of the variation of the dependent 
variable for all the 4 regression results, and the figures of adjusted ^ 'a re  below 
zero. F test results (all below 0.5) indicate the significance o f # "  is extremely low. 
It is clear that the sample regressions do not seem to fit the data. Furthermore, the 
estimated coefficients of variable ‘AManagerial Ownership’ in the 4 regressions are 
mixed: the estimated coefficients are found to be negative (-20.194 and -24 777 
respectively) in the first two regressions, but positive (9.981 and 125.784 
respectively) in the remaining two regressions, all of which are not statistically 
significant at an effective level (t statistic = -0.66, -0.25, 0.18 and 0.54 respectively). 
It suggests that there is no significant relationship between managerial ownership 
changes and earnings performance changes.
In model 2, the change of CFO from the pre-IPO year to the post-IPO year / (ACFO,) 
is regressed on contemporaneous managerial ownership change (AOwnership, / = 
1, 2,3,  4) over the same period. The regression results of model 2 provide a same 
finding: these models explain less than 0.5% ( #" )  of the variance of dependent 
variable. The estimated coefficients are found to be all negative (-36.337, -55.513, 
-9.241 and -100.524 respectively), showing that there is no positive relation 
between operating performance changes and contemporaneous managerial 
ownership changes over the same period.
Based on model 1 and 2, there is no significant evidence that the change in 
operating performance from before to after the IPO is positively associated with the 
contemporaneous change in managerial ownership over the same period. The
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regression results show that the models are highly mis-specified, since #" values 
are unacceptably low. It implies that some relevant independent variables may 
have been missed out in the regression models, so the variance of dependent 
variable may be wrongly attributed to the variable of managerial ownership 
dispersion, and the error term is abnormally inflated.
In the third and fourth models, a set of control variables is introduced into the 
regression models: operating performance changes (AROA and ACFO) are then 
regressed on managerial ownership change (AManagerial Ownership) and a set of 
control variables. In model 3, it seems that the 4 regressions are better specified: 
the values of #" have increased to around 10% (F statistic = 1.18, 1.38, 1.32 and 
1.28 respectively). However, the estimated coefficients are found to be positive 
(11.428 and 194.537 respectively) in some years, but negative (-14.412 and 
-20.946 respectively) in some other years, all of which are not statistically 
significant at an effective level. The model 4 also explains 10% or less of the 
variation of dependent variable for all the 4 regressions. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficients are found to be all negative (-4.127, -34.341, -19.444 and -66.197 
respectively), showing that there is no positive relation between operating 
performance changes and contemporaneous managerial ownership changes over 
the same period.
8.2.2 Control Variables
In addition, regression results show no significant relation between dependent 
variables (operating performance changes) and control variables (Size, Age, 
ACapital expenditure, AGovernment subsidy. Ownership type. Ownership 
concentration and Board composition).
Firstly, the pooled cross-sectional analysis shows small and newly-established
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IPOs are likely to report a larger decline in reported operating performance from 
before to after the IPO. The estimated coefficients for variable ‘Size’ in the two 
models (regressed on ROA and CFO respectively) are 0.052 and 0.006, and the 
coefficients for variable ‘Age’ are 0.008 and 0.007 respectively. However, the t test 
indicates that they are not statistically significant. Secondly, the change in 
operating performance seems to be positively associated with the 
contemporaneous change in capital expenditure over the same time. The 
estimated coefficients are 0.019 (t statistic = 1.08) and 0.070 (t statistic = 1.89) 
respectively, showing that this evidence is not strongly significant.
Moreover, the change in government subsidy from before to after the IPO does not 
seem to be positively related to the change in operating performance, and the 
estimated coefficients are -0.228 (t statistic = -0.97) and -0.130 (t statistic = -0.27) 
respectively. As shown in Table 8-2, government subsidies are very small, so that 
the effect of these subsidies on corporate operating performance is really limited. 
Even though Table 8-2 shows that there is a small decline in government subsidies 
from before to after the IPO. the small decline has little impact on the long-run 
operating performance of Chinese IPOs.
In model 3 and 4, the three control variables (ownership type, ownership structure 
and board composition) have been added into analysis. Due to a concern of 
multicollinearity between the three control variables, it is not possible to assess the 
relative importance of the three variables in explaining the variance of the 
dependent variable compared to another. The regression models are specified to 
test the effect of managerial ownership dispersion on operating performance 
changes from before to after the IPO, and the multicollinearity among the control 
variables will not affect research outcomes of testing the hypothesis of managerial 
ownership dispersion.
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8.3 Further Discussion
The managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis states that owing to the 
dispersion of managerial ownership resulting from the IPO, managers will deviate 
from the value-maximising goal, and companies' operating performance in the 
long run may be negatively affected by the deviation from value maximisation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This hypothesis has a clear empirical implication for 
IPO firms; the operating performance decline in the post-IPO period relative to the 
pre-IPO level should be positively correlated with the contemporaneous dispersion 
in managerial ownership (Mikkelson et al.. 1997).
However, there is no evidence to support this conjecture by using Chinese IPO 
data. The regression results show that the operating performance change of IPO 
firms from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period is not significantly associated 
with contemporaneous managerial ownership change over the same period; the 
deterioration of operating performance is not likely to be affected by corporate 
managerial ownership resulting from the flotation.
It is evident that there are very few companies (less than 2% in the sample) 
reporting to have their stocks owned by corporate managers in the pre-IPO period. 
Moreover, the managerial ownership is not effectively high in China, normally 
lower than 5%q , s o  that the change in managerial ownership does not necessarily 
lead to the change in corporate operating performance. It is also found that 
managerial ownership does not significantly disperse from the pre-IPO period to 
the post-IPO period. Some companies (3.7% of the sample) report their 
managerial ownership to rise to a higher level in the post-IPO period, primarily 
because they establish managerial stock incentive plans after going public and 
bring managers more in line with the best interests of shareholders. As a result, it is 
unlikely to expect any decline in operating performance to be positively associated
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with the contemporaneous managerial ownership dispersion over the same period 
So, in this sense, it is believed that managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis 
does not explain the decline in operating performance of Chinese IPO firms from 
the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period, primarily because managerial 
ownership is barely used in Chinese stock market.
8.4 Summary
This chapter provides evidence that the decline in reported operating performance 
of Chinese IPO firms is not significantly associated with the change in managerial 
ownership from before to after the IPO. The main reason is that managers in 
Chinese listed firms hold a very small percentage of ownership, which is too small 
to make any effective impact on corporate operating performance. Moreover, there 
is no significant decrease in the post-IPO managerial ownership relative to the 
pre-IPO managerial ownership. So, managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis, 
which is conjectured by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is not applicable to Chinese 
stock market and could not explain the decline in post-IPO reported operating 
performance of Chinese IPOs relative to the pre-IPO level.
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Chapter 9 Hypothesis Testing: Accrual-based earnings management
Next, this study investigates the effect of accrual-based earnings management 
around the IPO on long-run operating performance of Chinese IPOs. Previous 
studies have documented the use of accrual-based earnings management related 
to securities offerings. This research follows the prior literature by investigating 
total accruals (TAC) and discretionary accruals (DAC) of IPO firms and their 
variation from before to after the IPO. The modified Jones model (1991) is used to 
compute discretionary accruals, since Dechow et al. (1995) compare various 
models of discretionary accruals and conclude that the modified version of the 
Jones (1991) model is the most statistically powerful model for detecting 
accrual-based earnings management.
9.1 Total Accruals and Its Variation
Table 9-1 demonstrates assets-scaled total accruals (TAC) before and after the 
IPO, which is the actual difference between Net Income (Nl) and Cashflow From 
Operation (CFO) scaled by lagged (-1) total assets, less the median 
contemporaneous figure of the same 2-digit SlC-code publicly traded firms.
Panel A presents the industry-adjusted TAC figures from Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year: 
IPO firms report a significant and positive industry-adjusted TAC figure of 0.084 
(mean value, t statistic = 5.43) and 0.082 (median value, z statistic = 6.42) 
respectively in the Y (-1) year. In the IPO year, the figure remains significant and 
positive (0.102, t statistic = 7.07) and (0.096, z statistic = 6.42) in mean and median 
values respectively. However, the figure declines in the post-IPO years: the mean
155
and median industry-adjusted TAC figures are 0.026 (t statistic = 2.73) and 0.023 
(z statistic = 2.55) respectively in Y (+1) year. From that year onwards, 
industry-adjusted TAC figures further decline to -0.001 (mean value, t statistic = 
-0.17) and 0.010 (median value, z statistic = 0.52) respectively in Y (+2) year. It 
seems that IPO firms are likely to report a significantly negative TAC figures 
between the Y (+3) year and the Y (+4) year, since the TAC figure is negative 
(-0.012, z statistic = 1.72; -0.009, z statistic = 1.80) in median values in Y (+3) year 
and Y (+4) year respectively.
Panel B presents the changes in industry-adjusted TAC from Y (-1) year to Y (+/) 
year (/ = 1,2,3,4). It is clear that there is a significant decline from the pre-IPO year 
to the post-IPO year /. For example, the decline in industry-adjusted TAC is -0.057 
(mean value, t statistic= -3.28) and -0.061 (median value, z statistic = 4.35) from Y 
(-1) year to Y (+1) year; and the decline is significantly larger (-0.085, t statistic = 
-5.08; and -0.086, z statistic = 5.83) in Y (+2) year, relative to the Y (-1) level. From 
Y (-1) year to Y (+3) year, the declines are -0.092 (mean value, t statistic = -4.89) 
and -0.097 (median value, z statistic = 5.58) respectively. It seems that the 
declines from the Y (-1) year to the Y (+4) year are slightly lower (-0.088, t statistic 
= -5.00 and -0.073, z statistic = 5.25 respectively), but still strongly significant.
Table 9-1 shows IPO firms report a significantly large positive TAC in the pre-IPO 
year, and the TAC turns to be a negative figure, which is relatively small in absolute 
value, from the Y (+3) year onwards. It clearly indicates that from before to after the 
IPO there is a significant decline in TAC. So, as the equation below shows.
^Reportedearn ings (IS,N1) =  lS.Cashflo\v (àCFO) +  ATolal accruals (ATAC'j
where the change in reported earnings consists of the two components; the 
change in the CFO and the change in the TAC. The decline in TAC from before to
156
after the IPO could be one of the explanations for the decline in contemporaneous 
operating performance over the same period. As Beneish (2001) argues, accruals 
component is under the control of managers, and it is very likely to be manipulated 
by managers for opportunistic purposes, like equity offerings. So, it is expected 
that the decline in TAC may be associated with managers' discretionary use of 
accruals to manipulate reported earnings. So, Table 9-1 shows that managers may 
engage in accrual-based earnings management to boost reported earnings in the 
pre-IPO period.
9.2 Discretionary Accruals and Its Variation
However, it should be noted that total accruals could be further broken into 
discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. In Table 9-1, discretionary 
accruals component (DAC) is not separated from non-discretionary accruals 
component (Non-DAC), so that we cannot see the change in total accruals (TAC) is 
caused by the change in discretionary accruals and/or non-discretionary accruals.
ATotal accruals =  ADiscretionaiy accruals + ANon-discretionary accruals
As discussed in literature review, only discretionary accruals component is under 
the control of managers. So, there is need to separate discretionary accruals from 
non-discretionary accruals to see if discretionary accruals are artificially 
manipulated over the entire period. In Table 9-2, modified Jones (1991) model will 
be used to calculate discretionary accruals.
Table 9-2 presents assets-scaled discretionary accruals (DAC) before and after the 
IPO, net of the median contemporaneous figure of the same 2-digit SlC-code 
publicly traded firms. It is clear that the mean value and the median value of DAC 
in the Y (-1) year are 0.079 (t statistic = 5.03) and 0.075 (z statistic = 5.96)
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respectively, indicating th. : IPO firms report abnormally large positive 
discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO period. It implies that managers may 
artificially manipulate discretionary accruals to push the earnings performance 
higher in the pre-IPO period.
Moreover, the magnitude of discretionary accruals in the IPO year still stays 
significantly high, and the mean and the median of discretionary accruals are 
0.102 (t statistic = 7.76) and 0.090 (z statistic = 6.60) respectively. However, DAC 
then declines in the Y (+1) year, but still stays positive: the mean value and the 
median value are 0.016 (t statistic = 1.76) and 0.020 (z statistic =1.61) respectively, 
and the median value is no longer statistically significant at any effective level. In Y 
(+3) and Y (+4) year, DAC becomes negative (-0.013 and -0.008 in mean values, t 
statistic = -1.53 and -1.04 respectively; -0.015 and -0.010 in median values, z 
statistic = 2.09 and 1.79 respectively). The median values are statistically 
significant at 10% level, showing that IPO firms begin to reverse discretionaiy 
accruals from the Y (+3) year on, as expected.
However, the evidence of unwinding the discretionary accruals from the Y (+3) 
year onwards is not effectively strong. Firstly, the mean values of discretionary 
accruals in the Y (+3) year and the Y (+4) year are not statistically significant at any 
effective level. A further data examination on the industry-adjusted discretionary 
accruals shows that there are some outlier firms, which push the mean values of 
the two distributions upwards. It is indicated that many Chinese IPOs do not seem 
to significantly unwind the discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period. This 
finding will be further discussed in next section.
Panel B further reports that there is a significant decline in discretionary accruals 
from Y (-1) year to the post-IPO period. It shows that the declines from Y (-1) yeai 
to Y (+1) year are -6.2% (mean value, t statistic = -3.48) and -7.2% (median value,
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z statistic = 4.61) respectively. The declines from Y (-1) year to Y (+2) year are 
-8.6% (mean value, t statistic = -5.00) and -8.6% (median value, z statistic = 5.64) 
respectively: the changes from Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year are -8.7% (t statistic = 
-4.90) and -8.1% (z statistic = 5.19) respectively. The significant decline in 
discretionary accruals from before to after the IPO is likely to lead to a 
contemporaneous decrease in reported earnings over the same period, since 
discretionary accruals component is one of the three components of reported 
earnings.
Discretionary accruals component is different from the other two components of 
reported earnings, because it is under the control of managers. The abnormal 
movement in discretionary accruals may reveal a likely earnings manipulation 
through discretionary accruals. Table 9-2 confirms that IPO firms artificially 
manipulate discretionary accruals upwards to inflate reported earnings in the 
pre-IPO year. It also shows that there is a significant decline in discretionary 
accruals in the post-IPO period, relative to the pre-IPO level, which could lead to a 
decline in reported earnings in the aftermarket period. The finding does indicate 
that managers are likely to unwind discretionary accruals a bit in the post-IPO 
years, although the evidence of unwinding is not strongly significant.
9.3 Further Discussion
Table 9-1 and 9-2 both indicate that accruals component is artificially manipulated 
upwards to boost pre-IPO reported earnings. In the post-IPO period, the 
abnormally large discretionary accruals component Is not sustainable, and the 
decline in discretionary accruals could lead to a decrease in reported earnings. In 
prior literature, IPO firms are expected to unwind the discretionary accruals in the 
post-IPO period. For example, Teoh et al., (1998) find that IPO firms in the US 
begin to unwind the discretionary accruals after the IPO. However, it is surprising
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that Chinese IPO firms seem to unwind the discretionary accruals starting from the 
Y (+3) year onwards and the evidence of unwinding is very weak.
One of the possible explanations is that Chinese IPOs tend to delay the unwinding 
process and the reversal of discretionary accruals would be spread over a long 
period after the IPO, i.e. longer than 4 years. Although Chinese IPO firms do not 
considerably unwind the accruals in the first four years subsequent to the IPO, they 
may be able to unwind the accruals at a later time. Chinese accounting practices 
seem to be supportive of this conjecture for the following three reasons:
Firstly, due to strong governmental intervention in financial reporting practices, 
accounting estimates and accounting choices under Chinese GAAP are not freely 
flexible, in which case discretionary accruals are not fully under the control of 
managers. After the promulgation of 1998 GAAP reform (CMOF, 1998), listed firms 
have been allowed to determine provisions for impairment losses of loans and 
receivables, investments and inventories; however, the government still keeps the 
control over the provisions for the rest of tangible and intangible assets. So, 
Chinese managers can only manipulate these accruals items that have been 
reformed in the 1998 GAAP. More importantly, it should be noted that these 
reformed accruals items are still not at the full discretion of managers, even after 
the 1998 GAAP reform, because the government constantly plays a vital role in 
influencing listed firms' accounting practices. For example, write-offs of impaired 
assets may be subject to the approval by the responsible government agency, and 
the alteration of accounting estimates may also be reviewed by government 
officials. So, it may take a longer time to see the reversal of discretionary accruals, 
since discretionary accruals are less controlled by managers.
Secondly, the unwinding process of discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period is 
slow, probably because managers are reluctant to unwind discretionary accruals
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immediately after the IPO. A reversal of discretionary accruals is very likely to 
negatively affect reported earnings of IPO firms substantially, and public complaint 
and/or fraud investigation by market regulators may follow up. So, managers may 
spread the unwinding process in a longer period to avoid any negative impact of 
the unwinding. Roosenboom et al. (2003) provide evidence to support this 
conjecture: in the post-IPO years, Dutch managers reduce provisions for 
impairment in an attempt to mitigate the negative effect of the inevitable reversal of 
current accruals on reported net income. It is particularly true in China, because 
Chinese market is still underdeveloped: the quality of external auditors is relatively 
low; corporate governance is newly established and weak; and institutional 
ownership is too small to be an effective monitoring mechanism. In this case, 
Chinese firms are more likely to carry impaired assets on their balance sheets for a 
long time, and fail to unwind the accruals in a timely manner.
In addition, a further examination on firms' public disclosures provides interesting 
insights on weak evidence of unwinding the accruals in the post-IPO period. It is 
found that around 28% of sample IPO firms did make a prior-earnings restatement 
in the post-IPO period, showing that reported earnings in the pre-IPO period need 
to be restated, or say retrospectively adjusted. Table 9-3 reports a comparison 
Table between originally reported earnings (assets-scaled EBITDA) and restated 
earnings. A paired-sample mean test shows that the restated number is 
significantly lower than the original number by 2.18% (t statistic = 6.43); and the 
median test indicates that the restated number is lower than the original number by 
1.16% (z statistic = 8.12). The finding provides evidence that reported earnings in 
the pre-IPO period go lower, if restated. These prior-earnings restatements clearly 
confirm that the original pre-IPO earnings have been exaggerated, and the 
restated earnings may be more likely to show a true picture of firms’ profitability. 
More importantly, these restatements further provide the reason why original 
pre-IPO reported earnings need to be restated. Almost all the sample IPO firms,
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which have restated their pre-IPO reported earnings in the post-IPO period, claim 
that they have recorded a lower provision for impairment loss of account 
receivables, investments and inventories in the pre-IPO period. Since a provision 
for impairment losses is one of the important components of discretionary accruals, 
the presence of these restatements indicates accrual-based earnings 
management may have been engaged in the pre-IPO period to boost reported 
earnings of Chinese IPOs. Once the pre-IPO earnings are restated, discretionary 
accruals would not be unwound in the post-IPO period. This evidence of 
prior-earnings restatements could interpret, at least partly, why there is no 
sufficient evidence of unwinding discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period.
9.4 Poor Stock Performance In the Aftermarket Period
Finally, this study investigates how the market reacts to the managers’ 
accrual-based earnings management around the IPO. In prior literature on US 
markets (Teoh et al., 1998; Healy and Whalen, 1999), investors do not fully see 
through the accrual-based earnings management around the IPO. If this is true. 
IPO firms, which use accrual-based earnings management to boost pre-IPO 
earnings, are likely to poorly perform in the stock market in the long run (Teoh et al., 
1998; Roosenboom et al., 2003). In Table 9-4, stock returns are measured by 
using Buy-And-Hoid Returns (BAHRs) and Cumulative-Abnormal-Returns (CARs), 
inclusive of dividends and other distributions, less contemporaneous median 
return of publicly traded firms within 2-digit SIC code. Long-term BAHRs and 
CARs are calculated starting from the second trading day to an event year / (/ = 
1,2,3,4,5). Then, IPO firms are split into four quartile portfolios by the average 
magnitude of discretionary accruals (DAC), in the pre-IPO years (the Y (-1) year 
and the Y (0) year), by using modified Jones (1991) model.
Panel A of Table 9-4 shows the mean value of benchmark-adjusted BAHRs in four
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different DAC portfolios: the quartile portfolio (Q4) with the largest positive DAC in 
the pre-IPO years are likely to underperform their industry peers by more than 15% 
over 2 years or longer; however, the remaining portfolios (01, 02, Q3), which 
report a small positive DAC or negative DAC in pre-IPO years, do not seem to 
substantially underperform their industry peers. Panel B further confirms the 
finding by using the CARs. In Panel B, the largest positive DAC portfolio (04) seem 
to underperform their industry peers by more than 10% over 2 years or longer; 
however the other three quartile portfolios perform much better than 04 and do 
not seem to either underperform (and/or outperform) their industry peers.
Table 9-4 presents evidence that IPO firms, which have the largest positive DAC in 
the pre-IPO period, are likely to perform poorly in the stock market. In other words, 
pre-IPO accruals management is likely to be associated with stock 
underperformance in the post-IPO period. Table 9-4 further reveals that those who 
report a negative DAC in the pre-IPO period do not perform differently in 
comparison to IPOs reporting a small positive DAC in the pre-IPO period and/or 
their industry peers.
9.5 Summary
Teoh et al. (1998) and Roosenboom et al. (2003) argue that managers of IPO firms 
may manipulate discretionary accruals to boost reported earnings in the pre-IPO 
period. In the post-IPO period, the unwinding of accounting accruals could lead to 
a significant decline in reported earnings relative to the pre-IPO level. In this 
research, there is evidence to support this hypothesis by using Chinese IPO data. 
Chinese IPO firms report positive large discretionary accruals in the Y (-1) year; 
from Y (+3) year onwards, it seems that IPO firms begin to slightly unwind the 
accruals. Since discretionary accruals component is one of the three components 
of reported earnings, the change in discretionary accruals from the pre-IPO period
63
to the post-IPO period will have a significant effect on long-term reported earnings 
of IPO firms.
Surprisingly, there is no strong evidence of unwinding the discretionary accruals in 
the post-IPO period. I argue that the reversal of discretionary accruals would be 
spread over a long period, i.e. longer than 4 years after the IPO. Firstly, the lack of 
flexibility in accounting choices and/or accounting estimates may be responsible 
for the insufficient evidence of post-IPO unwinding the discretionary accruals. 
Secondly, managers may slow down the unwinding process to avoid the negative 
impact of the unwinding on post-IPO reported earnings. Finally, it is found that 
many firms (28% of the sample) claim that they have recorded a lower provision for 
asset impairments in pre-IPO financial statements, and therefore in the post-IPO 
period they have to restate their pre-IPO reported earnings and the provision for 
impairment losses. In this case, pre-IPO reported earnings have been boosted 
through this specific accrual item of provisions for impairment losses, and once 
pre-IPO earnings are restated, there is no need for a reversal of discretionary 
accruals in the post-IPO period.
Further, the market reaction to pre-IPO accrual-based earnings management has 
been examined. It is found that IPO firms with a large positive DAC in the pre-IPO 
period clearly underperform their industry peers in stock market and/or 
underperform the IPO firms with smaller positive or negative DAC, in terms of both 
long-run BAHRs (Buy-And-Hold Returns) and CARs (Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns). It implies that investors can not see through this pre-IPO accrual-based 
earnings management, and they may be overoptimistic about IPO’s prospective 
profitability. This finding highlights the inefficiency of Cliinese stock market, 
because the stocks involved with pre-IPO accrual-based earnings management 
are likely to perform poorly in the aftermarket period.
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Chapter 10 Hypothesis testing: RPT-based Earnings Management
In Chapter 9, it is found that Chinese IPOs are likely to engage in accrual-based 
earnings management in the pre-IPO period to boost reported earnings Table 9-2 
shows there is a significant decline in discretionary accruals component (DAC) 
from before to after the IPO. It is indicated that managers use accruals at their own 
discretion to boost reported earnings in Y (-1) and Y (0) years. However, accruals 
management has no impact on corporate cashflow performance, so that it cannot 
explain why there is a significant decline in cashflow performance of IPO firms from 
before to after the IPO (as presented in Table 6-7).
In Table 10-1, the aggregate amount of cashflow component and non-discretionary 
accruals component is examined, since cashflow component and
non-discretionary accruals component will never be affected by managers’ 
discretionary use of accrual-based earnings management schemes. If there is any 
significant decline in the aggregate amount of cashflow component and 
non-discretionary accruals component from before to after the IPO, there should 
be a second explanation for the decline in earnings performance from the pre-IPG 
period to the post-IPO period, besides accrual-based earnings management.
Table 10-1 shows non-discretionary components (including cashflow and 
non-discretionary accruals) over the 6 years and the variation from before to after 
the IPO. It is clear that the aggregate amount of cashflow and non-discretionary 
accruals in Y (-1) year are 0.047 (mean value, t statistic = 2.83) and 0.006 (median 
value, z statistic = 2.01) respectively, indicating that earnings performance may 
also have been exaggerated in the pre-IPO period. The level of non-discretionary
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components in the IPO year turns to be significantly negative, and the mean and 
the median values are -0.031 (t statistic = -1.64) and -0.049 (z statistic = 2.97) 
respectively. In the post-IPO years, non-discretionary components fluctuate 
around zero, and statistically insignificant at any effective level. Panel B further 
confirms that there is a significant decline in non-discretionary components 
(cashflow and non-discretionary accruals) from before to after the IPO: from Y (-1) 
year to Y (+1) year, there is a significant decline o f -0.063 (mean, t statistic = -3.42) 
and -0.032 (median, z statistic = 3.24) respectively. From Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year, 
the mean and median declines are -0.046 (t statistic = -2.45) and -0.024 (z statistic 
= -2.02) respectively.
Table 10-1 shows that, besides discretionary accruals, the aggregate amount of 
cashflow and non-discretionary accruals also reports a significant decline from 
before to after the IPO, which has nothing to do with managers’ accruals 
management. It implies that there should be a second explanation for the decline 
of earnings performance from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period.
In this research. It is hypothesised that IPO firms may use RPT-based earnings 
management schemes to manipulate pre-IPO reported earnings. As discussed 
earlier, RPT-based earnings management is a totally different earnings 
manipulation technique, because it may potentially affect firms’ cashflow 
performance, and/or accruals components as well.
10.1 RPT Practices of Chinese IPOs
First of all, this study presents RPT practices of Chinese IPO firms on a line-item 
basis, and all types of related transactions are categorised into the seven line 
items, including loans, trade relationship, non monetary assets, administrative 
services, royalty and leases. Related loans are further split into two items: ‘Loan
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offered’, which denotes the loans offered by listed companies to their controlling 
shareholders, and ‘Loan obtained’, which denotes the loans by controlling 
shareholders to listed subsidiaries. Loan guarantees will be removed from this 
study, unless they are executed and become the real transfer of economic 
resources between two parties ^ . Loan guarantees provided by controlling 
shareholders (or IPO subsidiaries) to IPO subsidiaries (or controlling shareholders) 
are always free of charge in China. Unlikely, cash loans, loan guarantees are not 
real transfer of economic resources between the two related parties. So, loan 
guarantees, either provided or received, have limited impacts on the operating 
performance of IPO firms. However, loan guarantees may be transferred into cash 
loans, if the borrowers failed to return the funds to the lenders and the guarantors 
would have to pay back on behalf of the borrowers. In this sense, loan guarantees 
become the real transfer of economic resources, which may have serious impacts 
on the operating performance of IPO firms.
‘Trade relationship’ represents the sales and/or purchases of goods, products, and 
services between controlling shareholders and their listed subsidiaries, and 'Non 
monetary assets’ denotes the sales and/or acquisitions of non-monetary assets 
between controlling shareholders and their listed subsidiaries, such as tangible 
and intangible assets. ‘Administrative services’ is defined as the expenses paid 
from controlling shareholders (or listed subsidiaries) to listed subsidiaries (or 
controlling shareholders) for obtaining administrative services and the use of 
private resources. ‘Royalty’ and ‘Lease’ are defined as the annual expenses paid 
for the use of patents, permits and franchises between controlling shareholders 
and listed subsidiaries, and the annual expenses paid for operating and financial 
leases between controlling shareholders and listed subsidiaries respectively.
’  1 liirlher e.xamine my empirical results by taking loan guarantees into consideration. In other words, the variable 'loans' 
is measured as the sum o f cash loans and loan guarantees for a particular llrm-year (the tables are not reported in this 
thesis). And, I have obtained very similar findings.
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Table 10-2 reports the seven line items of related party transactions between 
controlling shareholders and their listed subsidiaries in terms of actual amount 
scaled by lagged (-1) total assets. As a whole, the aggregate RPTs scaled by 
lagged (-1) total assets starts at 24.18% in Y (-1) year, and reaches a peak of 
30.15% in the IPO year. It declines to 20.12% in Y (+1) year, and then remains 
steady from that year on.
The top 3 line items, which include loans (offered and obtained) and trade 
relationship, show the most active transactions between controlling shareholders 
and listed subsidiaries. Trade relationship is the largest type of transactions in 
value. The percentage in Y (-1 ) year is 19.46%, and rises to 21.48% in the IPO year 
It significantly declines to 13.86% in Y (+1) year and ranges from 12 78% to 
15.27% in the post-IPO period. Loans offered by IPO firms to their controlling 
shareholders begin at 0.82% only in Y (-1) year, and soon reaches a peak of 4.96% 
in the IPO year. The percentage then decreases to 3.82% in Y (+1) year, and 
steadily decreases further to 3.05% in Y (+4) year. The percentage of loans 
obtained from controlling shareholders fluctuates around 1% over the 6-year 
period, but there is a much higher percentage of 2.44% in Y (-1) year.
10.2 Two RPT Variables and Descriptive Statistics
This study conducts the regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
RPT variables and corporate operating performance. The seven type of line-item 
RPTs are grouped into two by their economic substance: ‘Net loans’ and 
‘Operating RPTs’. ‘Net loans’ is defined as the difference between ‘ loans obtained 
and ‘loans offered’. ‘Operating RPTs’ aggregate the amounts of non-loan RPTs, 
which include ‘trade relationship’, ‘Non-monetary assets’, ’Administrative services . 
‘Royalties’ and ‘Leases’. Table 10-3 provides the descriptive statistics of the two 
RPT variables: Net loans and Operating items, and their variation from Y (-1) year
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to Y (/■) year (/ = 1,2,3,4) (i.e. ANet loans and AOperating itenns). All the numbers 
are scaled by lagged (-1) total assets.
Panel A describes the variable of ‘Net loans' before and after the IPO. It shows that 
in Y (-1) year, related loans are very small. The mean value of net loans is a 
positive figure (0.44%, t statistic= 0.82), but statistically insignificant: the median 
value is 0.00% (z statistic=0.56). In Y (0) year, the mean and median values of net 
loans turn to be large negative figures of -3.73% (t statistic = -4.32) and -0.45% (z 
statistic = 4.75) respectively, showing that IPO firms evidently provide cash loans 
to controlling shareholders from that year on. In Y (+1) year, IPO firms keep making 
loans to controlling shareholders, but the magnitude of cash loans seems to 
decrease a little (-3.24% in mean value, t statistic = -4.21 ; -0.27% in median value, 
z statistic = 4.77). It further declines steadily in subsequent years, and reaches the 
bottom in Y (+4) year at -1.84% (mean value, t statistic = -3.24) and -0.00% 
(median value, z statistic =3.12) respectively.
Panel B describes the variable ‘Operating items’ before and after the IPO. In terms 
of mean value, the magnitude of operating items in Y (-1 ) year is 20.85% (t statistic 
= 5.29), and it goes up to 24.26% (t statistic = 8.43) in Y (G) year, but it drops to 
15.56% (t statistic = 6.28) and fluctuates around 15% in the subsequent years. In 
terms of median value, the magnitude of operating items does not seem to decline 
from before to after the IPO: the figure is 3.32% in Y (-1) year, and goes up to 
6.47% (z statistic = 8.00) in Y (+1) year, and fluctuates around 5% in the 
subsequent years.
Panel C and Panel D describe the variation of the two RPT variables from the 
pre-IPO year to the post-IPO years. Panel 0  shows that, in terms of mean values, 
there is a significant decline in net loans from Y (-1) year to Y (/) year (/= 1,2,3,4): 
for example, on average, the decline from Y (-1) year to a post-IPO year is around
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-3.00%, which is statistically significant at 1% level. However, in terms of median 
values, the declines are very small; for example, the figure from Y (-1 ) year to Y (+1 ) 
year is -0.40% only, and the one from Y (-1) year to Y (+2) year and/or the years 
afterwards is close to 0.00%. Panel D shows that, in terms of mean values, there is 
a likely decline in operating RPTs from Y (-1) year to a post-IPO year, however, it is 
not really significant on a constant basis. In terms of median values, it seems that 
there is no significant change from Y (-1) year to a post-IPO year.
Table 10-3 shows that operating RPTs between controlling shareholders and IPO 
subsidiaries is significantly large in the pre-IPO period; it is likely to decrease in the 
post-IPO period relative to the pre-IPO level. Moreover, it is evident that IPO 
subsidiaries begin to make significant cash loans to controlling shareholders as 
soon as the IPO event is completed.
10.3 Relation between pre-IPO Operating RPTs and Operating Performance
In this section, it is hypothesised that the size of pre-IPO operating (non-loan) 
RPTs is positively associated with operating performance (in terms of both ROA 
and CFO) of IPO firms in the pre-IPO period. If this is the case, it is expected that 
IPO firms with larger operating RPTs in the pre-IPO period are likely to report better 
pre-IPO operating performance; and in the post-IPO period, those IPO firms are 
likely to suffer a larger decline in operating performance from before to after the 
IPO, since pre-IPO performance has been artificially exaggerated through 
RPT-based earnings manipulation.
In Table 10-4, the sample firms are sorted by the magnitude of pre-IPO operating 
RPTs, which is measured as the aggregate amount of operating RPTs in the Y (-1) 
year and the IPO year scaled by the lagged (-1) total assets, and then segregate 
the IPO firms into four different quartile portfolios. Portfolio Q1 represents the IPO
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firms reporting the smallest pre-IPO operating RPTs, while portfolio Q4 represents 
the IPO firms reporting the largest pre-IPO operating RPTs. Table 10-4 presents 
industry-adjusted operating performance of IPO firms over the 6 years segregated 
by the four pre-IPO operating RPTs quartile portfolios.
Panel A shows that, in Y (-1) year and Y (0) year, the mean values of 
industry-adjusted ROA for portfolio Q1 are the lowest among the four portfolios 
(7.16%, t statistic = 5.76: 2.08%, t statistic = 2.59), however, portfolio Q4 reports 
the largest (20.31%, t statistic = 5.86; 14.25%, t statistic = 3.02). It indicates that 
IPO firms with larger pre-IPO operating RPTs are likely to report better earnings 
performance in the pre-IPO period. Furthermore, there is a significant decline in 
earnings performance from before to after the IPO for all the four quartile portfolios, 
but it is clear that IPO firms with larger pre-IPO operating RPTs are likely to report a 
larger decline in earnings performance from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO 
period, since the mean values of earnings performance of the four portfolios in the 
post-IPO period are not significantly different from each other (as shown by the 
one-way AN OVA test results).
Panel B presents the mean values of industry-adjusted CFO for the four quartile 
portfolios before and after the IPO. Portfolio Q4 with the largest pre-IPO operating 
RPTs reports the highest cashflow performance in Y (-1) year (16.47%, t statistic = 
1.95) among the four quartile portfolios; while the remaining three portfolios (01, 
02, 03) report relatively lower cashflow performance (2.62%, 3.45% and 3.67% 
respectively). Furthermore, it seems that IPO firms with largest pre-IPO operating 
RPTs report an evidently large decline in cashflow performance from the pre-IPO 
period to the post-IPO period; however all the other three portfolios do not seem to 
report a significant decline in cashflow performance.
Table 10-4 confirms that pre-IPO operating performance may have been artificially
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exaggerated through operating RPTs. IPO firms with larger operating RPTs in the 
pre-IPO period are likely to report better operating performance in the pre-IPO 
period; and consequently those IPO firms are likely to suffer a large decline in 
operating performance from before to after the IPO.
As shown in Table 10-4, IPOs involved with large operating RPTs in the pre-IPO 
period are likely to engage in pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management. 
Operating RPTs are primarily beneficial to IPO subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period, 
however, in the post-IPO period, these beneficial RPTs are likely to be reduced. 
Moreover, controlling shareholders may be likely to obtain cash loans from IPO 
firms in return for what controlling shareholders have done in the pre-IPO period 
So, if this is the case, IPOs involved with RPT-based earnings management in the 
pre-IPO period are expected to reduce their operating RPTs in the post-IPO period 
and make more cash loans to controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period.
Table 10-5 confirms this conjecture. It presents operating RPTs and net loans over 
the 6 years around the IPO, and the sample IPO firms are still segregated into 4 
quartile portfolios, by the magnitude of their operating RPTs in the pre-IPO year. 
Panel A shows that the first three quartile portfolios (Q1, Q2 and Q3), which report 
relatively small operating RPTs in the pre-IPO period, continue to report a small 
amount of operating RPTs in the post-IPO period, and operating RPTs do not 
seem to decline from before to after the IPO. However, the fourth quartile portfolio
(04) reports tremendously large operating RPTs in the pre-IPO period, and there 
is a clear decline in operating RPTs from before to after the IPO, Panel B presents 
loan RPTs over the 6 years around the IPO in 4 quartile portfolios. The first three 
quartile portfolios (01, 0 2  and 03), which report smaller pre-IPO operating RPTs, 
seem to make cash loans to controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period, but 
the magnitude of such loans is relatively smaller (-0.89%, -2.82% and -2.99% 
respectively). However, the fourth quartile portfolio (04), which report larger
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pre-IPO operating RPTs make more cash loans to controlling shareholders in the 
post-IPO period (-4.38%).
Table 10-5 shows that IPO firms involved with a large percentage of beneficial 
operating RPTs in the pre-IPO period significantly reduce those beneficial 
operating RPTs in the post-IPO period. More importantly, the more controlling 
shareholders make operating transactions with their subsidiaries in the pre-IPO 
period, the more controlling shareholders receive cash loans from their listed 
subsidiaries in the post-IPO period. It implies that controlling shareholders receive 
cash loans from their listed subsidiaries in the post-IPO period, probably in return 
for profits and/or resources transferred into the subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period 
(Cheng et al., 2007).
10.4 Regression Analysis
10.4.1 Explanatory Variables
Then, a cross-sectional regression analysis is used to further investigate the 
relation between the IPO operating performance and related party transactions. 
The industry-adjusted operating performance (ROA and CFO) is regressed on the 
two line-item RPT variables and a set of control variables, which include firms’ Size 
and Age, Capital expenditure. Government subsidy. Ownership type. Ownership 
concentration and Board composition.
Panel A of Table 10-6 presents the regression results, where ROA is regressed on 
RPT variables. The first two models explain 18.3% and 21.0% ( ^ ’ ) of the variation 
of the dependent variable respectively, and the values are significant (F 
statistics = 2.19 and 2.61 respectively). The estimated coefficients of variable 
‘Operating items’ in the two models are found to be strongly positive (0.078 and
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0.083 respectively) and statistically significant (at 5% significance level), indicating 
that operating transactions significantly contributes to the IPO earnings 
performance between the Y (-1) year and the V (0) year. The coefficients of 
variable ‘Net loan’ are positive (0.198 and 0.206 respectively) for the first two years, 
and none is found strongly significant (t statistic = 0.81 and 1.13 respectively). 
Further, for the remaining model, the R~ value increases to 27.3% (F statistic = 
3.68). Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of ‘operating items’ decreases to
0.044 (t statistic = 1.67) without statistical significance; moreover, the coefficient of 
‘Net loan' is strongly positive (0.318, t statistic = 3.23) at 1% significance level. As 
shown in Table 10-3, 'Net loan’ turns to be negative figures in the post-IPO period 
which represent loan transactions by listed firms to controlling shareholders. The 
regression result shows that such loans have a negative effect on post-IPO 
earnings performance. In addition, a proper residual test has also been conducted 
to detect heteroscedasticity. White’s heteroscedasticity test results show that the 
P-values for the three models are 0.29, 0.16 and 0.11 respectively, indicating 
homoscedasticity assumption holds for these regressions.
Panel B further provides regression results, where the dependent variable ‘ROA’ is 
replaced with ‘CFO’. The first two models explain 9.0% and 16.4% {R~) of the 
variation of the dependent variable (CFO) respectively (F statistic = 0.95 and 1.91 
respectively). The coefficients of variable ‘Operating items’ in the first model are 
found to be positive (0.082, t statistic = 2.17) at 5% significance level, indicating 
that operating transactions significantly contributes to the IPO cashflow 
performance in Y (-1) year. Flowever, the positive relationship between operating 
RPTs and cashflow performance fades away in the post-IPO period. In Y (-1) year, 
the coefficient of variable ‘Net loan’ is -0.374 and statistically insignificant. In Y (0) 
year, it is found to be positive (0.837) and statistically significant at 1% level. The 
estimated coefficient of ‘Net loan’ maintains to be positive (0.286, t statistic = 2.62), 
indicating that ‘Net loan’ is positively associated with post-IPO cashflow
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performance, in addition, W hite’s heteroscedasticity test results show that the 
P-values for the three models are 0.17, 0.18 and 0.13 respectively, indicating 
homoscedasticity assumption holds for these regressions.
Table 10-6 provide evidence to confirm the two hypotheses (H3a and H3b) that 
operating performance of IPO firms, in terms of earnings performance and 
cashflow performance, is highly related to RPTs between controlling shareholders 
and IPO firms. It is found that the size of operating RPTs is positively associated 
with pre-IPO operating performance. This positive relationship fades away, when 
the firms are listed. Simultaneously, IPO firms significantly make cash loans to their 
controlling shareholders from the IPO year onwards, and such loans has a 
negative effect on post-IPO operating performance.
10.4.2 Control Variables
In addition, regression results show no significant relation between dependent 
variables (operating performance) and control variables (Size, Age, Capital 
expenditure, Government subsidy. Ownership type. Ownership concentration and 
Board composition). The estimated coefficients of control variables 'Size', Age', 
‘Capital expenditure’ and ‘Government Subsidy’ are mixed (positive in some years, 
but negative in others). It is unlikely to draw any reasonable conclusion from the 
regression results.
The estimated coefficients of control variable ‘Ownership type’ are consistently 
negative, showing that non state-controlled firms are likely to report better 
operating performance. The estimated coefficients of variables ‘Ownership 
concentration’ and ‘Board composition’ are consistently positive, indicating that 
firms with concentrated ownership and board composition may report better 
operating performance. However, the evidences are not significantly strong
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Furthermore, due to the concern of multicollinearity between the three control 
variables and the concern of multicollinearity between RPT variables and 
ownership concentration and/or board composition, it is not possible to assess the 
relative importance of the three control variables in explaining the variance of the 
dependent variable compared to another, although the two kinds of 
multicollinearity do not affect research conclusions.
10.5 Market reaction to the change in operating RPTs and net loans
Then, this study investigates how the stock returns respond to the change in RPTs 
from before to after the IPO (Hypothesis, H3c and H3d). In Table 10-7, stock 
returns are measured by using Buy-And-Hold Returns (BAHRs), inclusive of 
dividends and other distributions, less contemporaneous benchmark return 
(median value of 2-digit SIC-code publicly traded firms). Long-term BAHRs are 
calculated starting from the second trading day to the fourth event year. Moreover, 
stock returns are also measured as the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
starting from the second trading day to the fourth event year, inclusive of dividends 
and other distributions, less benchmark returns. So, stock performance is 
regressed on two RPT variables (Aoperating RPTs and Anet loans) and a set of 
control variables (Size, Age, ACapital expenditure, AGovernment Subsidy, 
Ownership type. Ownership concentration and Board composition). ANet loans is 
defined as the difference of net loans in the post-IPO period (between Y (0) year 
and Y (+3) year) and net loans in the Y (-1) year scaled by lagged (-1) total assets 
AOperating items is the difference between the aggregate amount of post-IPO 
operating RPTs (between Y (0) year and Y (+3) year) and pre-IPO operating RPTs 
(Y (-1) year) scaled by lagged (-1) total assets.
Table 10-7 presents the two regression results, which indicate the relation between 
aftermarket stock performance of Chinese IPOs and RPT variables. The two
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models explain 34.7% and 21.4% {R~)  of the variation of the dependent variable 
respectively (F statistic = 4.90 and 2.52 respectively). The estimated coefficients of 
variable ‘AOperating items’ in the two regressions are found to be strongly positive 
(0.184 and 0.138 respectively) and highly significant (at 1% and 5% level 
respectively), indicating that there is a positive relation between the change in 
operating RPTs from before to after the IPO and aftermarket stock performance of 
IPO subsidiaries. The estimated coefficients of variable ‘ANet loan’ are also 
positive (0.473 and 0.373 respectively), and statistically significant at 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. In addition, W hite’s heteroscedasticity test results show that 
the P-values for the two models are 0.16 and 0.79 respectively, indicating 
homoscedasticity assumption holds for these regressions.
Table 10-7 presents evidence that there is a relation between the change in RPTs 
and aftermarket stock performance in the long run. It shows that IPOs that report a 
large reduction in operating RPTs from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period 
perform poorly in the stock market. Furthermore, IPO firms involved with cash 
loans to controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period are also likely to perform 
poorly in the market over a four-year event period, in comparison to their industry 
peers. This finding is supportive of prior conjecture that public investors, when 
poorly protected, might be willing to buy corporate shares only at a lower price (La 
Porta, 1998).
10.6 RPTs Segregated by Firms Characteristics
Finally, this study examines ownership characteristics and governance 
characteristics of IPO firms involved with RPT practices, aiming to find out the 
effects of firms characteristics on the likelihood of pre-IPO RPT-based earnings 
management and post-IPO expropriation practices. In Table 6-12 and 6-13, IPO 
firms with concentrated ownership and board composition are likely to report
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abnormally higher operating performance between the Y (-1) year and the Y (0) 
year; and report a larger performance decline from before to after the IPO than the 
remaining IPO firms. It is expected that IPO firms with higher ownership 
concentration and less independent board from controlling shareholders are likely 
to engage in RPT-based earnings management in the pre-IPO period, and 
expropriate the IPO subsidiary in the post-IPO period, so that those IPO firms are 
likely to outperform the industry peers in operating performance and report a larger 
decline in operating performance from before to after the IPO.
This section investigates two aspects of ownership structure and corporate 
governance characteristics: (1) Ownership concentration; and (2) Board 
composition. The evidences are presented in Table 10-8.
(1) Ownership concentration
It is expected that a diversified ownership structure of IPO firms is likely to 
constrain pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management and post-IPO expropriation 
practices, when controlling shareholders retain strong voting power. It is believed 
that the ownership structure is less concentrated, if the controlling shareholder 
holds a percentage of 30% ownership or less. However, once the percentage by 
the controlling shareholder reaches 50% or above, the ownership structure of the 
IPO firm is considered to be highly concentrated and, as a result, the controlling 
shareholder has gained the absolute power to control shareholders' meetings 
Then, in Panel A, IPO firms are segregated into three portfolios by the percentage 
of ownership held by controlling shareholders at the end of the IPO year (cutting 
points: 30% and 50%). Panel A shows that only 9 IPO firms have a less 
concentrated ownership structure (^30%), and they, on average, report the 
smallest magnitude of pre-IPO operating RPTs (2.15%, t statistic = 1.53 in Y (-1) 
year) and the smallest magnitude of post-IPO loans in the post-IPO period (with a
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range between -0.17% and -1.52%). However, most sample IPO firms (199) report 
a highly concentrated ownership structure (>50%) and show the significantly 
largest pre-IPO operating RPTs (22.67%, t statistic = 4.97 in Y (-1) year) and the 
largest loan RPTs to controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period (with a range 
between -2.20% and -4.37%).
Panel A shows that IPO firms with a highly concentrated ownership structure are 
more likely to engage in RPT-based earnings management in the pre-IPO period, 
and get expropriated by controlling shareholders through cash loans in the 
post-IPO period.
(2) Board composition
It is expected that a board independent from the controlling shareholders is likely to 
constrain pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management and post-IPO expropriation 
practices conducted by controlling shareholders, primarily because a balanced 
and independent board of directors is likely to effectively monitor the operating 
activities and financial reporting practices of the firm. The independence of the 
board is essential to the effectiveness of corporate governance of the company, 
and each company should be headed by an effective board, which is collectively 
responsible for the success of the company (UK Combined Code, 2003). However, 
once the independence of the board is jeopardised, the effectiveness of the 
monitoring is questionable. China did not officially bring independent directors into 
the board, until the promulgation of the Code of Corporate Governance in 2002, 
and, traditionally, the board is fully occupied by the representatives from major 
shareholders. It is hypothesised that IPO firms with a non-independent board of 
directors are more likely to engage in the pre-IPO RPT-based earnings 
management and post-IPO expropriation practices.
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The sample IPO firms are then segregated into three portfolios by the percentage 
of directors in the board who represent the controlling shareholder at the end of the 
IPO year (cutting points; 30% and 50%). Panel B shows that the 88 sample IPO 
firms with a more independent board (30% or less) report the smallest magnitude 
of pre-IPO operating RPTs (10.99%, t statistic = 2.71 in Y (-1) year) and the 
smallest post-IPO loan RPTs to controlling shareholders (ranging from -0.94% to 
-1.74%). The 65 sample IPO firms with a moderately independent board (more 
than 30% but less than 50%) show a larger amount of pre-IPO operating RPTs 
(24.08%, t statistic = 2.55 in Y (-1) year) and a larger amount of loan RPTs to 
controlling shareholders (ranging from -1.47% to -2.57%) than IPO firms with a 
more independent board do. But the amount is lower than the one of the 86 sample 
IPO firms with a less independent board (50% or above) do (ranging from -2.24% 
to -6.07%).
Panel B shows that IPO firms with a board less independent from the controlling 
shareholder are more likely to engage in RPT-based earnings management in the 
pre-IPO period, and be expropriated via related loans by the controlling 
shareholder in the post-IPO period.
10.7 Further Discussion
In this research, it is found that Chinese IPOs are likely to manipulate pre-IPO 
operating performance; the first way is to adjust discretionary accounting accruals, 
and the second way is to structure artificial related party transactions with 
controlling shareholders. As discussed earlier, RPT-based earnings management 
is generally different from accruals management. Firms engage in accrual-based 
earnings management by borrowing from either the past or the future, for example, 
indulging in opportunistic behaviours in accounting method choices and 
discretionary estimates (i.e. discretionary judgements of provisions for asset
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impairments and so on). However, RPT-based earnings management occurs 
between two related parties by injecting valuable assets and/or shifting profits from 
one party to the other party. It should also be noted that there are some small 
overlaps between pre-IPO accruals management practices and pre-IPO 
RPT-based earnings management practices. For example, a firm may artificially 
structure sales relationship with its controlling shareholder by accelerating credit 
sales without paying for the goods and services in cash. In this case, the firm 
engages in an accrual-based earnings management practice, which is also 
regarded as a RPT-based earnings management practice as well. In spite of these 
small overlaps, the two earnings management techniques still significantly differ 
from each other in most occasions.
Technically, it is impossible to precisely separate the effect of accruals 
management and RPT-based earnings management on reported earnings, 
because RPT-based approach may have an effect on either discretionary accruals 
component, non-discretionary accruals component or cashflow component of 
reported earnings. As discussed earlier, there are some overlaps between the two 
earnings management techniques so that the effects of the two techniques on 
reported earnings can be hardly separated. However, we may be able to separate 
at least partly the two effects from each other. Since accruals management 
practices do not impact cashflow performance of IPO firms, the abnormal cashflow 
performance in the pre-IPO period may be associated with RPT-based earnings 
management practices. In this chapter, it is evident that IPO firms are very likely to 
engage in RPT-based earnings management to boost pre-IPO cashflow 
performance.
I have further examined the relation between pre-IPO accruals management and 
pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management, to see whether Chinese IPOs use the 
two earnings management techniques simultaneously in the pre-IPO period.
However, I find that the correlation between discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO 
year and the size of operating RPTs in the pre-IPO year is very weak (Pearson’s 
correlation is -0.03) and statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.78). It shows that IPO 
firms engaging accruals management to boost pre-IPO reported performance do 
not report a large percentage of operating RPTs in the pre-IPO year. The finding 
implies that Chinese IPOs do not use the two earnings management techniques 
simultaneously in the pre-IPO period.
10.8 Summary
In this chapter, it is hypothesised that IPO firms may engage in the pre-IPO 
RPT-based earnings management to inflate pre-IPO reported operating 
performance. It is found that reported operating performance of IPO firms is highly 
associated with related party transactions between controlling shareholders and 
IPO firms. Operating RPTs (non-loan), which account for the main type of RPTs 
between controlling shareholders and listed firms, are positively associated with 
the abnormally high operating performance in the pre-IPO period. In the post-IPO 
period, however, the relation between operating RPTs and operating performance 
of IPO firms seems to disappear.
It is also evident that loans offered by the IPO firms to their controlling 
shareholders, which are often regarded as the expropriation of the subsidiaries, 
are small and insignificant in the pre-IPO period, indicating that controlling 
shareholders are less likely to expropriate their subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period. 
However, in the post-IPO period, controlling shareholders begin to significantly 
expropriate their listed subsidiaries through related loans. Moreover, such loans 
are negatively associated with post-IPO operating performance. One may argue 
that prospect of expropriation may discourage participation of public investors in 
the IPOs. However, it is important to recognise that Chinese IPOs are offered at a
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great discount to attract investors. Chan et al. (2004) find that Chinese IPOs are 
highly underpriced and the average underpricing® for Chinese A-share IPOs 
(1993-1998) is 178%. As a result, the demand for Chinese IPOs is extremely high, 
and Chinese IPOs have been enthusiastically oversubscribed usually by 100 times 
or more. Even if investors expect controlling shareholders to expropriate IPO firms 
in the post-IPO period, investors may not turn away from participation in the IPOs. 
Moreover, one may also argue that when a controlling shareholder obtains cash 
loans from the listed subsidiary solely for its own benefits, the stock price may go 
down and controlling shareholders would lose money in the stock market and end 
up with nothing. However, the shares held by controlling shareholders are 
categorised as non-tradable shares, which can only be traded off the stock 
exchanges on a negotiation basis. So, controlling shareholders do not necessarily 
care much about the ups and downs of their stock prices on the exchanges, if they 
have no plan for a second equity offering.
Next, this study has investigated how the market reacts to the change in RPTs 
between controlling shareholders and listed firms. It presents evidence that IPO 
firms reporting a large decline in operating RPTs from before to after the IPO and a 
large amount of post-IPO loan RPTs are likely to perform poorly in stock market 
over a four-year period. It implies that Chinese investors can not fully see through 
this RPT-based earnings management, and may be overoptimistic about IPO’s 
prospective profitability. This finding highlights the inefficiency of Chinese stock 
market, because the stocks involved with pre-IPO RPT-based earnings 
management are likely to perform poorly in the aftermarket period.
Finally, this study further investigates the firms’ characteristics of IPO firms 
involved with pre-IPO operating RPTs and post-IPO loan expropriation practices it 
shows that IPO firms with a high level of ownership concentration and a board of
* Underpricing rate is calculated as the return on the (Irsl day oC trading (relative lo the ulTering price)
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directors less independent from the controlling shareholder are more likely to 
engage in the pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management and get expropriated by 
controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period via related loans. This finding is 
applicable to explain why IPO firms with higher ownership concentration and less 
independent board are likely to report abnormally higher operating performance in 
the pre-IPO period; and report a larger ROA decline from before to after the IPO 
than the remaining IPO firms.
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Chapter 11 Conclusion
11.1 Main Findings
This study examines the operating performance of Chinese IPOs, and the main 
research question is to explore the explanations for the change in reported 
operating performance in the post-IPO period relative to the pre-IPO level. It 
provides evidence that Chinese IPOs show a significant decline in reported 
operating performance from before to after the IPO, in terms of Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Operating Cashflow on Assets (CFQ). Then. I explore the reasons for 
the decline in reported operating performance and main findings of this research 
are:
Firstly. I examine the relation between managerial ownership dispersion from 
before to after the IPO and operating performance change of Chinese IPOs. The 
regression analysis shows no evidence that managerial ownership change from 
before to after the IPO is related to operating performance change over the same 
period, primarily because managerial ownership is very rare in China. Managers in 
Chinese listed firms hold a very small percentage of ownership (lower than 5%o), 
which is too small to make any effective impact on corporate operating 
performance. Moreover, the data further show that there is no significant decrease 
in the post-IPO managerial ownership relative to the pre-IPO managerial 
ownership. In this sense, managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis, developed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is not applicable to Chinese stock market and 
cannot explain the decline in operating performance of Chinese IPOs from before 
to after the IPO.
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Secondly, I examine discretionary accruals of IPO firms from before to after the 
IPO to see if managers are manipulating discretionary accruals to boost pre-IPO 
reported earnings. The finding shows that IPO firms report large positive 
discretionary accruals in the Y (-1) year and the Y (0) year, and from Y (+3) year 
onwards, it seems that IPO firms begin to unwind the accruals. The change in 
discretionary accruals from the pre-IPO period to the post-IPO period will have a 
significant effect on long-term reported earnings of IPO firms. Further, it is found 
that IPO firms with large positive discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO period are 
likely to underperform their industry peers in stock market and/or those IPO firms 
with smaller positive or negative discretionary accruals, in terms of both long-run 
BAHRs (Buy-And-Hold Returns) and CARs (Cumulative Abnormal Returns), It 
implies that investors can not see through this pre-IPO accrual-based earnings 
management, and they may be overoptimistic about IPO’s prospective profitability. 
This finding highlights the inefficiency of Chinese stock market, because the stocks 
involved with pre-IPO accrual-based earnings management are likely to perform 
poorly in the aftermarket period.
This study also points out that there is no strong evidence of unwinding the 
discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period. I argue that the reversal of 
discretionary accruals may be spread over a long period, i.e. longer than 4 years 
after the IPO. Firstly, the lack of flexibility in accounting choices and/or accounting 
estimates may be responsible for the insufficient evidence of post-IPO unwinding 
the discretionary accruals. Secondly, managers may slow down the unwinding 
process to avoid the negative impact of the unwinding on post-IPO reported 
earnings. Finally, many firms (28% of the sample) claim that they have recorded a 
lower provision for asset impairments in pre-IPO financial statements, and 
therefore they have restated their pre-IPO reported earnings and the provision for 
impairment losses in the post-IPO period. In this case, pre-IPO reported earnings 
have been evidently boosted through this specific accrual item of provisions for
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impairment losses, and one- pre-IPO earnings are restated, there is no need for a 
reversal of discretionary accruals in the post-IPO period.
Thirdly, I extend prior literature by focusing on a second source of earnings 
management, i.e. RPT-based earnings management. The finding shows that 
related party transactions between IPO firms and controlling shareholders have 
significant effects on reported operating performance of IPO firms. The abnormally 
high reported operating performance in the pre-IPO period is positively associated 
with the size of operating RPTs (non-loan) between controlling shareholders and 
IPO firms in the pre-IPO period. However, in the post-IPO period, controlling 
shareholders discontinue these RPT-based manipulative practices, and begin to 
expropriate IPO subsidiaries by obtaining a large percentage of cash loans from 
IPO subsidiaries, primarily in return for profits and/or resources transferred into 
IPO subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period (Cheng et al., 2007). The post-IPO 
operating performance is negatively associated with the size of such loans by IPO 
firms to controlling shareholders .in the post-IPO period. It is also found that 
long-term IPO stock performance is significantly associated with the change in 
operating RPTs (and/or loan RPTs) from before to after the IPO. It implies that 
Chinese investors can not fully see through this RPT-based earnings management, 
and may be overoptimistic about IPO’s prospective profitability. This finding 
highlights the inefficiency of Chinese stock market, because the stocks involved 
with pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management are likely to perform poorly in the 
aftermarket period.
In addition, this study has answered the research question that is left behind in 
prior literature; Wang et al. (2001), Chen and Shih (2004) conjecture that highly 
concentrated ownership structure and governance characteristics of IPO 
companies may impact the long-run IPO operating performance. However, the 
question 'why concentrated ownership and weak governance affect the IPO
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long-term operating performance in China’ has not been explored. I argue that IPO 
firms with a high level of ownership concentration and a board of directors less 
independent from the controlling shareholder are more likely to engage in the 
pre-IPO RPT-based earnings management and get expropriated by controlling 
shareholders in the post-IPO period via related loans. This finding is applicable to 
explain why IPO firms with higher ownership concentration and less independent 
board are likely to report abnormally higher operating performance in the pre-IPO 
period; and report a larger ROA decline from before to after the IPO than the 
remaining IPO firms.
11.2 Contributions of the Research
The purpose of this research is not limited to adding another piece of evidence to 
the global IPO operating performance literature, but to explore the explanations for 
the decline in operating performance of Chinese IPOs in the long run. Specifically,
I investigate the related party transactions around the flotation and its impacts on 
the long-term operating performance of Chinese IPOs. It is hypothesised that, 
besides accrual-based earnings management, Chinese IPOs may also engage in 
this RPT-based earnings management to boost pre-IPO operating performance 
To my best knowledge, this study is the first research to study the association 
between IPO operating performance and related party transactions with controlling 
shareholders.
Then, this study adopts a new methodology (aggregate accruals model) to detect 
accrual-based earnings management for Chinese IPOs. Wang (2005) has 
analysed two specific accrual components (annual change in accounting 
receivables and annual change in inventories) of Chinese IPOs, but finds no 
evidence pre-IPO accruals management. 1 argue that specific accrual models are 
defective in detecting earnings management for a multi-industry sample, and we
are unable to rule out the possibility that Chinese listed companies continue to 
manipulate pre-IPO earnings through other accruals items. This research uses the 
modified Jones (1991) model to calculate discretionary accruals, which proxy for 
accrual-based earnings management behaviour, since Dechow et al. (1995) argue 
that modified Jones (1991) model is the most statistically powerful model to detect 
accrual-based earnings management, and it is widely used in prior studies.
The significance of this research is to establish a new theoretical framework for the 
IPO operating performance combining both accrual-based earnings management 
and RPT-based earnings management. It further provides empirical evidence for 
the theoretical argument by using IPO data in China. This research identifies the 
inefficiency of Chinese stock market, since the findings show that investors can not 
fully see through both accruals management and RPT-based earnings 
management. Investors seem to be overoptimistic about IPO's prospective 
profitability, and IPO stocks involved with pre-IPO earnings management (both 
accrual-based and RPT-based) are likely to perform poorly in the aftermarket 
period.
11.3 Implication
My findings have important implication for investors willing to participate in Chinese 
IPO market. There is evidence that Chinese IPO firms are likely to manipulate 
operating performance through accruals and/or through related party transactions 
in the pre-IPO period. So, investors may need to check those IPO prospectuses 
and corporate financial statements with great caution, before making the 
investment decision. There are some signs, which may be helpful to detect 
pre-IPO earnings management: (1) IPO firms report an abnormally larger amount 
of accruals component relative to industry peers, for example, the level of 
allowance for doubtful debts and/or provisions for impairment losses relative to the
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normal level. (2) IPO firms report a large percentage of operating RPTs in the 
pre-IPO period, since firms may abuse the use of operating RPTs to boost sales 
and/or profits before going public. (3) The ownership structure of IPO firms is 
highly concentrated and the board of directors is less independent from controlling 
shareholders. Evidence shows that IPO firms with concentrated ownership and 
less independent board are more likely to engage in the pre-IPO earnings 
management.
Secondly, my research may be of use to market regulators in the financial sector. 
Market regulators may need to do more to constrain the pre-IPO earnings 
management, in order to protect public investors. The most important thing is to 
improve rules and regulations, particularly the regulations for information 
transparency and financial disclosure quality. Of course, enforcing these rules and 
regulations is as equally important as developing these rules and regulations.
11.4 Limitation
Due to data unavailability, I can only investigate one full financial year prior to the 
IPO and four years after the IPO. According to disclosure regulations. Chinese IPO 
firms are only required to disclose historical operating performance and RPT 
details of the most recent financial year on their IPO prospectuses. Only a very 
small number of IPO firms provide two-year historical information prior to the IPO 
on a voluntary basis. So, in this sense, the evidences may be difficult to justify, if we 
could not look at the financial years further backwards prior to Y (-1) year.
Another problem of data collection goes to the quality of information disclosures. I 
can only observe and collect the data of RPT practices disclosed on public sources, 
such as IPO prospectuses and corporate financial statements. I assume that 
companies produce their annual reports in accordance with the CSRC’s
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regulations and disclose their RPT practices whenever required. However, it firms 
fail to perform their responsibilities of public disclosures, RPT variables, as a result, 
may be inappropriately determined. If firms fail to report RPT practices, the positive 
relation between RPT variables and IPO performance may turn to be less 
significant, or diminish to irrelevance.
11.5 Further Research
In this research, I try to explain the abnormally high operating performance of 
Chinese IPOs in the pre-IPO period. My main hypothesis is that pre-IPO reported 
operating performance is artificially manipulated. However, there is a possibility 
that the abnormally ‘good’ pre-IPO operating performance is genuine, because 
firms may be timing the IPO, and go public only when their businesses operate well 
In this research, I do not distinguish the effect of this ‘genuine outperformance’, 
and I will leave it for future research.
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Appendix A: Corporate Gc vernance Practices in China
According to Chinese Company Law, listed companies are required to adopt a 
two-tier board structure composed of a board of directors and a supervisory board 
The board of directors is defined as a decision-making organ of the company, 
j which is empowered to appoint the CEO and other senior managers, call
I shareholders’ meetings, implement the resolutions of shareholders’ meetings,
I determine internal management systems and make other decisions authorised by
shareholders.
1. Shareholders’ Meeting
The shareholders’ meeting is the supreme sovereignty in corporate governance, or 
‘the organ of power of the corporation.’ According to Company Law (ed. 1993 Ch. 
3.104-106), the shareholders’ meetings shall be convened at least once a year, 
and an interim shareholder’ meeting may be convened, whenever necessary. All 
the shareholders attending a shareholders’ meeting shall have the right to one vote 
for each share held, with no regard to the particular category in which the shares 
belong (e.g. state shares, LP shares and tradable shares).
By statute, the shareholders are provided the following comprehensive 
decision-making powers at the meetings; (1) to make decisions regarding 
corporate policies on business operation and investment plans; (2) to elect and 
replace directors and to determine their remuneration; (3) to elect and replace 
shareholder supervisors and to determine their remuneration; (4) to examine and 
approve the board of directors' and board of supervisors' reports; (5) to examine 
and approve the corporate financial financial budget and final account plans: (6) to 
examine and approve the corporate profit distribution and making up of loss plans,
I
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(7) to make resolutions on the increase or the reduction of the corporation's 
registered capital; (8) to decide whether to issue corporate bonds; (9) to make 
decisions regarding corporate mergers, divisions, dissolution and liquidation; and 
(10) to amend the corporate memorandum of associations {Company Law, ed. 
1993 Ch. 3.103).
2. Board of Directors
Aboard of directors is composed of 5-19 members, and directors are all appointed 
with a majority approval in the shareholders’ meeting {Company Law, ed. 1993 Ch. 
3.112). According to the Regulation for the Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies (CSRC, 1997 Ch. 3.57), only the block shareholders (5% ownership or 
more) can nominate new candidates for the board of directors, and small public 
shareholders (less than 5% ownership) are not allowed to recommend a director 
candidate.
The board of directors exercise the following functions and powers: (1) to convene 
the shareholders general meeting and to report on its work to the shareholders 
general meeting; (2) to implement resolutions passed at the shareholders general 
meetings; (3) to decide on the business operation plans and the investment plans 
of the company; (4) to formulate the financial financial budgets and the final 
accounts of the company; (5) to formulate plans for the profit distribution and 
making up losses of the company; (6) to formulate plans for increasing or reducing 
the registered capital of the company and plans for the issue of company bonds , (7) 
to formulate plans for the merger, division and dissolution of the company; (8) to 
decide on the establishment of the internal management organs of the company; 
(9) to engage or dismiss the manager and, upon recommendation of the manager, 
to engage or dismiss the deputy manager(s) and responsible persons in charge of 
the financial affairs of the company, and to decide on matters concerning their
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remuneration: and (10) to formulate the basic management system of the 
company {Company Law, ed. 1993 Ch. 3.112).
Prior to the promulgation of the Code for Corporate Governance (CSRC, 2002) 
there were no independent directors in the board, in the post-2002 years, all the 
listed companies (A- and B-share companies) are required to have at least one 
third of board members to be appointed as independent directors by 2003. The 
independent director should not: (1) represent a significant shareholder (5% 
ownership or more); (2) have been an employee of the company and/or the 
company's significant shareholders; (3) have close family ties with any of the 
directors and senior employees in the company and/or its significant shareholders’ 
entity: (4) have a material business relationship with the company either directly, or 
as a senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; and
(5) receive additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee 
(CSRC, 2002).
The CSRC (2002) requires independent directors to carry out their duties 
independently without compromising themselves to the influence of the company's 
major shareholders, or other entities or persons who are interested parties of the 
listed company. They shall earnestly perform their duties in accordance with laws, 
regulations and the company's articles of association, shall protect the overall 
interests of the company, and shall be especially concerned with protecting the 
interests of minority shareholders from being infringed.
According to the CSRC (2002), an audit committee is encouraged to establish on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis. The audit committee, if established, should be chaired by 
an independent director and be composed mainly of independent directors, among 
them at least one being an accounting expert. The main duties of the audit 
committee include: (1) to recommend the appointment of a company's external
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auditors; (2) to review the internal audit system and its execution; (3) to oversee 
the interaction between a company's internal and external auditors; (4) to inspect 
the company's financial information and its disclosure; and (5) to monitor the 
corporate governance system (CSRC, 2002).
3. A Supervisory Board
The Supervisory Board is the ‘monitoring organ’ of the company. According to the 
Company Law {e6. 1993 Ch. 3.124), a board of supervisors consist of no less then 
3 members, and the supervisors shall be made up of shareholders’ representatives 
and one representative of Labour Union from the listed company. Members of the 
supervisory board are also appointed by, and report to, the shareholders.
The responsibilities of the board include: (1) reviewing financial statements; (2) 
monitoring directors’ and managers’ compliance with law, (3) requiring directors or 
managers to make rectification when any act causes harm to company interests; (4) 
proposing interim shareholder meetings, whenever necessary; (5) attending the 
meetings of the board of directors, and (6) reporting to the shareholders at the 
annual general meetings (Company law, ed. 1993 Ch. 3.126).
4. Management Team
Top management team, including CEO, also called as a general manager in China 
is appointed by the board meeting of directors. The Company Law (ed.1993 Ch 
3.119) describes the major responsibilities of CEO as follow: (1) implementing the 
resolutions of the board of directors and carrying out the day-to-day business 
operations; (2) preparing and drafting the company’s internal control system, and 
the company’s regulation; (3) appointing the senior managers other than those to 
be appointed by the board of directors, such as Deputy Executive Officer.
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Table 4-1: Seven types of related party transactions widely used in China
Types Description
1. Goods and Services 
(trade relationship)
Sales/Purchases of goods, products, and 
services between controlling shareholder 
and its listed subsidiary
2. Sales/Acquisitions of 
non-monetary assets
Sales/Acquisitions of non-monetary assets 
between controlling shareholder and its listed 
subsidiary, such as tangible and intangible 
assets
Non-Loan RPTs 
(Operating items)
3. Overhead assigned 
(administrative services)
Overhead costs paid from controlling 
shareholder (or its listed subsidiary) to its 
listed subsidiary (or the controlling 
shareholder) for obtaining administrative 
services and the use of facilities
4. Royalties and Franchises
Patents, permits and Franchises between 
controlling shareholder and its listed 
subsidiary: normally controlling shareholder 
acts as the franchisor
5. Leases
The operating and financial leases between 
controlling shareholder and its listed 
subsidiary
6. Cash Loans The loans of cash between controlling shareholder and its listed subsidiary
Loan RPTs
7. Loan Guarantees
The loan guarantees provided for listed 
company using controlling shareholder’s 
assets as collateral, or provided for 
controlling shareholder using listed firm’s 
assets as collateral
Note: Based on the corporate annual reports of Chinese A/B share companies
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Table 5-1: Performance measures employed in typical prior iiterature
Prior studies Data source Major measures Other measures
1 Jain and Kini 
(1994)
682 US IPOs 
(1976-1988)
(1) EBITDA/Total Assets
(2) Operating Cash 
Flows / Total Assets
(1) Actual Sales and 
Growth
(2) Asset Turnover
(3) Capital Expenditure
2 Mikkelson et 
al. (1997)
283 US IPOs 
(1980-1983)
(1) EBITDA/Total Assets (1) EBITDA/Sales
3 Kutsuna et al. 
(2002)
247 Japanese 
IPOs (1995-1996)
(1) Sales
(2) Net Income
(3) Net Income / Sales
(1) Growth of Sales
(2) Growth of Net Income
4 Kim et al. 
(2004)
133 Tail IPOs 
(1987-1993)
(1) EBIT / Total Assets
(2) Operating Cash 
Flows / Total Assets
(1) Sales
(2) Sales / Total Assets
(3) Capital Expenditure
5 Aharony et al. 
(2000)
83 Chinese H- 
(B-) share IPOs 
(1992-1995)
(1) Net Income / (Total 
Assets-Cash)
(1) Sales
6 Huang and 
Song (2003)
38 Chinese 
H-share IPOs 
(1993-1998)
(1) EBITDA / Total Assets
(2) EBITDA/Sales
(3) EBITDA/Equity
(1) Sales
(2) Asset Turnover
(3) Debt-equity-ratio
(4) Dividends / Sales
7 Wang et al. 
(2001)
992 Chinese 
A-share IPOs 
(1990-2000)
(1) EBITDA/ Total Assets
(2) EBITDA/Sales
(1) Sales and its Growth
(2) Debt-equity-ratio
(3) Capital Expenditure
8 Chen and 
Shih (2004)
884 Chinese 
A-share IPOs 
(1992 -2000)
(1) Sales and its Growth
(2) Net Income and 
Growth
(1) Earnings Per Shares
(2) Net Income / Equity
(3) Current ratio and 
quick ratio
9 Wang (2005) 747 Chinese 
A-share IPOs 
(1994-1999)
(1) EBIT/Total assets
(2) Net income / Total 
assets
(1) Sales / Total assets
(2) EBIT/ Sales
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Table 6-2: Choices of operating performance measures in this research
Variables Definitions
1 ROA
Return on assets, EBITDA scaled by lagged (-1) total 
assets (EBITDA: Earnings before interests, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortisation)
2 CFO Cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
3 Sales
(1) Nominal sales;
(2) Nominal sales scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
4 Sales growth Growth rate of sales
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Table 5-3: China’s SIC (Standard Industry Classification, 2001)
D Water, electricity, and gas
E Construction
F Transport & public utilities
G Information technology
B Mining
C5 Electronic components and home appliances
L Publishing, media, and allied services
K Service
China’s SIC (2001)
C3 Stationery, sporting, musical instmments
C7 Equipments and machineries
C1 Textiles, suits and leathers
C8 Drugs and Biologic products
I Finance and insurance
J Real estate
M Miscellaneous products and services
CO Foods and beverages
C2 Wood products and furniture
C4 Petroleum refining, chemical products
A Agriculture, forestry, & fishing
C Manufacturing
H Wholesale and retail trade
C6 Mineral products and metal products
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Table 5-4: Explanatory variables
Category Variables Definitions
Managerial
ownership
Variables
Managerial
Ownership
The ownership held by directors and management, including 
GEO, GFO and Deputy Executive Officers at a given year-end
AManagerial
Ownership
The change in the ownership held by directors and 
management, including GEO and Deputy Executive Officers, 
from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year 
Y+1; year Y+2; yearY+3; yearY+4)
Accruals
Variables
DAG
The industry-adjusted assets-scaled discretionary accruals, 
which is computed by using the modified Jones (1991) model, 
less the median contemporaneous figure of the same 2-digit 
SIG-code publicly traded firms
ADAG
The change of the industry-adjusted assets-scaled total 
accruals from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO 
period (year Y+1; year Y+2; yearY+3; yearY+4)
Net Loans
The difference between loans provided by controlling 
shareholders to their listed subsidiaries and loans provided by 
listed subsidiaries to their controlling shareholders scaled by 
lagged (-1) total assets; loans guarantees should not be 
included, if not executed
RPT
variables
Operating
RPTs
The aggregate amount of asset-scaled related party 
transactions, which exclude loan transactions, for example: the 
sales and/or purchases of goods, products, and services; 
non-monetary assets; royalties; administrative overheads and 
leases.
A Net Loans The change in net loans from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year Y+1; year Y+2; yearY+3; yearY+4)
AOperating
RPTs
The change in non-loan RPTs from the pre-IPO period (year 
Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year Y+1; year Y+2; year Y+3; year 
Y+4)
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Table 5-5: Control Variables
Control variables Definition
1 AGE The difference between the establishment year and the IPO year
2 SIZE The natural logarithm of beginning-year total assets
3
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
The capital investment (adjusting for depreciation 
charges) from the prior year scaled by lagged (-1) total 
assets
ACAPITAL EXPENDITURE
The change in asset-scaled capital spending from the 
pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year 
Y+1 : year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
4
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
The government subsidy received by the listed firm, 
including tax refunds, and project-specific government 
grants scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
A GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
The change in asset-scaled government subsidy from 
the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period 
(year Y+1; year Y+2; yearY+3; yearY+4)
5 OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION
The proportion of ownership held by the controlling 
shareholder at the end of the IPO year
6 OWNERSHIP TYPE
The type of the controlling shareholder, which is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling 
shareholder is ultimately owned by the state at the end of 
the year; 0 otherwise
7 BOARD COMPOSITION The proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at the end of the IPO year.
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Table 6-1: Sample’s distribution by industry sector
SIC (2001) Sample WholeMarket* %
A Agriculture, forestry, & fishing 10 37 27.03%
B Mining 5 24 20.83%
C Manufacturing 153 832 18.39%
- CO Foods and beverages (14) (59) (23.73%)
- C1 Textiles, suits and leathers (16) (71) (22.54%)
- C2 Wood products and furniture (1) (5) (20.00%)
- 03 Papers, stationery, sporting, musical instruments (4) (30) (13.33%o)
- C4 Petroleum refining, chemicals, and allied products (27) (158) (17.09%>)
- 05 Electronic, electric components and home appliances (5) (51) (9.80%)
- 06 Mineral products and metal products (27) (129) (20.93%)
-0 7  Equipments and machineries (35) (233) (15.02%)
- 08 Drugs and Biologic products r24j (96) (25.00%)
D Water, electricity, and gas 9 62 14.52%
E Construction 4 28 14.29%
F Transport & public utilities 13 61 21.31%
G information technology 12 85 14.12%
H Wholesale and retail trade 10 93 10.75%
1 Finance and insurance 2 10 20.00%
J Real estate 1 49 2.04%
K Service 12 42 28.57%
L Publishing, media, and allied services 1 10 10.00%
M Miscellaneous products and services 7 78 8.97%
TOTAL 239 1431 16.70%
Source: Standard Industry Classification of China (ed. 2001)
Note: * ending at 31 December 2005 (data source: http://www.csrc.gov.cn)
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Table 6-2: Sample distribution by the type of controlling shareholder
Categories Stock counts (Percentage)
Average ownership held by 
controlled shareholders
State-controlled 200(83.68%) 64.25% t
Sample Non-state-controlled 39(16.31%) 53.06% t
Subtotal 239(100%) 62.42% t
State-controlled 927(81.6%) 47.9% t
whole
market* N 0 n-state-co ntro lied
209
(18.4%) 35.9% t
Subtotal 1136(100%) 45.7% t
t  Percentage of shareholdings at the year-end of the IPO year 
$ Source: Securities Intelligent Unit of China Economy Daily (2001)
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Table 6-3: Sample descriptive statistics
Panel A: Scale of operations (Unit: billion Chinese ¥)
Mean Median Min Max
Sales
Sample 1.44 0.70 0.03 15.63
Whole market 1.90 0.62 0 . 0 0 417.19
Tests 
(t or z statistic)
-0.46
(0 .2 2 )
0.08
(0 .8 6 )
Total Assets
Sample 5.19 1.50 0.43 279.30
Whole market 4.94 1.34 0 . 0 2 503.89
Tests 
(t or z statistic)
0.25
(0.50)
0.16
(0.24)
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively 
Panel B: Profitability (Unit: billion Chinese ¥)
EBITDA
Sample 0 .2 1 0.09 -0 . 2 2 1.95
Whole market 0.27 0.08 -1.07 63.01
Tests 
(t or z statistic)
-0.06
(0.34)
0 .0 1
(0.09)
ROA 
(EBITDA on 
lagged(-l) assets)
Sample 7.27% 6.84% -13% 30%
Whole market 8.52% 7.12% -6 8 % 205%
Tests 
(t or z statistic)
0.75%
(0 .1 0 )
-0.28%
(0.28)
CFO
(Operating cashflow 
on lagged(-l) 
assets)
Sample 6.89% 5.47% -15% 8 8 %
Whole market 5.37% 4.84% -90% 268%
Tests 
(t or z statistic)
1.52%
(0 .0 0 )
0.63%
(0.08)
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Note: Mean tests (t statistics in parenthesis): two-sample student's T tests (2 tails)
Median tests (z statistics in parenthesis): two-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests (2 tails)
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Table 6-4: Definition of the IPO Year, the Y (-1) Year and the Y (+1) Year
IPO date
Fiscal 
Year 
End -2
Fiscal 
Year 
End - 1
Fiscal 
Year 
End 0
Fiscal 
Year 
End +1
Fiscal 
Year 
End +2
Fiscal 
Year 
End +3
Fiscal 
Year 
End +4
IPO YearO IPO Year +2 IPO Year +4
IPO Y e a r-I IPO Year +1 IPO Year +3
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Table 6-6: The un-adjusted ROA and CFO
Panel A: un-adjusted ROA
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
21.57% ***
(17.65)
16.59%***
(11.18)
9 .440 /0***
(12.27)
7.63% ***
(10.53)
7.39% ***
(12.05)
7.27%***
(1 0 .2 2 )
Median
(Z-statistic)
19.05% ***
(8.59)
12.94%***
(8.56)
8.56%***
(8.33)
7.47% ***
(7.42)
7.02% ***
(7.88)
6.84%***
(7.42)
Maximum 89.30% 128.58% 52.45% 28.32% 25.10% 29.88%
Minimum 0.62% 0.40% -8.65% -17.37% -10.93% -12.94%
Standard
Deviation 0 . 1 2 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07
Panel B: un-adjusted CFO
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
7.39% ***
(3.05)
3.08%
(1.33)
6 .0 1 %***
(5.06)
6.89% ***
(5.64)
4.92% ***
(6.28)
4.05%***
(4.48)
Median
(Z-statistic)
3.18% ***
(4.52)
1 .2 2 % 
(1.27)
5.38%***
(5.40)
5,47% ***
(6.04)
5.34% ***
(5.76)
3.84%***
(4.76)
Maximum 180.01% 180.01% 63.52% 88.33% 29.34% 26.86%
Minimum -28.62% -39.11% -41.32% -15.00% -19.53% -23.49%
Standard
Deviation 0.23 0 . 2 2 0 .1 1 0 . 1 2 0.07 0.08
Note:
ROA denotes EBITDA scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
CFO denotes Cashflow from operations scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
Mean tests (t statistics in parenthesis): one-sample student’s T tests (2 tails) 
Median tests (z statistics in parenthesis): one-sample Wilcoxon rank tests (2 tails)
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Table 6-6: The industry-adjusted ROA and CFO
Panel A: industry-adjusted ROA
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (4-3) Y (4-4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
12.71%***
(10.39)
7.06%***
(4.76)
0.09%
(0.11)
0.10%
(0.13)
-0.44%
(-0.72)
-0.65%
(-0.91)
Median
(Z-statistic)
10.18%***
(8.43)
3.40%***
(6.20)
-0.79%
(0.87)
-0.07%
(0.45)
-0.82%
(1.07)
-1.08%
(1.43)
Maximum 80.40% 119.00% 43.02% 20.74% 17.26% 21.91%
Minimum -8.30% -9.10% -18.01% -24.95% -18.73% -20.82%
Standard
Deviation 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Panel B: industry-adjusted CFO
Y(-1) Y(0) Y (+1) Y (+2) Y (4-3) Y (4-4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
6.74%***
(2.79)
-0.41%
(-0.17)
1.72%
(1.45)
2.55%*
(1.98)
-0.28%
(-0.35)
-0.70%
(-0.78)
Median
(Z-statistic)
2.54%***
(3.81)
-2.26%
(1.37)
1.09%*
(1.70)
1.12%
(1.60)
0.13%
(0.03)
-0.91%
(0.53)
Maximum 179.36% 176.52% 59.23% 83.99% 24.13% 22.10%
Minimum -29.26% -42.59% -45.60% -19.33% -24.73% -28.25%
Standard
Deviation 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.08
* ** ***
Note:
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Industry-adjusted ROA denotes EBITDA scaled by lagged (-1) total assets less 
contemporaneous figures of listed firms in the same 2-digit SIC sector 
Industry-adjusted CFO denotes Cashflow from operations scaled by lagged (-1) total 
assets less contemporaneous figures of listed firms in the same 2-digit SIC sector
Mean tests (t statistics in parenthesis): one-sample student’s I  tests (2 tails) 
Median tests (z statistics in parenthesis): one-sample Wilcoxon rank tests (2 tails)
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Table 6-7: The change in industry-adjusted ROA and CFO from before to after 
the IPO
Panel A: AROA
( - l ) t o  (0 ) ( - l ) t o  (+1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) (-1) to (+3) (-1) to (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-5.64%***
(-6.26)
-12.62% ***
(-10.52)
-12.61%***
(-9.77)
-13.15%***
(-10.92)
-13.36%***
(-10.81)
Median
(Z-statistic)
-5.00%***
(6.80)
-9.88% ***
(8.52)
-10.15%***
(8 .2 2 )
-11.35% ***
(8.46)
-11.50%***
(8.30)
Maximum 38.60% 9.35% 6.87% 2.69% 4.70%
Minimum -41.30% -80.00% -80.41% -78.51% -77.00%
Standard Deviation 0.08 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Note: AROA = industry-adjusted ROA figures in a post-IPO year less the 
corresponding ROA figures in Y (-1) year
Panel B: ACFO
( - l ) t o  (0 ) ( - l ) t o  (+ 1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) ( - l ) t o  (+3) (-1 ) to (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-7.14%***
(-4.46)
-5.02% **
(-2.17)
-4.20%*
(-1.76)
-7.03%***
(-2.85)
-7.46%***
(-2.95)
Median
(Z-statistic)
-2.80%***
(5.84)
-2 .2 0 %**
(2.27)
-1.81%*
(1.78)
-3.35%***
(3.14)
-3.70%***
(3.70)
Maximum 38.20% 34.18% 68.75% 29.45% 40.70%
Minimum -99.40% -172.76% -174.93% -176.69% -171.00%
Standard Deviation 0.15 0 . 2 2 0.26 0.24 0.24
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Note: ACFO = industry-adjusted CFO figures in a post-IPO year less the 
corresponding CFO figures in Y (-1) year
Mean tests (t statistics in parenthesis): one-sample student’s T tests (2 tails)
Median tests (z statistics in parenthesis): one-sample Wilcoxon rank tests (2 tails)
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Table 6-8: Actual sales
Panel A: un-adjusted sales (Unit: Million Chinese ¥)
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean 843.14***(5.96)
948.16***
(5.61)
1,068.41***
(5.84)
1,086.08***
(5.99)
1,217.34***
(5.91)
1,449.86***
(5.69)
Median 377.91***(8.59)
389.61***
(8.59)
416.31***
(8.58)
532.03***
(7.98)
562.25***
(8.59)
701.85***
(8.59)
Maximum 8,797.43 11,452.92 11,916.58 12,016.59 12,580.60 15,625.02
Minimum 78.11 82.96 40.03 42.02 40.74 31.86
Standard
Deviation 1,399.92 1,672.04 1,808.59 1,792.61 2,036.78 2,522.16
Panel B: industry-adjusted sales (Unit: Million Chinese ¥)
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean 504.14***(3.56)
580.16***
(3.43)
655.41***
(3.58)
640.08***
(3.53)
701.34***
(3.40)
823.86***
(3.23)
Median 38.91***(3.61)
21.61***
(2.78)
3.31***
(2.67)
86.03***
(3.54)
46.25**
(2.59)
75.85**
(2.45)
Maximum 8,458.43 11,084.92 11,503.58 11,570.59 12,064.60 14,999.02
Minimum -260.88 -285.03 -372.96 -403.97 -475.25 -594.13
Standard
Deviation 1,399.92 1,672.04 1.808.59 1,792.61 2.036.78 2,522.16
Panel C: ASales (Unit: Million Chinese ¥)
(-1 ) to  (0 ) (-1 ) to (+ 1 ) (-1 ) to (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) (-1) to (+4)
Mean 76.02*(1.93)
151.26**
(2.54)
135.94
(1 .6 6 )
197.20*
(1.91)
319.72**
(2.17)
Median -1 . 0 0(0.40)
- 1 1 . 6 8
(0.49)
27.29*
(1.95)
13.93
(1 .1 0 )
-41.75
(0.91)
Maximum 2,626.48 3,045.15 3,866.04 5,060.46 7,978.71
Minimum -840.32 -1,229.09 -3,932.74 -3,385.86 -2,932.92
Standard Deviation 389.94 588.40 810.52 1,020.94 1,453.30
Note: Asales = sales figures in a post-IPO year less the corresponding sales figures in
Y (-1) year
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Table 6-9: Asset-scaled sales
Panel A: un-adjusted asset-scaled sales
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean 98.80% ***(16.25)
83.31%***
(13.66)
55.30% ***
(13.75)
51.56% ***
(14.59)
49.44% ***
(14.33)
51.08%***
(15.11)
Median 91.50% ***(8.29)
70.50%***
(8.59)
46.00% ***
(8.59)
43.00% ***
(8.59)
41.50% ***
(8.59)
50.50%***
(8.59)
Maximum 415.66% 391.09% 266.14% 174.07% 185.76% 161.47%
Minimum 5.87% 4.56% 5.53% 5.50% 4.70% 4.31%
Standard
Deviation 0.60 0.60 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.33
Panel B: industry-adjusted asset-scaled sales
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean 9.53%(1.09)
13.64%*
(1.79)
11.24%** 
(2.18)
9.95% **
(2.26)
5.24%
(1.09)
2.50%
(0.48)
Median 8.71%(1.50)
4.08%
(1.55)
0.38%
(1.43)
5.10% **
(1.98)
3.52%
(0.94)
3.38%
(0.49)
Maximum 386.84% 317.51% 236.82% 148.61% 135.28% 149.79%
Minimum -218.02% -170.66% -100.72% - 1 0 1 .1 1 % -117.24% -142.28%
Standard
Deviation 0.85 0.75 0.50 0.43 0.47 0.51
Panel C: A industry-adjusted asset-scaled sales
(-1 ) to (0 ) ( - l ) t o  (+1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) (-1) to (+4)
Mean 4.11%(0.97)
1.71%
(0.31)
0.42%
(0.06)
-4.29%*
(-1.80)
-7.03%*
(-1.94)
Median 0 .6 8 %(0.48)
0.23%
(0.13)
-0.54%
(0.05)
-0.34%
(1.45)
-3.60%*
(1.79)
Maximum 158.75% 158.73% 151.70% 145.44% 161.02%
Minimum -210.58% -238.06% -377.67% -362.28% -367.62%
Standard Deviation 0.41 0.53 0 . 6 6 0.70 0.73
Note: A asset-scaled sales = asset-scaled figures in a post-IPO year less the corresponding
asset-scaled sales figures in Y (-1) year
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Table 6-10: Sales growth
Panel A: un-adjusted growth
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean 14.78% ***(4.54)
10.99%***
(4.73)
18.02%***
(5.28)
16.34%***
(4.71)
14.32%***
(4.31)
20.54%***
(5.61)
Median 8.07% ***(4.73)
8.23%***
(4.31)
14.96%***
(4.37)
11.67%***
(4.55)
10.23%***
(4.51)
15.16%***
(6 .2 2 )
Maximum 238.32% 90.31% 118.15% 144.33% 137.32% 172.26%
Minimum -23.04% -35.14% -60.80% -85.24% -97.34% -72.25%
Standard
Deviation 0.32 0 . 2 2 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.36
Panel B: industry-adjusted growth
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean 9.22% ***(2.83)
1.53% 
(0.65)
1 .2 2 %
(0.35)
5.11%
(1.47)
0.03%
(0 .0 1 )
2.15%
(0.58)
Median 2.52% **(2.23)
-1.24%
(0.07)
-1.84%
(0 .2 1 )
-0.43%
(1.09)
-4.06%
(0.23)
-3.24%
(0 .0 1 )
Maximum 232.76% 80.84% 101.35% 133.09% 123.03% 153.86%
Minimum -28.60% -44.61% -77.60% -96.48% -111.63% -90.65%
Standard
Deviation 0.32 0 . 2 2 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.36
Panel C: ASales Growth
( - l ) t o  (0 ) (-1 ) to (+1 ) (-1 ) to (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) ( - l ) to  (+4)
Mean -7.70%**(-2.09)
-8 .0 0 %*
(-1.91)
-4,12%*
(-1.89)
-9.19%*
(-1.84)
-7.08%
(-1.61)
Median -3.59%*(1.78)
-10.70% **
(2 .1 0 )
- 1 .1 0 %
(1.38)
-5.26%*
(1.84)
-6.43%*
(1.92)
Maximum 61.65% 89.47% 135.69% 134.39% 164.45%
Minimum -233.44% -176.62% -270.27% -299.71% -214.46%
Standard Deviation 0.36 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.43
Note: ASales growth -  growth rates in a post-IPO year less the corresponding growth rates in
Y (-1) year
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Table 6-11 : IPO operating performance segregated by the type of controlling shareholders
Panel A: Industry-adjusted performance (mean values)
Measure Categories Y(-1) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4) Post-IPOAverage
ROA
Non
State-controlled 1 2 .6 6 % 8.47% 0.64% 2.31% 1.50% 0.38% 1 .2 0 %
State-controlled 12.95% 6.79% -0 .0 2 % -0.34% -0.82% -0.85% -0.50%
Mean Differences 
(t statistic)
-0.29%
(-0 .1 0 )
1.67%  
(0.57)
0 .6 6 %
(0.45)
2.64%
(1.23)
2.31%
(1.62)
1 .2 2 %
(0.92)
1.70%
(1.13)
CFO
Non
State-controlled 7.62% -2.28% -0 .6 6 % 3.10% 0.83% -3.21% 0 .0 1 %
State-controlled 6.58% -0.05% 2.19% 2.44% -0.50% 0 .2 2 % 1.08%
Mean Differences 
(t statistic)
1.04%
(0.24)
-2.29%
(-0.46)
-2.84%
(-1.23)
0.65%
(0.28)
1.33%
(0 .6 8 )
-2.99%
(-1.30)
-1.07%
(-1.36)
Panel B: Industry-adjusted performance changes (mean values)
Measure Categories ( - l ) t o  (+1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) ( - l ) to  (+3) (-1) to (+4) Average
Non
State-controlled -12.31% -10.64% -11.45% -12.57% -11.74%
AROA State-controlled -1 2 .6 8 % -12.99% -13.48% -13.51% -13.17%
Mean Differences 
(t statistic)
0.36%
(0.15)
2.35%
(0.84)
2 .0 2 %
(0.89)
0.93%
(0.37)
1,43%
(0.47)
Non
State-controlled -8.27% -4.52% -6.78% -10.83% -7.60%
ACFO State-controlled -4.39% -4.13% -7.08% -6.80% -5.60%
Mean Differences 
(t statistic)
-3.88%
(-1 .1 0 )
-0.38%
(-0.08)
0.29%
(0.06)
-4.03%
(-0.83)
-2 .0 0 %
(-0.65)
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively 
Note: 1. Post-IPO Average denotes the mean amount between Y(+1) year and Y (+4) year
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Table 6-12: IPO operating performance segregated by ownership concentration
Panel A: Industry-adjusted measures (mean values)
Measure Portfolios Y(-1) Y (0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4) Post-IPOAverage
ROA
Ownership <30%  
(less concentrated) 4.91% 0.91% -5.40% -3.24% -1.33% -1 .6 6 % -2.91%
30%<Ownership :S50‘i' 7.77% 0.71% -2.28% -2.41% -3.79% -4.62% -3.27%
Ownership>50%  
(more concentrated) 13.87% 8 .2 0 % 0.81% 0.63% -0.08% -0 .2 2 % 0.29%
AN OVA 2.71*(0.07)
1.62
(0 .2 0 )
2.89*
(0.06)
1.53
(0 .2 0 )
1.31
(0.27)
1.36
(0.36)
2.13
(0 .1 1 )
CFO
Ownership ^30%  
(less concentrated) 2 .1 2 % -4.16% 4.46% 2.44% 0.58% -3.58% 0.98%
30%<Ownership ^50°/ 2.15% -6.45% -7.38% -2.44% -2 .6 8 % -4.23% -4.18%
Ownership>50%  
(more concentrated) 7.47% 0.46% 2.23% 2.98% -0.16% -0.14% 1.23%
AN OVA 0.27(0.76)
0.49
(0 .6 6 )
2.46*
(0.09)
0.64
(0.52)
0.38
(0.67)
1 .1 2
(0.32)
2 .0 2
(0.13)
Panel B: Industry-adjusted performance changes (mean values)
Measure Portfolios (-1 ) to (+1 ) ( - 1 ) t o ( + 2 ) ( - i ) t o  (+3) (-1) to (+4) Average
AROA
Ownership ^30%  
(less concentrated) -10.03% -8.14% -6.24% -6.58% -7.81%
30%<Ownership S50% -10.06% -1 0 .1 2 % -11.59% -12.40% -11.06%
Ownership>50%  
(more concentrated) -13.06% -13.24% -13.95% -14.09% -13.59%
AN OVA 0.36(0.69)
0.71
(0.49)
1.61
(0 .2 0 )
1.41
(0.24)
0.99
(0.37)
ACFO
Ownership <30%  
(less concentrated) 0.33% -1 .6 6 % -3.54% -7.70% -3.14%
30%<Ownership ^50% -8.53% -3.61% -3.81% -5.36% -5.33%
Ownership>50%  
(more concentrated) -5.25% -4.49% -7.64% -7.61% -6.24%
ANOVA 0.30(0.74)
0.04
(0.95)
1.65
(0.84)
0 .0 2
(0.97)
0.06
(0.93)* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Note; 1. ‘Ownership’ denotes the percentage of shares held by controlling shareholders at the 
end of IPO year
2. Post-IPO Average denotes the mean amount between Y(+1) year and Y (+4) year
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Table 6-13: IPO operating performance segregated by board composition
Panel A: Industry-adjusted measures (mean values)
Measure Portfolios Y(-1) Y (0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4) Post-IPOAverage
ROA
Percentage ^30%  
(more independent) 11.23% 5.57% -0.31% 0 .2 1 % 0 .1 1 % -1.62% -0.40%
30%<Percentage <50°y 11.30% 5.08% -0.81% 0.18% -1.61% -0 .6 8 % -0.74%
Percentage >50%  
(less independent) 15.81% 10.47% 1.34% -0 .1 0 % 0 .1 0 % 0.38% 0.43%
ANOVA 1 .6 6(0.19)
1.35
(0.26)
0.70
(0.49)
0 .0 0
(0.99)
0 .8 6
(0.42)
0.64
(0.53)
0.31
(0.72)
CFO
Percentage <30%  
(more independent) 4.81% -1.63% 2.98% 2.81% -3.10% -2.62% 0 .0 2 %
30%<Percentage ^50°/ 4.51% -3.67% -0.24% 2.61% 0.41% -2.08% 0.18%
Percentage >50%  
(less independent) 10.85% 3.90% 2.27% 2.23% 1.98% 2.55% 1.98%
ANOVA 0.72(0.48)
0.95
(0.38)
0.79
(0.45)
0 .0 0
(0.99)
3.99**
(0 .0 2 )
0.36
(0.69)
1.17
(0.31)
Panel B: Industry-adjusted performance changes (mean values)
Measure Portfolios ( - l ) t o  (+1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) {-1 )to  (+4) Average
Percentage ^30%  
(more independent) -11.53% - 1 1 .0 1 % - 1 1 .1 2 % -12.85% -11.63%
AROA
30%<Percentage 350% -11.85% -1 0 .8 6 % -12.65% -11.72% -11.72%
Percentage >50%  
(less independent) -14.47% -15,90% -15.71% -15.44% -15.38%
ANOVA 0.60 1.46 1 .1 0 0.75 1.09(0.54) (0.23) (0.33) (0.47) (0.33)
Percentage <30%  
(more independent) -1.82%o -2 .2 0 % -7.92% -7.43% -4.79%
A C F O
30%<Percentage 350% -4.75% -1.90% -4.09% -6.58% -4.33%
Percentage >50%  
(less independent) -8.58% -8.62% -8.87% -8.31% -8.54%
ANOVA 0.72 0.69 0.33 0.37 0.32(0.48) (0.50) (0.72) (0.69) (0.72)
*  it-k ic'k'k Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Note: 1. ‘Percentage’ denotes the proportion of board members (at the end of the IPO year) 
who represent the controlling shareholder, and hold a senior position in the controlling 
shareholder’s entity simultaneously.
2. Post-IPO Average denotes the mean amount between Y(+1) year and Y (+4) year
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Table 7-1: Regression models on managerial ownership dispersion hypothesis
AROA. = /3q +/?,  ^AManagerial_Ownership+ ^ 2 ^Size. *Age  ^+ (3^  ACapital_Qxpendittirq
+ ^ AGovernme}it_subsid)i +  J3^  0\vi'iership_lype. +/?, ^ Ownership_concentrcioir
+ ^BoQrd_ComposHm. +£,.
ACFO^ = /?o * A M anagena l_O M >nersh ip+^Size^ * Age  ^+ P,^  ^ ACapital_Gxpenditurq
+ P  ^ AGovermnent_subsid)i +  P^ ^ Ownership_type. +/?  ^^ Ownership_concentrciop 
+ P  ^ Board_Compositm^ +£■,
Panel A: T h e  change from Y  (-1) year to Y  (+1) year
AManagerial
Ownership Size Age
ACapital
Expenditure
^Government
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
^Managerial Ownership 
Size 
Age
ACapital Expenditure 
AGovernment Subsidy 
Ownership Type 
Ownership concentration 
Board Composition
0.180
-0.123
-0.006
-0.049
-0.045
-0.089
0.101
0.084
-0.009
0.064
0.070
-0.001
0.157
-0.214*
0.046
-0.266
-0.639
-0.256
-0.050
-0.028
0.070
-0.043
0.067
-0.049
0.105
0.288***
0.307*** 0.239***
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0 .1 0 , 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Panel B: T he  change from Y  (-1 ) year to Y  (+2) year
AManagerial
Ownership Size Age
ACapital
Expenditure
AGovernment
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
AManagerial Ownership
Size 0.137
Age -0.015 0.098
ACapital Expenditure 0.050 -0.088 -0.181
AGovernment Subsidy -0.115 0.080 -0.022 -0.166
Ownership Type -0.095 0.070 -0.266 -0.028 0.033
Ownership concentration -0.128 -0.001 -0.639 0.070 0.052 0.288***
Board Composition 0.059 0.157 -0.256 -0.043 0.190 0.307*** 0.239***
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Panel C: The change from Y (-1) year to Y (+3) year
AManagerial
Ownership Size Age
ACapitai
Expenditure
AGovernment
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
AManagerial Ownership 
Size 
Age
ACapitai Expenditure 
AGovernment Subsidy 
Ownership Type 
Ownership concentration 
Board Composition
0.163
-0.093
-0.059
-0.044
-0.011
-0.089
0.062
0.169
-0.047
0.087
0.070
-0.001
0.157
-0.133
-0.005
-0.266
-0.639
-0.256
-0.161
-0.028
0.070
-0.043
-0,013
0.036
0.139
0.288***
0.307*** 0.239***
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05  and 0.01 level, respectively
Panel D: The change from Y (-1) year to Y (+4) year
AManagerial
Ownership Size Age
ACapital
Expenditure
AGovernment
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
AManagerial Ownership
Size -0.005
Age 0.028 0.170
ACapital Expenditure -0.150 -0.010 -0.256
AGovernment Subsidy 0.146 0.042 -0.075 -0.193
Ownership Type -0.095 0.070 -0.266 -0.028 0.033
Ownership concentration -0.128 -0,001 -0.639 0.070 0.052 0.288***
Board Composition 0.059 0.157 -0.256 -0.043 0.190 0.307*** 0.239***
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Panel E: Pooled data
AManagerial
Ownership Size Age
ACapital
Expenditure
AGovernment
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
AManagerial Ownership 
Size 
Age
ACapital Expenditure 
AGovernment Subsidy 
Ownership Type 
Ownership concentration 
Board Composition
0.128
-0.069
0.000
-0.049
-0.042
-0.081
0.059
0.111
-0.047
0.032
0.049
-0.049
0.111
-0.123
-0.021
-0.242
-0.582
-0.233
-0.148
-0.112
0.085
-0.046
0.039
0.043
0.163
0.288***
0.307*** 0.239***
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Variables Definition
AManagerial
Ownership
The change in managerial ownership from the pre-IPO period {year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year Y+1; year Y+2; 
year Y+3; year Y+4)
Size The natural logarithm of beginning-year total assets in a post-IPO year (year Y+1 ; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
Age The difference between the establishment year and the IPO year
ACapital
Expenditure The change in asset-scaled capital investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) from the Y-1 year to a post-IPO year (year Y+1 ; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
AGovernment
Subsidy The change in asset-scaled government subsidy from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year Y+1 ; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
Ownership
Type
The type of the controlling shareholder, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling shareholder is 
ultimately owned by the state at the end of the year; 0 otherwise
Ownership
Concentration The proportion of ownership held by the controlling shareholder at the end of the IPO year
Board
Composition The proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at the end of the IPO year
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Table 7-2 Regression models on RPT-based earnings management hypothesis
ROAj ~ /Î, * Net _ loap + ySj * Operating _ items  ^ * Size^  Age,.
+ /?5 ^Capital_Qxpenditure. + Government_subsidy. +/?, Ownership_type.
+ p^ * Ownership_ concentraion. + /?g * Board_ Composiiiai,. + g,
CFO, = /?o +/?, Net_loan. + p^  ^Operating items  ^+ p^ ^Size  ^+p^ *Age,
+ P^ * Capita l_expendi/uref -hP^ ^Government_siibsidy, + p^ Ownership_t)pe,
+ P^  Ownership_concentraion^ + P  ^^Board_Compositiai^ +£*.
Panel A: at the pre-IPO period (/= -1)
Net loans OperatingRPTs Size Age
Capital
Expenditure
government
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
Net loans
Operating RPTs 0,019
Size 0.100 0.020*
Age 0.109 -0.131 0.154
Capital Expenditure -0,009 -0.111 -0.103 0.258*
Government Subsidy 0.103 -0.035 -0.141 0.103 0.093
Ownerstiip Type -0.101 0.136 0.070 -0.266 0.019 -0.037
Ownership concentration -0.109 0.255** -0.001 -0.639 -0.110 -0.105 0.288***
Board Composition -0.132 0.270*** 0.157 -0.256 0.028 -0.204 0.307*** 0.239**
Panel B; at the IPO year (/= 0)
Net loans OperatingRPTs Size Age
Capital
Expenditure
government
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
Net loans
Operating RPTs -0.210*
Size 0.052 -0.002
Age 0.171 -0.225* 0.174
Capital Expenditure 0.048 0.057 -0.089 0.162
Government Subsidy 0.173 -0.068 -0.060 -0.026 0.051
Ownership Type -0.158 0.121 0.070 -0.266 0.045 -0.001
Ownership concentration -0.100 0.324*** -0.001 -0.639 0.019 0.019 0.288***
Board Composition -0.366*** 0.360*** 0.157 -0.256 0.077 0.013 0.307*** 0.239**
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Panel C: at the post-IPO period (/= 1)
Net loans OperatingRPTs Size Age
Capital
Expenditure
Sovernment
Subsidy
Ownership
Type
Ownership
Concentration
Board
Composition
Net loans
Operating RPTs 0.020
Size 0.028 0.022*
Age -0.035 -0.212 0.164
Capital Expenditure 0.074 -0.069 -0.028 0.226*
Government Subsidy 0.129 -0.162 -0.056 0.123 0.658
Ownership Type -0.107 0.172 0.070 -0.266 -0.060 0.048
Ownership concentration -0.123 0.374*** -0,001 -0.639 -0.274* -0.273* 0.288***
Board Composition -0.175* 0.364*** 0.157 -0.256 -0.104 -0.189 0.307*** 0.239**
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Variables Definition
Net loans The difference between loans provided by the controlling shareholder to the listed subsidiary and loans provided by the listed subsidiary to controlling shareholder scaled by lagged (-1) total assets in a given period
Operating
items The aggregate amount of asset-scaled related party transactions, which exclude loan transactions, in a given period
Size The natural logarithm of beginning-year total assets in a given period
Age The difference between the establishment year and the IPO year
Capital
Expenditure The asset-scaled capital investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) in a given period
Government
Subsidy The asset-scaled government subsidy in a given period
Ownership
Type
The type of the controlling shareholder, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling shareholder is 
ultimately owned by the state at the end of the year; 0 otherwise
Ownership
Concentration The proportion of ownership held by the controlling shareholder at the end of the IPO year
Board
Composition The proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at the end of the IPO year
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Table 8-1: Descriptive statistics of managerial ownership
Panel A: Managerial ownership
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+2) Y  (+ 3 ) Y  (+4)
Mean  
(t statistic)
0.008%
(1 .0 2 )
0.008%
(1 .0 2 )
0.004%
(1.05)
0.004%
(1.57)
0 .0 0 2 %
(1.70)
0 .0 0 2 %
(1 .6 8 )
Median  
(z statistic)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.15)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.15)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.16)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.24)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.26)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.25)
Maximum 0.842% 0.842% 0.444% 0 .2 2 2 % 0.097% 0.108%
Minimum 0 .0 0 0 % 0 .0 0 0 % 0 .0 0 0 % 0 .0 0 0 % 0 .0 0 0 % 0 .0 0 0 %
Standard
Deviation 0.085% 0.085% 0.044% 0.025% 0.013% 0.014%
Panel B: A Managerial ownership
( - l ) t o  (+ 1 ) (-1 ) t o ( + 2 ) ( - l ) t o  (+3) (-1) to (+4)
Mean 
(t statistic)
-0.004%
(-1 .0 0 )
-0 .0 0 0 %
(-0.27)
-0 .0 0 1 %
(-0.75)
0 .0 0 0 %
(0 .2 2 )
Median 
(z statistic)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.24)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(4.85)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(5.04)
0 .0 0 0 %***
(4.90)
Maximum 0 .0 0 0 % 0.097% 0.065% 0.043%
Minimum -0.398% -0 .2 2 2 % -0 .2 2 2 % -0.030%
Standard Deviation 0.040% 0.025% 0.023% 0.005%
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition
Managerial
Ownership
Ownership percentage held by directors and top management, 
including CEO, Chief Finance Officer and Deputy Executive Officers 
at a given year-end
AManagerial
Ownership
The change in managerial ownership from the pre-IPO period (year 
Y-1) to the post-IPO period (year Y+1; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
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Table 8-2: Descriptive statistics of control variables
Panel A: Size (The natural logarithm of beginning-year total assets)
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+ 2 ) Y  (+3) Y  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
8.732***
(194.04)
8.857***
(211.76)
9.081***
(240.83)
9.147***
(234.23)
9.193***
(227.97)
9.239***
(223.50)
Median
(Z-statistic)
8.665***
(8.59)
8.790***
(8.59)
8.990***
(8.59)
9.065***
(8.59)
9.110***
(8.59)
9.180***
(8.59)
Maximum 10.91 10.94 1 1 .0 1 1 1 . 1 2 11.24 11.45
Minimum 8 .0 1 8 .2 1 8.42 8.57 8.59 8.62
Standard Deviation 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40
Panel B: Age (year)
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+ 2 ) Y  (+3) Y  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
4.020***
(16.10)
4.020***
(16.10)
4.020***
(16.10)
4.020***
(16.10)
4.020***
(16.10)
4,020***
(16.10)
Median
(Z-statistic)
3.000***
(8.69)
3.000***
(8.69)
3.000***
(8.69)
3.000***
(8.69)
3.000***
(8.69)
3.000***
(8.69)
Maximum 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00
Minimum 2 .0 0 0 2 .0 0 0 2 .0 0 0 2 . 0 0 0 2 .0 0 0 2 .0 0 0
Standard Deviation 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47
Panel C; Capital expenditure (asset-scaled)
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+ 2 ) Y  (+3) Y  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
6.93% ***
(4.12)
17.40% ***
(7.43)
0.43%*
(1.98)
9.72*% **
(10.70)
7.85%***
(7.89)
7,91%***
(8.34)
Median
(Z-statistic)
2 .0 2 %***
(7.17)
9.79% ***
(8.54)
0 .0 0 %***
(5.78)
6.64% ***
(8.79)
5.06%***
(6.54)
4.65%***
(5.90)
Maximum 128.14% 149.63% 19.18% 50.18% 44.28% 52.85%
Minimum 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0.27% 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Standard Deviation 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.09
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Table 8-2: Descriptive statistics of control variables (continued)
Panel D: A Capital expenditure (asset-scaled)
(-1 ) to (+ 1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) ( - l ) t o  (+3) ( - l ) to  (+4)
Mean -6.53% *** 2.76% 0.87% 0.9%(-3.79) (1.49) (0.49) (0.52)
Median -1.82% *** 3.28% *** 2.3% *** 1.96%**(6.47) (4.34) (3.00) (2.52)
Maximum 90.33% 47.83% 43.02% 52.34%
Minimum -128.19% - 1 1 0 .8 6 % -104.18% -108.87%
Standard Deviation 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18
Panel E: Government subsidy (asset-scaled)
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+ 2 ) Y  (+3) Y  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0.70% ***
(5.12)
0.90%***
(5.43)
0.29%***
(3.86)
0.15% ***
(4.11)
0.26%***
(3.98)
0 .1 0 %***
(3.74)
Median
(Z-statistic)
0 .0 0 %***
(5.36)
0 .0 0 %***
(6.32)
0 .0 0 %***
(5.70)
0 .0 %***
(5.83)
0 .0 0 %***
(5.12)
0 .0 0 %***
(6.44)
Maximum 6.24% 10.55% 4.97% 2.39% 3.56% 3.56%
Minimum 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.017 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.005
Panel F: A Government subsidy (asset-scaled)
( - l ) t o  (+ 1 ) ( - l ) t o  (+2 ) ( - l ) t o  (+3) ( - l ) to  (+4)
Mean -0.40% ***(-3.21)
-0.54%***
(-4.01)
-0.46% ***
(-3.11)
-0.54%***
(-3.64)
Median 0 .0 0 %***(3.14)
0 .0 0 %***
(3.38)
0 .0 0 %**
(2.33)
0 .0 0 %***
(3.07)
Maximum 2.62% 1.03% 2.38% 2.37%
Minimum -6.26% -6.26% -6 .2 2 % -6.28%
Standard Deviation 0 .0 1 2 0.013 0.013 0.014
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Panel G: Ownership and board composition (at the end of the IPO year)
Ownership Type OwnershipConcentration Board Composition
Mean 0.836***(22.06)
62.42%***
(42.84)
43.36%***
(14.55)
Median 1 .0 0 0 ***(9.05)
66.67% ***
(8.59)
40.65%***
(8.14)
Maximum 1 .0 0 0 84.96% 1 0 0 .0 0 %
Minimum 0 .0 0 0 6 .8 6 % 0 .0 0 %
Standard Deviation 0.37 0.14 0.29
*  iek * * * Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Variables Definition
Size The natural logarithm of beginning-year total assets in a given year
Age The difference between the establishment year and the IPO year
Capital
expenditure
The asset-scaled capital investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) in a given 
year
ACapital
expenditure
The change in asset-scaled capital investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) 
from the Y-1 year to a post-IPO year (year Y+1 ; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
Government
subsidy The asset-scaled government subsidy in a given year
AGovernment
subsidy
The change in asset-scaled government subsidy from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) 
to the post-IPO period (year Y+1; year Y+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
Ownership
type
The type of the controlling shareholder, which is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the controlling shareholder is ultimately owned by the state at the end of the 
year; 0  otherwise
Ownership
concentration
The proportion of ownership held by the controlling shareholder at the end of the 
IPO year
Board
composition
The proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at 
the end of the IPO year
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Table 8-3: Cross-sectional regressions on managerial ownership changes
Model 1 : AROA. -  +  p^ ^ AM anageria l_O wnership^ +£•,.
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients
(-1) to (+1) (-1) to (+2) (-1) to f+3) f-1) to (+4) Pooled
Intercept
(t-statistic) +/-
-0.127***
(-10.51)
-0.126***
(-9.74)
-0.131*** 
(-1 0 . 8 6  )
-0.133***
(-10.78)
-0.129***
(-10.9)
AManagerial Ownership 
(t-statistic) +
-20.194
(-0 .6 6 )
-24.777
(-0.25)
9.981
(0.18)
125.784
(0.54)
-16.293
(-0.29)
0.4% 0 .2 % 0 .0 % 0.3% 0 .0 %
Adjusted R^ -0.5% -0.7% - 1 .0 % -0.7% -0 .0 %
F Statistic 
(critical values, at 5% level)
0.44
(3.90)
0.06
(3.90)
0.03
(3.90)
0.29
(3.90)
0.08
(3.88)
Sample Size 239 239 239 239 956
Model 2: ACFO. = + A  ^M anageria l_O w nersh ip^
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients
(-1) to (+1) (-1)to(^2) M ) to (+3) (-1) to (+4J Pooled
Intercept
(t-statistic) +/“
-0.051**
(-2 .2 1 )
-0.042
(-1.57)
-0.070***
(-2.84)
-0.074***
(-2.93)
-0.059**
(-2.50)
AManagerial Ownership 
(t-statistic) +
-32.337
(-0.55)
-55.513
(-0.53)
-9.241
(-0.08)
-100.524
(-0 .2 1 )
-33.312
(-0.30)
R= 0.3% 0 .2 % 0 .0 % 0 .2 % 0 .0 %
Adjusted R^ -0.7% -0 .6 % -1 .8 % -2.9% -0.9%
F Statistic 
(critical values, at 5% level)
0.31
(3.90)
0.28
(3.90)
0 .0 0
(3.90)
0.04
(3.90)
0.09
(3.88)
Sample Size 239 239 239 239 956
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition
AROA The change of industry-adjusted ROA from Y (-1) year to the financial year / subsequent to Y (/ = 1, 2, 3, or 4 respectively).
ACFO The change of industry-adjusted CFO from Y (-1) year to the financial year / subsequent to Y  (/ = 1, 2, 3, or 4 respectively).
AManagerial
Ownership
The change in managerial ownership from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the 
post-IPO period (year Y+1; year Y+2 ; year Y+3; year Y+4)
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Table 8-3: Cross-sectional regressions on managerial ownership changes (continued)
Model 3 : AROA^ =  Ao +  A i *  AM anageria l _  Ownership , + + /^ 3  *
+ /?,, * AC apita l _  exp enditnre ,• + * AGovernment _  subsidy
+ P(, "^Ownership _type,. + p^ "^Ownership _  concentrât ion ^
+  / ? 8  * Board _  Cornpositio + s,
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients
(-1) to  (+1) (- I)  to  (+2) (-1) to  (+3) (-1) to  (+4) Pooled
Intercept
(t-statistic) +/-
-0.704**
(-2.31)
-0.558*
(-1.71)
-0.660**
(-2.17)
-0.771***
(-2.48)
-0.692**
(-2.29)
AManagerial_Ownership
(t-statistic) +
-14.412
(-0.45)
-20.946
(-0.40)
11.428
(0 .2 1 )
194.537
(0.82)
-14.943
(-0.26)
Size
(t-statistic) +
0.052
(1.56)
0.036
(1.04)
0.053
(1.60)
0.066*
(1.95)
0.052
(1.58)
Age
(t-statistic) +
0.009
(1.42)
0 .0 1 1
(1.63)
0.007
(1.18)
0.005
(0.80)
0.008
(1.28)
ACapital_expenditure
(t-statistic) +
0.080
(1.09)
0.141*
(1.92)
0.040
(0.57)
0.054
(0.74)
0.019
(1.08)
AGovernment_subsidy
(t-statistic) +
-0.910
(-0.96)
0.045
(0.04)
-0.942
(-1.03)
-1.569*
(-1.70)
-0.228
(-0.97)
Ownership_type
(t-statistic) -
0.014
(0.41)
0 .0 1 2
(0.32)
0.007
(0 .2 1 )
0.008
(0.24)
0.009
(0.27)
Ownership_concentration
(t-statistic) -
0.106
(0.94)
0.097
(0.81)
0.039
(0.35)
0.013
(0 .1 2 )
0.060
(0.54)
Board_composition
(t-statistic) -
-0.058
(-1.32)
-0.084*
(-1.76)
-0.078*
(-1.75)
-0.033
(-0.71)
-0.063
(-1.54)
9.5% 1 1 .0 % 1 0 .6 % 10.3% 10.9%
Adjusted R^ 1.4% 3.0% 2.5% 2.3% 1.9%
F Statistic 
(critical values, at 5% level)
1.18
(2 .0 0 )
1.37
(2 .0 0 )
1.32
(2 .0 0 )
1.28
(2 .0 0 )
1.24
(1.94)
White's Test (P-value) 0.15 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.33
Sample Size 239 239 239 239 956
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Table 8-3: Cross-sectional regressions on managerial ownership changes (continued)
Model 4: ACFO. = P^ +  A M anageria l _  Ownership ,■ + ^2 * Size. + * A ge .
+ A 4 * AC apita l _  exp e n d itn re + As * AGovernment _  subsidy 
+ Ae Ownership _ typ e j + A? ^Ownership _  concentrât ion ^
+ As * Board _  Cornpositio n. + s.
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients
(-1) to  (+1) (-1) to (+2) (-1) to  (+3) (-1) to (+4) P oo led
Intercept
(t-statistic) +/-
-0.006
(-0 .0 1 )
-0.622
(-0.91)
0.003
(0 .0 0 )
-0.166
(-0.25)
-0 .2 2 0
(-0.36)
AManagerial_Ownership
(t-statistic) +
-4.127
(-0.06)
-34.341
(-0.32)
-19.444
(-0.17)
-66.197
(-0.13)
-4.286
(-0.03)
Size
(t-statistic) +
-0.019
(-0.29)
0.045
(0.61)
-0 .0 1 0
(-0.15)
0.013
(0.18)
0.006
(0.09)
Age
(t-statistic) +
0 .0 1 1
(0.87)
0 .0 1 2
(0 .8 6 )
0.005
(0.36)
-0.003
(-0 .2 2 )
0.007
(0.54)
ACapital_expenditure
(t-statistic) +
0.254*
(1.81)
0.353**
(2.31)
0.270*
(1.81)
0.164
(1.07)
0.070*
(1.89)
AGovernment_.subsidy
(t-statistic) +
-2.214
(-1 .2 2 )
0.554
(0.26)
0.610
(0.31)
-0.475
(-0.24)
-0.130
(-0.27)
Ownership_type
(t-statistic) -
0.094
(1.41)
0.071
(0.89)
0.053
(0.71)
0.076
(0.99)
0.074
(1.04)
Ownership_concentration
(t-statistic) -
0.109
(0.50)
0 .2 0 2
(0.81)
-0 .0 1 1
(-0.04)
-0.053
(-0 .2 2 )
0.067
(0.30)
Board_composition
(t-statistic) -
-0.157*
(-1.84)
-0 .2 0 1 *
(-2 .0 1 )
-0.088
(-0.94)
-0 .1 1 2
(-1.13)
-0.135
(-1.51)
R" 10.9% 10.3% 4.8% 3.9% 7.4%
Adjusted R^ 2.9% 2.3% -3.7% -4.6% -0.9%
F Statistic 
(critical values, at 5% level)
1.36
(2 .0 0 )
1.28
(2 .0 0 )
0.56
(2 .0 0 )
0.45
(2 .0 0 )
0.89
(1.94)
White’s Test (P-value) 0.23 0.33 0.40 0.26 0.31
Sample Size 239 239 239 239 956
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Table 9-1: Industry-adjusted total accruals (TAC) scaled by lagged total assets
Panel A: TAG
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0.084***
(5.43)
0 .1 0 2 ***
(7.07)
0.026***
(2.73)
-0 .0 0 1
(-0.17)
-0.008*
(-1.94)
-0.004
(-1.43)
Median
(Z-statistic)
0.082***
(6.42)
0.096***
(6.42)
0.023**
(2.55)
0 .0 1 0
(0.52)
-0 .0 1 2 *
(1.72)
-0.009*
(1.80)
Maximum 0.673 0.555 0.484 0.214 0.300 0.290
Minimum -0.513 -0.386 -0.224 -0.238 -0.256 -0.325
Standard
Deviation 0.152 0.143 0.096 0.082 0.087 0.098
Panel B; ATAC
( - l ) t o  (+1 ) (“1 ) to (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) (-1 )to (+ 4 )
Mean
(t-statistic)
-0.057***
(-3.28)
-0.085***
(-5.08)
-0.092***
(-4.89)
-0.088***
(-5.00)
Median
(Z-statistic)
-0.061***
(4.35)
-0.086***
(5.83)
-0.097***
(5.58)
-0.073***
(5.25)
Maximum 0.636 0.595 0.621 0.523
Minimum -0.561 -0.594 -0.641 -0.664
Standard Deviation 0.172 0.166 0.186 0.174
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively 
Note: Total accruals = Reported earnings - Cashflow
Definition
TA G
Assets-scaled total accruals, which is the actual value of total accruals 
scaled by lagged (-1) total assets, less the median contemporaneous 
figure of the same 2-digit publicly traded firms
A TA C The change in industry-adjusted assets-scaled TAG in a particular post-IPO year relative to that in the pre-IPO year
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Table 9-2: Industry-adjusted asset-scaled discretionary accruals (DAC)
Panel A: DAC
Y(-1) Y(0) Y(+1) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0.079***
(5.03)
0 .1 0 2 ***
(7.76)
0.016*
(1.76)
-0.007
(-0.84)
-0.013
(-1.53)
-0.008
(-1.04)
Median
(Z-statistic)
0.075***
(5.96)
0.090***
(6.60)
0 .0 2 0
(1.61)
0 .0 0 0
(0.13)
-0.015*
(2.09)
-0 .0 1 0 *
(1.79)
Maximum 0.660 0.520 0.460 0.190 0.260 0.280
Minimum -0.530 -0.190 -0.230 -0.250 -0.270 -0.320
Standard
Deviation 0.155 0.130 0.093 0.083 0.085 0.096
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Panel B: ADAC
( -1 ) t o  (+ 1 ) ( - 1 ) t o  (+ 2 ) ( - 1 ) to  (+3) ( -1 ) to  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-0.062***
(-3.48)
-0.086***
(-5.00)
-0.092***
(-4.78)
-0.087***
(-4.90)
Median
(Z-statistic)
-0.072***
(4.61)
-0.086***
(5.64)
-0 .1 1 1 ***
(5.44)
-0.081***
(5.19)
Maximum 0.630 0.590 0.600 0.520
Minimum -0.570 -0.600 -0.650 -0.660
Standard Deviation 0.177 0.170 0.191 0.175
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
D efin ition
D AC
Assets-scaled discretionary accruals, which is computed by using the  
modified Jones (1991 ) model, less the m edian contem poraneous figure  
of the sam e 2 -digit publicly traded firms
ADA C Th e  change in industry-adjusted assets-scaled DAC in a particular post-IPO  year relative to that in the p re-IP O  year
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Table 9
O riginal Restated Mean (Median) tests
Mean 12.71%*** 10.51%*** 2.18%***
(t-statistic) (10.39) (4.76) (6.43)
Median 10.18%*** 8.50%*** 1.16%***
(Z-statistic) (8.43) (6.20) (8.12)
Maximum 80.40% 80.40%
Minimum -8.30% -11.00%
Standard
Deviation 0.12 0.12
*  * *  * * * Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Note: Original: the original industry-adjusted asset-scaled EBITDA in the Y (-1) year 
Restated: the restated industry-adjusted asset-scaled EBITDA in the Y (-1) year 
Mean test: a paired-sample T test (t statistic in parenthesis)
Median test: a paired-sample Wilcoxon Z test (z statistic in parenthesis)
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Table 9-4: Market reaction to accrual-based earnings management
Panel A: Long-term benchmark-adjusted BAHRs (Buy-And-Hold Returns)
BAHRs in 4 quartile portfoiios
0.05
-0.05 - 
- 0.1 -
iÈr— Q1-negative DAC
-0.15 - 
- 0.2 - -B— Q4-posilive DAC
-0.25 - 
-0.3 -
-0.35
Panel B: Long-term CARs (Cumulative Abnormal Returns)
CARs in 4 quartile portfolios
0.05
j& a Y_(±2)____ y_(±3)_____-Y_(±4)____ Y_(±5)__.-0.05 - 
- 0.1 -  
-0.15 - 
- 0.2 -
-0 .2 5 -------
-0 .3 --------
-0.35 - - -
■«^01-negative DAC
Q3
Q4-positive DAC
Definition
BAHRs in four DAC 
quartiies
The mean value of benchmark-adjusted BAHRs in a quartile portfolio starting from the 
second trading day to an event year (/ = 1,2,3,4,5)
CARs in four DAC 
quartiies
The mean value of Cumulative Abnormal Returns in a quartile portfolio starting from the 
second trading day to an event year (/ = 1,2,3.4,5) less the market benchmark
Cut-off variable 
(DAC)
The average amount of industry-adjusted asset-scaled discretionary accruals (DAC) 
between the Y (-1) year and the Y (0) year
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Table 10-1: Industry-adjusted asset-scaled non-dlscretionary components of 
reported earnings
Panel A: Non-discretionary components
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y ( + 1 ) Y  (+2) Y  (+ 3 ) Y  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0.047***
(2.83)
-0.031*
(-1.64)
-0.015
(-1.29)
0.008
(0.93)
0.008
(0 .8 6 )
0 .0 0 1
(0.14)
Median
(Z-statistic)
0.006**
(2 .0 1 )
-0.049***
(2.97)
-0.027*
(1.73)
0 .0 0 1
(0.62)
0.006
(0.99)
0.008
(0.45)
Maximum 0.698 1.140 0.485 0.238 0.356 0.247
Minimum -0.462 -0.446 -0.500 -0.205 -0.310 -0.337
Standard
Deviation 0.167 0.192 0 .1 2 1 0.086 0 .1 0 1 0 .1 1 0
Panel B: A Non-discretionary components
( - l ) t o  (+1 ) (-1 ) to (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) (-1 ) to (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-0.063***
(-3.42)
-0.039**
(-2.19)
-0.039*
(-1.90)
-0.046**
(-2.45)
Median
(z-statistic)
-0.032***
(3.24)
-0.018*
(1.73)
-0.014*
(1.72)
-0.024**
(-2 .0 2 )
Maximum 0.356 0.387 0.476 0.483
Minimum -0.822 -0.761 -0.780 -0.726
Standard Deviation 0.183 0.178 0 .2 0 2 0.185
* ** *** Qenote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively 
Note: Reported earnings = Cashflow + Discretionary accruals + Non-discretionary accruals
Non-discretionary components = Cashflow + Non-discretionary accruals
= Reported earnings - Discretionary accruals
Definition
Non-discretionary
components
The sum of industry-adjusted assets-scaled non-discretionary accruals, which is 
computed by using the modified Jones (1991) model, plus industry-adjusted 
assets-scaled cashflow from operations
ANon-discretionary
components
The change in industry-adjusted assets-scaled Non-discretionary components in 
a particular post-IPO year relative to that in the pre-IPO year
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Table 10-2: Asset-scaled RPTs before and after the IPO
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+2) Y  (+ 3 ) Y  (+4)
Loan obtained 
(t-statistic)
2 .44%
(1.60)
1.14% ***
(3.09)
0 .63% ***
(3.22)
1.25% ***
(2.67)
0.43% ***
(4.19)
1.16% **
(2 .0 2 )
Loan offered 
(t-statistic)
0 .82% ***
(3.84)
4 .96% ***
(5.14)
3 .82% ***
(5 .01)
3 .46% ***
(4.51)
3 .35% ***
(4.36)
3.05% ***
(3.91)
Trade relationship 
(t-statistic)
19.46% ***
(5.21)
21.48% ***
(5.54)
13 .86% *** 
(5.58)
15.27% ***
(5.58)
12.78% ***
(5.35)
14.94% ***
(4.46)
Non monetary asset 
(t-statistic)
0.74%
(1.50)
2 .0 1 % **
(2.25)
1 .57% ***
(3.73)
1.71 % *** 
(2.84)
0.89% ***
(3.33)
2 .16% ***
(3.21)
Administrative service 
(t-statistic)
0 .65% ***
(4.39)
0.45% ***
(5.00)
0 .29% ***
(5.46)
0 .53% ***
(3.51)
0 .32% ***
(2.82)
0.38% ***
(3.00)
Royalty
(t-statistic)
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
Lease
(t-statistic)
0 .0 0 %
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
(1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 %
(1.48)
0 .0 0 %**
(2.38)
0 .0 0 % **
(2.30)
0 .0 0 %**
(1.92)
Total Amount 24 .18% ***(5.92)
30.15% ***
(6.74)
2 0 .1 2 % ***
(7.29)
22.19% ***
(7.42)
17.86% ***
(7.16)
21.78% *** 
(5.68)
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0 .05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Defin ition (actual amounts scaled by the lagged (-1) total assets):
1. Loan obtained The loans provided by controlling shareholders to their listed subsidiaries: loans guarantees should not be included, if not executed
2. Loan offered The loans provided by listed firms to their controlling shareholders; loans guarantees should not be included, if not executed
3. Trade relationship The sales and/or purchases of goods, products, and services between controlling shareholders and their listed subsidiaries
4. Non monetary asset
The sales and/or acquisitions of non-monetary assets between 
controlling shareholders and their listed subsidiaries, such as tangible 
and intangible assets
5. Administrative service
Expenses paid from controlling shareholders (or listed subsidiaries) to 
listed subsidiaries (or controlling shareholders) for obtaining 
administrative services and the use of private resources
6 . Royalty The annual expenses paid for the use of patents, permits and Franchises between controlling shareholders and listed subsidiaries
7. Lease The annual expenses paid for operating and financial leases between controlling shareholders and listed subsidiaries
8 . Total Amount The aggregate amount of related party transactions, which includes all the seven types of transactions
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Table 10-3: Descriptive statistics of the two RPT variables
Panel A: Net loans
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y ( + 1 ) Y  (+2) Y  (+3) Y  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0.44%
(0.82)
-3.73%***
(-4.32)
-3.24% ***
(-4.21)
-2.23%***
(-3.50)
-2.83%***
(-3.12)
-1.84%***
(-3.24)
Median
(z-statistic)
0 .0 0 %
(0.56)
-0.45%***
(4.75)
-0.27% ***
(4.77)
-0.16%***
(3.83)
-0.19%***
(3.24)
-0 .0 0 %*** 
• (3.12)
Maximum 36.23% 13.27% 9.35% 10.73% 3.35% 5.54%
Minimum -11.40% -47.45% -35.13% -37.09% -50.64% -38.62%
Standard Deviation 0.054 0.085 0.075 0.062 0.072 0.058
Panel B: Operating RPTs (non-loan RPTs)
Y (-1 ) Y ( 0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y  (+2) Y  (+3) Y  (+ 4 )
Mean
(t-statistic)
20.85% ***
(5.29)
24.26% ***
(8.43)
15.56% ***
(6.28)
17.56%***
(6 .1 2 )
13.97%***
(7.11)
1 7 .440 /0***
(5.05)
Median
(z-statistic)
3.32%***
(7.76)
6.97% ***
(10.24)
6.47% ***
(8 .0 0 )
5.67%***
(7.66)
4.96% ***
(6.98)
4.94% ***
(8 .0 0 )
Maximum 209.22% 260.76% 128.96% 130.36% 114.56% 222.90%
Minimum 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 % 0 .0 0 %
Standard Deviation 0.390 0.413 0.245 0.282 0.242 0.341
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition:
Net loan
The difference between loans provided by controlling shareholders to their 
listed subsidiaries and loans provided by listed subsidiaries to their controlling 
shareholders scaled by lagged (-1 ) total assets; loans guarantees should not 
be included, if not executed
Operating Items 
(Non-loan RPTs)
The aggregate amount of asset-scaled related party transactions, which 
exclude loan transactions, for example: the sales and/or purchases of goods, 
products, and services; non-monetary assets; royalties; administrative 
overheads and leases.
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Table 10-3: Descriptive statistics of RPT variables (continued)
Panel C: ANet loans
( - l ) t o  (+1 ) (-1 ) to (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) (-1 ) to (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-3.66%***
(-3.80)
-2.04%***
(-3.04)
-3.29%***
(-3.37)
-2.28%***
(2.65)
Median
(z-statistic)
-0.40%***
(4.99)
-0 .0 0 %***
(5.43)
-0 .1 0 %***
(6.08)
-0 .0 0 %***
(6.33)
Maximum 11.41% 11.14% 1 1 .1 2 % 10.60%
Minimum -44.50% -46.04% -60.06% -52.12%
Standard Deviation 0.095 0.086 0.096 0.086
Panel D; AOperatIng RPTs (non-loan RPTs)
( - l ) t o  (+ 1 ) (-1 ) to  (+2 ) (-1 )to  (+3) (-1 )to  (+4)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-5.27%*
(-1.81)
-3.36%
(-1.07)
-6 .8 8 %**
(-2.23)
-3.41%
(-0.85)
Median
(z-statistic)
0 .0 0 %***
(4.02)
0.05% ***
(3.16)
0 .0 0 %***
(2.97)
0 .0 0 %*"'
(4.78)
Maximum 75.06% 99.10% 97.23% 220.61%
Minimum -129.06% -120.03% -124.06% -132.41%
Standard Deviation 0.288 0.310 0.305 0.396
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition:
ANet loan The change in net loans from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to the post-IPO period (yearY+1; yearY+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
AOperating items 
(ANon-loan RPTs)
The change in non-loan RPTs from the pre-IPO period (year Y-1) to 
the post-IPO period (yearY+1; yearY+2; year Y+3; year Y+4)
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Table 10-4: Operating performance segregated by pre-IPO operating RPTs quartiies
Panel A: ROA figures
Quartiies Tests Y(-1) Y (0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Q1
(smaller)
Mean
(t-statistic)
7.16% ***
(5.76)
2.08% **
(2.59)
-0.85%
(-1 .1 1 )
1.15%
(1.57)
-0 .0 1 %
(-0.08)
-0.44%
(-0.53)
0 2 Mean(t-statistic)
10.23%***
(8.45)
3.64% **
(2.76)
-1.36%
(-1 .1 0 )
-0.59%
(-0.36)
-0.54%
(-0.53)
-1.91%
(-1.60)
0 3 Mean(t-statistic)
12.51%***
(6.06)
7.59% ***
(3.49)
-0 .1 0 %
(-0.07)
-0.83%
(-0.53)
-1.05%
(-0.72)
-1.83%
(-1.29)
0 4
(larger)
Mean
(t-statistic)
20.31% ***
(5.86)
14.25% ***
(3.02)
2.84%
(1.13)
0.65%
(0.39)
-0.18%
(-0.08)
1.87%
(0,90)
One-way 
AN OVA
F statistic 
(sig.)
6.50***
(0 .0 0 )
3.98**
(0 .0 1 )
1.52
(0.23)
0.51
(0.67)
0 .2 1
(0 .8 8 )
1.35
(0.27)* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Panel B: CFO figures
Quartiies Tests Y(-1) Y (0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2 ) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Q1
(smaller)
Mean
(t-statistic)
2.62% **
(2.38)
-5.64%*
(-1.85)
1.57%
(0.85)
3.56% **
(2 .2 2 )
-2.40%
(-1.48)
-1.08%
(-0.52)
0 2 Mean(t-statistic)
3.45%
(1.61)
0.54%
(0.23)
2.23%
(1.25)
-1.63%
(-1 .0 2 )
0.74%
(0.55)
1.89%
(1.45)
0 3 Mean(t-statistic)
3.67%
(1.52)
-2.64%
(-1 .0 1 )
-0.59%
(-0.39)
3.97%*
(1.80)
-1.07%
(-1.18)
-3.37%*
(-1.72)
0 4
(larger)
Mean
(t-statistic)
16.47%*
(1.95)
5.89%
(0.77)
3.48%
(0.96)
4.06%
(1.13)
2.15%
(1.29)
-0.29%
(-0.14)
One-way 
AN OVA
F statistic 
(sig.)
2.24*
(0.08)
1.28
(0.28)
0.51
(0.67)
1 .2 1
(0.30)
1 .8 6
(0.14)
1.36
(0.25)* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition:
Grouping variable 
(operating RPTs)
The aggregate amount of related party transactions other than loans 
and loans guarantees (which cover the sales and/or purchases of 
goods, products, services non-monetary assets and royalties and 
leases etc) between the Y (-1 ) year and the IPO year are scaled by the 
lagged (-1 ) total assets  ___
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Table 10-5: RPTs segregated by pre-IPO operating RPTs quartiies
Panel A: Operating RPTs
Quartiies Tests Y (-1) Year IPO Year Y (+1) Year Y (+2 ) Year Y (+3) Year Y (+4) Year
0 1
(smaller)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0.08% ***
(2.95)
5.04%**
(2.17)
6 .0 0 %*
(1.97)
3.01%***
(3.67)
3.89%**
(2.05)
2.61%***
(3.25)
0 2 Mean(t-statistic)
1.64% ***
(8.38)
7.77% **
(2.37)
5.49% ***
(3.09)
1 0 .2 0 %**
(2.24)
10.18%**
(2.42)
17.17%*
(1.93)
0 3 Mean(t-statistic)
9.40% ***
(8.54)
10.99%***
(6.98)
12.70%***
(5.93)
17.91%***
(4.41)
10.80%***
(4.62)
15.68%***
(4.07)
0 4
(larger)
Mean
(t-statistic)
76.84% ***
(7.60)
77.53% ***
(6.64)
40.16% ***
(5.26)
40.78% ***
(4.84)
32.55%***
(4.22)
35.85%***
(3.87)
One-way 
AN OVA
F statistic 
(sig.)
56.99***
(0 .0 0 )
33.57***
(0 .0 0 )
14.97***
(0 .0 0 )
1 0 .2 1 ***
(0 .0 0 )
7.54***
(0 .0 0 )
4.19***
(0 .0 0 )
Panel B: Net Loans
Quartiies Tests Y(-1)Year IPO Year
Y(+1)
Year
Y (+2) 
Year
Y (+3) 
Year
Y (+4) 
Year
Post-IPO
Average
Q1
(smaller)
Mean
(t-statistic)
0 .0 0 %
(0 .2 1 )
- 1 .6 6 %* 
(-2 .0 0 )
-0.60%
(-1.33)
-0.13%
(-0.41)
-0.41%
(-1.16)
-1.33%*
(-2 .0 0 )
.0.89%**
(-2 .2 1 )
0 2 Mean(t-statistic)
0.84%
(0.65)
-2.26%
(-1.63)
-3.94%***
(-2.81)
-3.58%***
(-3.24)
-3.14% ***
(-3.30)
-1.79%*
(-1.99)
-2.82%***
(-3.86)
0 3 Mean(t-statistic)
1.19%
(0.75)
-4.49% **
(-2.24)
-2.85%**
(-2.32)
-2.38%*
(-1.69)
-3.36%**
(-2.44)
- 1 .8 8 %
(-1.29)
-2.99%**
(-2.61)
0 4
(larger)
Mean
(t-statistic)
-0.23%
(-0.28)
-6.61% ***
(-2.95)
-4.36%**
(-2 .1 2 )
-3.68%*
(-1.73)
-4.52%*
(-1.89)
-2.56%
(-1.57)
-4.38%**
(-2.48)
One-way 
AN OVA
F statistic 
(sig.)
0.383
(0.76)
4.60***
(0 .0 0 )
1.16
(0.32)
1.54
(0 .2 0 )
2.15*
(0.09)
0.77
(0.51)
2.65*
(0.05)ŸC ** *** Denote significance {2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition:
Grouping variable 
(operating RPTs)
The aggregate amount of related party transactions other than loans and loans 
guarantees (which cover the sales and/or purchases of goods, products, 
services non-monetary assets and royalties and leases etc) in the Y (-1) year 
scaled by the lagged (-1 ) total assets
Post-IPO average The mean amount of asset-scaled net loans between the IPO year and the Y 
(+ 4 )year
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Table 10-6: Cross-sectional regression models on RPT variables
Model 1:
ROA^ = /?o + /^ i * Net _ lo  an ^ + A  * Operating _jtems^ + Size. 4-/?^  * Age.
+ / ? 5  * Capital_Q xpendittire. * Government_subsidy^ + A  * Ownership__type^ 
+ A  * Ownership_concentration. + A  * Board_Composition^ +  £•,.
Predicted
Sign
Coefficients
Before IPO 
(Y-1 year)
IPO year 
(Y+0 year)
After IPO 
(4 post-IPO years)
Intercept
(t-statistic) +/-
0.735**
(2.33)
-0.019
(-0.05)
-0.042
(-0.28)
RPT
N etjoan
(t-statistic) +
0.198
(0.81)
0.206
(1.13)
0.318***
(3.23)
variables Operatingjtems
(t-statistic) +
0.078**
(2.35)
0.083**
(2 .1 0 )
0.044
(1.67)
Size
(t-statistic) +
-0.062*
(-1 .8 6 )
0.006
(0.16)
-0 .0 0 1
(-0.09)
Age
(t-statistic) +
-0 .0 1 0
(-1.59)
-0.006
(-0.80)
0 .0 0 0
(0.07)
Control
variables
Capital_expenditure
(t-statistic) +
0.045
(0.59)
0.129**
(2 .1 0 )
-0 .0 0 0
(-0 .0 2 )
Government_subsidy
(t-statistic) +
-0.290
(-0.32)
0.534
(0.65)
0.564
(1.37)
Ownership_type
(t-statistic) -
-0.044
(-1.30)
-0.062
(-1.52)
-0.032**
(-2.04)
Ownership_concentration
(t-statistic) -
0.003
(0.03)
0.056
(0.43)
0.106**
(2.04)
Board_composition
(t-statistic) -
0.071
(1.59)
0.083
(1.49)
0.025
(1 .2 1 )
R" 18.3% 2 1 .0 % 27.3%
Adjusted R^ 9.9% 13.0% 19.9%
F Statistic 
(critical values, at 5% level)
2.19
(2.05)
2.61
(2.05)
3.68
(2.05)
White’s test (P-value) 0.29 0.16 0 .1 1
Sample Size 239 239 239
* ** *** Denote significance {2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Table 10-6: Cross-sectional regression models on RPT variables (continued)
Model 2:
CFO,. = A  + P\ Net _loan^ + A  * Operating_items^ + A  * Size^ + A  *
+ A  Capital_e.xpenditurej + A  * Government_subsid)r + A  * Ownership_type^ 
+ A  * Owmership _concentrationi + A  * Board ^ Composition^ + g.
Predicted Coefficients
Sign Before IPO IPO year After IPO
(Y-1 year) (Y+0 year) (4 post-IPO years)
Intercept 0.232 -0.032 -0.341**
(t-statistic) (0.65) (-0.05) (-2.05)
Net loan -0.374 0.837*** 0.286**
RPT (t-statistic) (-1 .2 1 ) (2 .8 8 ) (2.62)
variables Operatingjtems 0.082** 0.074 0.045
(t-statistic) (2.17) (1.18) (1.61)
Size -0.025 -0 .0 1 0 0.033*
(t-statistic) (-0.67) (-0.16) (1.91)
Age 0.003 -0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 1
(t-statistic) (0.52) (-0.05) (-0.53)
Capital_expenditure + 0 .1 1 1 0.053 0 .0 2 0
variables (t-statistic) (1 .0 0 ) (0.54) (0.54)Government_subsidy 0.406 1.682 0.667
(t-statistic) (0.40) (1.29) (1.45)
Ownershipjype -0.055 -0 .0 1 0 -0.008
(t-statistic) (-1.43) (-0.15) (-0.48)
Ownership_concentration 0.081 0.084 0.062
(t-statistic) (0.64) (0.40) (1.07)
Board_composition -0 .0 2 1 0.172* 0.028
(t-statistic) (-0.41) (1.91) (1 .2 0 )
R" 9.0% 16.4% 25.1%
Adjusted R^ -0.4% 7.8% 17.5%
F Statistic 0.95 1.91 3.29
(critical values, at 5% level) (2.05) (2.05) (2.05)
White’s test (P-value) 0.17 0.18 0.13
Sample Size 239 239 239
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Definition:
ROA Industry-adjusted EBITDA scaled by lagged (-1) total assets in a given year/period
CFO Industry-adjusted net Cashflow from Operations scaled by lagged (-1) total assets in a given year/period
Net loan
The loans by controlling shareholders to listed subsidiaries net 
of loans by listed subsidiaries to controlling shareholders in a 
given year/period scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
Operating items The operating RPTs in a given year/period scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
Size The normal logarithm of total assets at the end of the IPO year
Age The difference between the establishment year and the IPO year
Capital expenditure The capital investment (adjusting for depreciation charges) in a given year/period scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
Government subsidy The aggregate amount of government subsidy received in a given year/period scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
Ownership
concentration
The proportion of ownership held by the controlling shareholder 
at the end of the IPO year
Ownership type
The type of the controlling shareholder, which is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling shareholder is 
ultimately owned by the state at the end of the year; 0 otherwise
Board Composition The proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at the end of the IPO year.
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Table 10-7: Long-term stock performance regressed on RPT Variables
1. BAHR. = A  + A  * N N et_ loap  + A  * àOperatiiig__items^ + A  * Size  ^+ A  *
+ A  * àCapital_Qxpe}7ditnre^ + A  * b^Govemment_siibsidy + A  * Ownership_type^ 
+ A  0\mershîp_concentraton^ + A  ^ Board_Compositioi^ +<?,.
2 . = A  + A  * à N e t_ loa p  + A  * àO peratm g items^ + A  * +  A  *
+ A  ^àC ap ito l_oxpend îtiir^  + A  àGovernment_subsîdy + A  Ownership_type,
4-A  ^0\vnership_concentra iop  + A  ^ Board_ComposUioif + e .
Predicted Coefficients
Sign Model one Model two
Intercept
(t-statistic) +/-
-1.258
(-1.13)
-1.583
(-1.23)
RPT
ANetJoan
(t-statistic) +
0.473**
(2.51)
0.373*
(1.71)
variables AOperatingJtems
(t-statistic) +
0.184***
(4.01)
0.138**
(2.59)
Size
(t-statistic) +
0.156
(1.32)
0.170
(1.24)
Age
(t-statistic) +
-0 .0 2 0
(-0.94)
-0 .0 1 0
(-0.41)
Control
variables
AGapital_expenditure
(t-statistic) +
-0.156
(-1.23)
0.006
(0.03)
AGovernment_subsidy
(t-statistic) +
-0.969
(-0.63)
-0.054
(-0.36)
Ownershipjype
(t-statistic) -
-0.113
(-0.94)
-0.104
(-0.74)
Ownership_concentration
(t-statistic) -
-0.169
(-0.44)
-0.008
(-0 .0 1 )
Board_composition
(t-statistic) -
0.147
(0.92)
0.173
(0.93)
R" 34.7% 21.4%
Adjusted R^ 27.6% 12.9%
F Statistic 
(critical values, at 5% level)
4.90
(1.90)
2.52
(1.90)
White’s test (P-value) 0.16 0.79
Sample Size 239 239
Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
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Definition;
BAHR
The benchmark-adjusted post-IPO Buy-and-hold return 
starting from the second trading year up to four years in event 
time
CAR
The benchmark-adjusted post-IPO Cumulative Abnormal 
return starting from the second trading year up to four years in 
event time
ANet loan
The difference between net loans in the post-IPO period 
(between Y (0) year and Y (+3) year) and net loans in the Y (-1) 
year scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
AOperating items
The difference between the aggregate amount of post-IPO 
operating RPTs (between Y (0) year and Y (+3) year) and 
pre-IPO operating RPTs (Y (-1) year) scaled by lagged (-1) total 
assets
Size The normal logarithm of total assets at the end of the IPO year
Age The difference between the establishment year and the IPO year
ACapital expenditure
The average decline in capital expenditure from Y (-1) year to 
the post-IPO years (between Y (0) year and Y (+3) year), 
scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
AGovernment subsidy
The average decline in government subsidy from Y (-1) year to 
the post-IPO years (between Y (0) year and Y (+3) year), 
scaled by lagged (-1) total assets
Ownership
concentration
The proportion of ownership held by the controlling shareholder 
at the end of the IPO year
Ownership type
The type of the controlling shareholder, which is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the controlling shareholder is 
ultimately owned by the state at the end of the year; 0 otherwise
Board Composition The proportion of directors representing the controlling shareholder in the board at the end of the IPO year
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Table 10-8: RPTs segregated by firm characteristics 
Panel A: Ownership concentration
Portfolios StockCounts
Types of 
RPTs Y(-1) Y (0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Concentration ^30% 9
Net loans -0.55%(-1.45)
-1.52%
(-1.37)
-1.15%*
(-2.02)
-0.67%*
(-2.01)
-0.17%
(-0.73)
-0.17%
(-0.71)
(least concentrated) Operating
RPTs
2.15%
(1.53)
1.90%
(1.31)
1.25%
(1.11)
0.70%
(1.89)
11.77%
(1.03)
2.53%
(1.28)
30%< Concentration <50°/ 31
Net loans 3.36%(1.15)
-0.22%
(-0.16)
-4.63%
(-1.40)
-2.21%
(-1.46)
-2.36%*
(-1.84)
-0.07%
(-0.13)
Operating
RPTs
14.81%*
(1.95)
7.57%**
(2.41)
6.01%**
(2.32)
5.28%**
(2.25)
4.16%**
(2.22)
8.93%*
(2.11)
Concentration ^50% 199
Net loans 0.09%(0.17)
-4.37%***
(-4.35)
-3.10%***
(-3.98)
-2.27%***
(-3.16)
-3.07%***
(-3.59)
-2.20%***
(-3.13)
(most concentrated) Operating
RPTs
22.67%***
(4.97)
27.80%***
(5.70)
17.69%***
(6.12)
20.11%***
(6.05)
15.55%***
(5.46)
19.43%*“
(4.80)
* ** *** Denote significance (2-tai ed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respective y
Panel B: Independence of the board of directors
Portfolios Stockcounts
Types 
of RPTs Y(-1) Y (0 ) Y (+ 1 ) Y (+2) Y (+3) Y (+4)
Board ^30%  
(more independent) 88
Net loans 0.52%(0.65)
-0.71%
(-0.96)
-1.74%*
(-1.72)
-1.05% 
(1.56)
-1.30%*
(1.98)
-0.94%*
(1.86)
Operating
RPTs
10.99%**
(2.71)
12.75%***
(3.17)
7.86%***
(3.97)
13.23%***
(3.71)
7.41%***
(3.58)
6.05%***
(4.16)
30%<Board<50% 65
Net loans 1.41%(1.04)
-2.15%
(-1.58)
-1.47%**
(-2.19)
-2.15%*
(-1.94)
-2.54%**
(-2.12)
-2.57%*
(-1.99)
Operating
RPTs
24.08%**
(2.55)
21.86%***
(3.34)
15.64%***
(3.63)
16.26%***
(3.16)
15.77%***
(3.03)
25.06%**
(2.75)
Boards50%  
(less independent) 86
Net loans -0.32%(-1.00)
-8.11%***
(-4.37)
-6.07%***
(-3.55)
-3.43%**
(-2.50)
-4.74%***
(-2.82)
-2.24%*
(-1.87)
Operating
RPTs
28.55%***
(4.05)
37.98%***
(4.06)
23.51%***
(4.28)
22.86%***
(3.88)
19.35%***
(3.84)
23.32%***
(3.78)* ** *** Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
Definition:
Concentration The percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder in the listed firm at the end of the IPO 
y e a r ___________________
Board The proportion of board members (at the end of the IPO year) who represent the controlling 
shareholder, and hold a senior position in the controlling shareholder's entity simultaneously
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